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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petrs are the owners of the 
publication rights to "A Time to Heal," the memoirs of former 
President Ford. The rights held by petrs gave them exclsuive 
-------rights to publish and sell the Ford memoirs in book form and to _____ ____, 
license the right to publish excerpts in newspapers or periodicals 
prior to book publication. The memoirs were informal, based upon 
Ford's recollections without reliance on documents. Petrs 
licensed to Time magazine the exclusive right to publish excerpts 
from Chapters I and III, which Time's editor described as the 
"most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript." The 
excerpts were to appear in an issue of Time that was to go on sale 
on April 16, 1979. Time paid $12,500 upon signing the license 
agreement and was to pay another $12,500 upon its publication of 
the excerpts. The contract provided that Time could renegotiate 
the second installment in the event there was any publication from 
Chapters I and III before Time's. 
In March 1979, resps received a copy of the manuscript from a 
"clandestine source" who has never been identified. Resps took t:.__--------
excerpts from the book and rushed to print a 2,250-word cover 
story entitled, "The Ford Memoirs Behind the Nixon Pardon." 
The DC determined that approximately 83% of the story was copied 
or paraphrased from the unpublished manuscript. Resps received 
$418 from newsstand sales of the edition containing the article. 
Following the appearance of the article published by resps, 
/ 
Time sought permission from petrs to publish its excerpts a week 
earlier than origihally scheduled. Because of a "careful program 
coordinating the Time article and the book's release," petrs 
s~ 
(. 
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refused Time's request. Time thereafter did not publish any of 
the manuscript and refused to pay the second installment of 
$12,500. 
Petrs brought this suit in DC (S.D.N.Y.; Owen, J.) and were 
awarded $12,500 plus interest. On appeal, the CA2 reversed, with 
Judge Meskill dissenting. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs: Petrs contend that the CA2, in 
conflict with the holdings of other CAs, redefined and severely 
I 
lim} ed the scope of what is protectible under the copyright laws 
in a work of nonfiction. The CA2 held (a) that in works 
..._. · ~ -~, 
concerning news and history, the "troublesome" concept of 
expression must be limited to "its barest elements -- the ordering 
and choice of the words themselves" P.A. A19; (b) that facts 
coupled with expression cannot constitute a copyrightable 
totality, P.A. A21; and (3) that almost unlimited paraphrasing 
from a work of nonfiction is permissible, unless the copier has 
"borrowed virtually an entire work," P.A. Al7. r No other circuit has attempted to limit expression to its 
l \ barest elements. In Miller v. Universal Studios, 650 F.2d 1365 
(CA5 1981), the CA5 upheld an instruction to a jury that stated 
that while a general theme cannot be copyrighted, "its expression 
throughout the pattern of the work, the sequence of its events, 
the development of the interplay of its characters and its choice 
of detail and dialogue can be copyrighted." Id., at 1368. In 
United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 450 (CA9 1978), the CA9 
accorded protection to a mapmaker's "selection, arrangement and 
presentation" of terrain features. Prior decisions of the CA2 
~ 
l 
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have rejected the narrow definition of protectible expression now 
espoused by the majority. In Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall 
Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1014 (1978), a unanimous court stated, "What is protected is 
the manner of expression, the author's analysis or interpretation 
of events, the way he structures his material and marshals facts, 
his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular 
developments." Id., at 95. 
The ruling that fact coupled with expression cannot 
constitute a copyrightable totality conflicts with the holdings of 
other circuits on two counts. First, the unauthorized copying of 
works consisting primarily of factual material has been held to be 
an infringement by a number of circuits. Flick-Reedy Corp. v. 
( . Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (CA7 1965), cert. denied, 383 
U.S. 958 (1966) (mathematical data and formulae concerning 
hydraulic cylinders); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 
3 (CA7 1977) (selection, ordering, and arrangement of the names 
and addresses of suppliers of gardening materials); Leon v. 
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (CA9 1937) 
(telephone directory). Second, the majority's rejection of the 
totality concept is in direct conflict with a line of cases in the 
CA9. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 451 (CA9 
1978) ("when a work displays a significant element of 
compilation,that element is protectible even though the individual 
components of the work may not be, for originality may be found in 
taking the commonplace and making it into a new combination or 
arrangement"). 
(, 
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The holding that paraphrasing from a work of nonfiction 
J 
constitutes infringement ony if the copier "borrowed virtually an 
entire work" is in conflict with the holdings of several circuits. 
See, e.g., Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 
(CA7 1965) (finding infringement where dfdt had paraphrased 2 
pages of a 32-page booklet containing mathematical data and 
formulae); Meccano v. Wagner, 246 F. 603 (CA6 1916), aff'g 234 F. 
912 (S.D. Oh. 1916) (upholding finding of infringement based upon 
paraphrasing of some statements and descriptions in an instrument 
manual for mechanical toys). 
Underlying the majority's three holdings limiting 
copyrightability was its perceived need to "construe the 
copyrightability in accord with First Amendment freedoms." The 
majority feared that unless it limited the scope of copyright 
protection in the manner outlined above, an "individual could 
become the owner of an important political event merely by being 
the first to depict the event in words" and a public official 
could "take private possession of the most important details of a 
nation's historical and political life by adding language here and 
there on the perceptions or sentiments he experienced while in 
office and insisting that the work's entire contents are thereby 
made his alone by virtue of copyright." P.A. Al9, A21. But these 
fears are unfounded. The individual would not become the "owner" 
of the event by being the first to depict it in words. He would 
become only the owner of his own description of the event. And 
even that ownership is subject to the limitation of the doctrine 
of fair use. 
l 
( 
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The majority's fair use analysis did not strike the proper 
balance between the constitutionally-based policy of encouraging 
authorship and the First Amendment. The majority referred 
frequently to the "monopoly" of the author, but nowhere 
acknowledged the important public policy -- motivating the 
creative activity of authors and inventors, see Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, 104 s. Ct. 774, 782 (1984) -- underlying 
the monopoly. In addition, the majority downplayed authorship by 
defining what is protectible in such a way as to eliminate 
important elements of authorship. By reason of its arbitrary 
definition of authorship, the majority saw the case as involving 
only a "very limited use of copyrighted words" and the taking of a 
"meager, indeed infinitesimal amount of Ford's original language." 
P.A. A29, A30. On the free speech side of the balancing, the 
majority's analysis was equally defective. In the majority's 
view, application of the copyright laws to this use would "impede 
that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a democratic state." 
P.A. A4. The actions of resps did not facilitate the harvesting 
of knowledge. The material was about to be published in Time and, 
shortly thereafter, in book form. 
The CA2 holding significantly impairs a publisher's ability 
to license the publication of excerpts in advance of book 
publication. Publishers will know that if they circulate a 
manuscript to ascertain third-party interest in acquiring such 
rights, there is a real risk that someone will take for free what 
is being offered for sale. Thus, the dissemination of information 
will be adversely affected. As the dissenting judge stated, the 
• 
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only freedom the majority has advanced is the freedom to "chisel[] 
for personal profit." P.A. A48. 
The majority gave no weight to the facts that (a) the use was 
nonproductive and (b) the manuscript was unpublished. Apart from 
an introduction, which told of the publication plans for the book, 
and a conclusion, which promised a future article dealing with the 
ethics of what it had done, resps added only transition sentences 
and phrases to what they had lifted from the manuscript. The 
majority openly acknowledged that it gave no weight to the fact 
that the use was nonproductive. This holding is inconsistent with 
the Court's decision in Sony. The entire Court in Sony believed 
that whether or not a use is productive is an important factor in 
determining fair use. Indeed, the four dissenters believed that 
that factor was controlling. 104 s. Ct., at 807-808. The 
majority in Sony disagreed only as to whether the factor was 
determinative. Id., at 795, n. 40. There is no suggestion, in 
either opinion, that the nonproductive nature of the use is 
entitled to no weight at all. 
The majority also erred in ignoring the fact that the 
manuscript was unpublished. The legislative history of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 makes it clear that Congress intended that 
the distinction between published and unpublished works be a 
factor weighed in the fair use analysis. Thus, the Senate report 
states: 
"The applicability of the fair use doctrine to 
unpublished works is narrowly limited since, although 
the work is unavailable, this is the result of a 
deliberate choice on the part of of the copyright owner. 
• 
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Under ordinary circumstances, the copyright owner's 
right of first publication would outweigh any needs of 
reproduction for classroom purposes." S. Rep. No. 94-
473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975). 
Resps: The CA2 first reviewed the challenged article to 
determine to what extent the material petrs claimed had been 
copied was subject to copyright protection. In so doing, the CA2 
followed a long line of cases that have held that facts, material 
in the public domain, and material not original to an author are 
not copyrightable and that copyright liability consequently cannot 
flow from publishing such material. Adhering to the guidelines in 
the case law that distinguish between fact and expression, the CA2 
first concluded that, in addition to an author's language, 
protectible expression "exists, in part, in [an author's] overall 
(. arrangement of facts" and in the "structure he chooses for the 
work as whole." P.A. Al6. Applying that principle of law to the 
facts of this case, the CA2 concluded, "In this case, there can be 
no concern that this mode of expression was usurped; the article 
drew upon only scattered parts and not the total entity with its 
unique and protected mosaic." Ibid. Petrs disagree not with the 
CA2's statement of the law, but with the application of the law to 
the facts of this case. 
The decision of the CA2 is grounded in the least 
controversial and most clearly established of all propositions of 
copyright law: facts may not receive copyright protection. The 
CA2 did not hold that the totality of the manuscript was not 
copyrightable. It merely held that the presence of copyrightable 
"reflections" did not transform noncopyrightable fact into 
- -- 9 -
copyrightable expression. Nor did the CA2 hold, as petrs assert, 
that "the almost unlimited paraphrasing from a work of nonfiction 
is permissible, unless the copier has 'borrowed virtually an 
entire work.'" Pet. 10. What the CA2 did hold is that if 
"paraphrasing" means reporting facts revealed in a book without 
using the author's expression, then, indeed, paraphrasing does not 
violate any copyright rights held by the author. The CA2 stated, 
Here, The Nation drew on scattered pieces of information 
from different pages and different chapters, and then 
descibed that information in its own words." P.A. Al8. 
The purported conflict presented by petrs is fanciful. In the 
cases cited by petrs, the courts found for the pltffs because the 
dfdts had copied the entirety of the pltffs' manuals, with only 
minor alterations, and had passed the manuals off as their own. 
Petrs advance the argument that the article did not 
contribute sufficiently to society or was not sufficiently 
productive to justify the invocation of the privilege of fair use. 
The statute itself, however, includes news reporting as a 
presumptively fair use. 17 u.s.c. § 107. The CA2 panel was 
unanimous in holding that the DC's decision that the article was 
not news reporting was clearly erroneous. Nor was the CA2 
incorrect in deciding that it was error for the DC to hold that, 
in order that a use be fair, news must be "hot" enough to overcome 
a copyright violation. If that were the law, courts would be 
obliged to enter the thicket of determining how much benefit 
publishing a particular article conferred on the public. The CA2 
properly refrained from basing its decision upon its own 
- -- 10 -
subjective views of whether the journalism in the article was good 
or poor. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 
366 F.2d 303, 304, 307 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 
(1967); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 191 (CA2 1981) 
(Mansfield, J. dissenting): cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
Petrs' reliance on Sony is misplaced. Even the dissent in 
Sony states that news reporting is a presumptively productive use. 
104 S. Ct., at 807 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissenting). Similarly, 
petrs take a statement from the legislative history of§ 107 out 
of context. Petrs contend that the legislative history shows that 
fair use should be limited with respect to unpublished works. A 
closer look at the legislative history shows that the statement 
was made in the course of explaining that if a work is out of 
print, "the user may have more justification for reproducing it," 
but that this presumption that a use is fair will not apply if the 
work is purposely unpublished. s. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 64 (1975). Because the CA2 did not rely upon the 
unavailability of the memoirs as a factor in favor of a finding of 
fair use, this passage is not even relevant. 
--n....O 
4. DISCUSSION: Petrs have not presented any square 
conflict. Both the majority and the dissent in the CA2 point out 
that the requisite analysis in this case is fact-specific and is 
of the sort that must be done on a case-by-case basis. Although I 
am not convinced that the result here is correct, I do not see a 
clear-cut issue of law that the Court should address if it were to 
I 
grant cert in this case. 
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5. RECOMMENDATI0N: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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.Memorandum for the File 
No. 83-1632, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. and Readers Digest v. 
Nation Enterprises 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
This is the copyright/First Amendment case involving the 
memoirs of former President Ford published in book form as 
"A Time to Heal". Shortly before publication of the book, respon-
dents - actually the Nation magazine - received a copy of the 
manuscript from a clandestine source (the source has not been 
identified). On a crash basis, the Nation used the book manu-
script to write and publish the substance of a portion of the 
book. 
The book - 655 pages long - contained about 200,000 words. 
The Nation's summary was 2,250 words entitled "The Ford Memoirs: 
Behind the Nixon Pardon". The book had been copyrighted, and 
Ford had assigned the publication rights to petitioners. The 
/ oc held that the Nation's article quoted and paraphrased material 
from the book that was properly copyrighted, and that the 
fair use doctrine was not applicable. v CA 2 reversed (2 to 1) 
in an opinion by Judge Kaufman. It held that most of the 
material quoted and paraphrased by the Nation was not properly 
protected under the copyright laws, and that the portion of the 
book - found to be relatively minor portions - subject to being 
copyrighted could be ~eproduced by the Nation under the "fair 
use doctrine". 
• 
- -
No. 83-1632 2. 
The opinion by Judge Kaufman and Judge Meskill's dissent 
alby present the arguments "pro and con". Also the briefs of 
the parties are by competent counsel, including Floy d Abrams 
for respondents (conceded by Mr. Abrams himself to be the best 
First Amendment lawyer in the country ). 
The arguments based on the Copyright Act and decisions 
under it, are not readily summarized. The First Amendment is 
not emphasized by the courts below, although the public policies 
underlying freedom of the press are central to respondents' 
position. 
I will want my clerk's views. But confess that - at least 
as of now - I have a rather strong bias in favor of petitioners' 
position. Respondents, relying on Judge Kaufman's opinion, say 
that the critical ~ inction in applying the Copyright Act is 
between "expression" and "information". Respondents argue that 
publication of "facts, information or news" is not copyrightable, 
and that what Ford says are newsworthy facts. To the extent that 
some portions of the article may have been within the Copyright 
Law, respondents argue its publication was permissable under the 
"fair use" doctrine. It seems to me that Judge Meskill satisfac-
torily answers these arguments. 
• 
- • 
No. 83-1632 3. 
In terms of the broader social and public policies impli-
cated in this important case, if CA 2's decision is affirmed 
it is doubtful whether the memoirs of any public figure could 
be protected under the copyright laws. This would deter the 
writing of memoirs. This would not invariably be a detriment 
to history (too many self-serving memoirs are published of 
little historic value), but there are memoirs of enormous his-
toric significance (e.g. those of Winston Churchill). Nor, 
certainly in this case, was the public deprived of any "hard 
news'' as the Nation had full knowledge that the book was forth-
coming, and it rushed its own publication out to achieve a 
"scoop." 
Nor in my view does the Nation come into Court with 
entirely "clean hands". I have never been persuaded by the 
media's claim of total entitlement to publish stolen informa-
tion, and often to encourage the thieving. In this case, 
I also agree with Judge Meskill's final sentence to the effect 
that the only "chill" of information was respondents' 
"chiseling for personal profit". But I suppose the copy-
right laws are not designed to regulate ethics, and so I 
will be interested in my clerk's view as to which of the 
contending positions would constitute the basis for a 
principled opinion. 
k 1-f. 
L.F.P. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Lynda 
October 29, 1984 
No. 83-1632 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises 
Question Presented 
To what extent does the fair use doctrine protect 
copying, for purposes of news reporting, of portions of a 
work of nonfiction, when the material was taken from an 
unpublished manuscript that was soon to be published, and 
the copying was unauthorized? 
,/ 
- - 2. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Although §102 of the Copyright Revision Act of 
1976 ("Act"), 17 u.s.c. §102, provides copyright protection 
for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression," it also provides that that protection ---- -- · 
does not extend_ to_ any @§, "regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied" 
in a work. This exclusion from copyright protection of ----------
ideas fjijgenera l ly2.,_been h_eld applicable to [facts,] as well. 
Section 106 of the Act provides for the copyright 
owner's exclusive rights to use or authorize the use of the 
copyright in reproductions, derivative works, and in other 
ways. Section 107 provides that notwithstanding these 
exclusive rights, "the fair use of a copyrighted work 
for purposes such as er i tic ism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an 
an 
/J. -~,1 
~ 
0,,t,f -
~i.h 
~ 
a-+-{_ 
·-~ 
infringement of copyright." The section lists the following 
~ factor~ to be considered in deciding whether 
~ 
~~~v' 
unauthorized use of a c-;pyr ightis "fair use": ---- ----
~ 
(1) t he purpose and character of the use, \l 
including whether such use is of a ' commercial 
1 
nature or is for nonprori t educational purposes; 
l ? - -:::- -- - -/}1_,?/~L,) (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
1-' J,A ~ ) the amount and ~ubstantiality of the portion 
,4,,t,VV-..... used in relation to tfie copy'r ighted work as a 
~, whole; and 
• 11~1-.,._ 
~~r 
(4) the effect of the use upon the ~ential 
market ~fo r or v alue of the copyr ighte d wor • 
~ 1-o 
1,(~ 
~ ",' 
-;i, 0 
- - 3. 
The fair use doctrine B°9enerallyA been considered to be a 
means of accommodating the conflicting rights of copyright 
owners to exclusive use of copyrighted material, and the 
public interest in access to the material. 
B. Facts and Decisions Below 
In 1977, former President Ford entered into a 
publishing contract with petrs, granting them the exclusive 
rights to publish and sell his memoirs, yet to be written, ----
in book form and to license the right to publish excerpts in ( p-µ- -
~--- --===--- ------------- ) ~~ 
newspapers or periodicals _1>rior to the book's publication.  
A manuscript was prepared, excerpts of which were scheduled 
for publication in Time magazine the week of April 23, 1979, 
with the book to be released shortly thereafter. In late 
March 1979, an undisclosed source put Victor Navasky, the 
editor of Nation magazine, into unauthorized possession of 
Ford's manuscript. Navasky hurriedly prepared an article 
based on the manuscript, which appeared on the newstands on 
April 3, 1979. 
~ 1 - As a result of the Nation 
~~ ~ ~,.,v;_ts contract to publish excerpts of the book and refused to 
1'"'~ pay $12,500 it still owed petrs. Petrs brought suit in DC 
• 
(SONY-Owen) charging resps with copyright infringement and 
certain state law violations, the latter of which were 
dismissed and are not at issue in this Court. The DC ruled LY(_ 
for petrs, finding the manuscript to be protected by 
-
copyright and the Nation's article 
the meaning of §107 of the Act. 
- 4. 
not a "fair use" within 
CA2 (Kaufman & Pierce) reversed. Dissecting the 
Nation article into its component parts and finding much of 
what was copied to be "facts," it concluded that only about 
1uvl-
~ 
/.,.V1.-,-<-
C JL/ -z_ ___,, 
1 
r;y-o 300 words were 
~k..l~_ small portion 
copyrightable. Finding the use of such a 
~~ 
~ ' 
• 
concluded that 
of 
the 
Ford's 
Nation 
work to 
article 
be insubstantial, it 
constituted fair use. 
§ e Meskill dissented/ on the ground that Ford's expression 
was copyrightable, and that the Nation had infringed the 
copyright 
expression. 
by copying or paraphrasing much of that 
Viewing the Nation's acquisition of the 
manuscript as unauthorized, and emphasizing the fact that 
the manuscript was soon to be published, Judge Meskill 
concluded that the use was not fair because its only purpose 
was to "chisel[] for personal profit." 
II. Discussion 
Judge Kaufman viewed this case as presenting the 
classic conflict between copyright law and the First 
Amendment: the copyright owner's right under the statute to 
exclusive use of his work versus the public's right to 
" 
~ 
access. Judge Kaufman considered the public's right to ~ , 
access to be even greater than usual in this case, where a /Y"l-j).J-/ 
nonfiction work concerning political figures and issues 
important to our nation were involved. These views go a 
- - 5. 
long way toward explaining the result CA2 reached in its 
opinion below. As the following discussion will 
demonstrate, however, CA2 misconstrued the copyright law and 
overestimated the extent to which the First Amendment 
concerns are implicated. 
A. What Constitutes Infringement 
There is no dispute about the fact 
manuscript, as a whole, is a copyrightable 
that Ford's 
work. The 
~ 
th.~ 
~ 
vt-
question is whether the portion that the Nation used in its ~ -
article constituted "copying" sufficient to amount to ~ LI-,~ 
infringement of the copyright. Professor Nimmer states that 
• 
the determination of infringement depends on whether the 
copy and the source are "substantially 
Nimmer, On Copyright §13. 03, at 13-18. 
similar." 3 M. 
Literal word-for-
word copying is not required for a finding of infringement; 
"11 1 J~ . 
~ . : paraphrasing also may be sufficient, and thus, 
~ ~ "(d] uplication or [even] 
~ 
near identity is not necessary to 
~ establish infringement." 
w~ 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. , 562 F. 2d 115 7, 1167 
,... ~ 
~ (CA9 1977). See Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 
F. 2d 9 0 5, 913 ( CA2 19 8 0) • On the other hand, bearing in 
mind the exclusion in §102(b) of the Act of copyright 
' \ 
Jl H ~ protection for facts or ideas, a similarity that is based 
~ • .uV'v solely on the duplication of facts or abstract ideas, .,~.,,. 
~~ without duplication of · the structure of the original work or 
• ~ the manner of expression, is not prohibited. ~. Atari, 
• 
~ 
JI (Y"lA 
ff'! ,~ 
- - 6. 
Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 
672 F.2d 607, 615 (CA7 1982) . A~ dge Learned Hand notei) 
decisions about what degree of similarity constitutes 
infringement "must invariably be ad hoc." Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (CA2 
1960) • 1 
The degree of substantial similarity sufficient to 
constitute infringement traditionally has been more narrowly 
viewed in the case of nonfiction, because uncopyr ightable 
facts, instead of a copyrightable fiction plot, are 
primarily involved. This is particularly true in cases in 
which a topic of historical or political interest is 
concerned, because of the perceived greater public interest 
in access to such matters. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc • 
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (CA2 1966); 
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. 
Rev. 983, 1012 (1970). 
CA2 acknowledged the existence of these principles 
but, I believe, erred in applying them. - In its zeal to 
protect the public's right of access, which, as I will 
discuss below, is not even in danger in this case, the court 
misapplied the law and gave insufficient weight to President 
~✓ 
;~ 1cA2 has held that the rules for determining substantial 
· similarity are the same under both the 1909 and the 1976 
Copyright Acts. Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 
F.2d 905, 912 note 10 (CA 1980). Hence, citations to 
opinions prior to the the 1976 Act are relevant on this 
point. 
• 
~ 
• 
~ 
~ 
• 
- - 7. 
Ford's rights to ~ xclusive use of his '
1
manner of expressing 
hist~rical facts. "'- (cl/--:;-~-~n"-uf_t.:f ft) 
First, CA2 improperly ruled that facts coupled 
with expression cannot constitute a copyrightable totality. 
CA2 reasoned that permitting President Ford to have 
copyright protection for his impressions of historical facts 
would permit him to have a private monopoly on fact at the 
public's expense. CA2's fears are 
If \ ) 
historical facts about which Ford wrote are, always have a-,,-,,{. 
ungrounded. ~ }~ 
------------- ~ been, and always will be, accessible to the public. Nothing i-0 
p~ nted the Nation or anyone else from ~ ng about the ~ 
same historical facts. Likewise, nothing would have 
prevented the Nation from writing about the fact that Ford 
recorded his impressions of those facts. The Nation would 
also have been free to describe, in its own words, what 
Ford's impressions were. What the copyright laws forbid is 
what the Nation did here: literally copying and slightly 
:---- -- - = ::::: , 
paraphrasing Ford's own 
-....---.:._..~ 
expressi:on - of his views - on the ,,.. -- ~ 
historical fact ~ That expression is explicitly protected by 
- ,_Jo 
§102(b) of the Act. A close examination of the comparison 
between the Ford manuscript and the Nation article in 
Appendix E to the petn for cert leaves me in no doubt that 
§":: tw~ a__r e substantially simil~ and that the Nation has 
infringed Ford's copyright. 
CA2 seeks to overcome this conclusion by engaging 
in a word-by-word dissection of the Ford manuscript to 
determine which parts are copyrightable and which parts are 
I 
~ 
• 
- - 8. 
not. Its analysis resulted in a conclusion that only 300 
words of the Nation article were copyrightable by Ford. 
CA2's approach is artificial, however, and contrary to the 
more logical view of most circuits that the only way to 
determine substantial similarity is to consider the J otali±y 
of the o_r_k in COillQa the two. ----- ~-, Apple 
Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387-388 
(CA5 1984): Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. 
v. McDonald's Corp., supra, 562 F.2d, at 1169. Even CA2 had 
previously espoused this view. See Jeweler's Circular 
Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). 
As part of its dissection, the court also 
improperly ruled that paraphrasing may only constitute 
infringement where virtually the entire work was used. In 
this case, only scattered portions and a relatively small 
percentage of the whole was used: therefore, the court 
concluded, the paraphrasing was not infringing. This 
conclusion is contrary, however, to settled law in other 
circuits that has never required that the majority of a work 
be paraphrased befo may be found. ~-, 
Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (CA7 
(2 pages of a 32-page booklet paraphrased constitutes 
~ 
~{~ 
Nation article 
The testimony at trial demonstrated that the l ~ 
drew from the r:ear t of Ford's manuscript i J ~c.,,,,,-/-' 
-1, 
1-vvz(; 
reproducing only the most interesting parts. 
~~, 
- - 9. 
Aside from being contrary to the law in other 
circuits, CA2 's rule is contrary to logic and good sense. ~ 
That rule would provide holders of copyrights in nonfiction 
works almost no protection, since all but complete 
IL duplications of those works would be deemed noninfr ing ing 
~ uses. Although CA2 states that this rule is necessary to 
..,,~rotect the First Amendment interests at stake, ultimately 
~ ~ the public would be harmed because authors would no longer 
~ 
• 
have the incentive of exclusive economic rights to spur them 
to produce nonfiction works for the public to read. See 
Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. 
Copy. 560, 586 (1982). 
In sum, CA2's conclusion that copyrightable 
expression in a nonfiction work must be limited to its 
"barest elements" fails to give proper protection to the 
author's work and creativity. It is ~ ssible to strike a 
more reasonable balance by protecting the author from -------------------_._) 
wholesale paraphrasing of his original thoughts on ---------historical facts. This approach leaves intact the public's 
access to the facts contained in a work of nonfiction and to 
original description of what the copyrighted work contains. 
At the same time, it protects the author's right to reap the 
economic rewards of his creative work. This more reasonable 
---------b ~ e will, as noted above, ultimately benefit the public 
more than CA2's rule, which might have the effect of 
discouraging nonfiction writers from future creative work. 
- - 10. 
contend that even if their article would 
ordinarily be an infringement, it constitutes 11 fair use 11 
I ( ~~ 
under §107 of the Act because it is news reporting. It is 
,,______ 
true that that section specifically mentions news reporting 
as an example of a use that might be fair, and hence, not an 
, . . A fringement. The DC had found that the Nation article was 
pl ~ an infringement beca: s-::--;;--:as not "news." CA2 ruled that 
p . this finding was clearly erroneous because the testimony 
"~ ->, revealed that Navasky' s purpose in publishing the article r was news reporting, and it concluded that the DC had 
essentially substituted its own view of what was good 
journalism for this undisputed evidence. Even if we assume, 
I 
• 
however, that the Nation article was news reporting, 
labeling it as such does not result in an automatic 
determination that the use is fair, because §107 provides 
the four factors, listed above in Part I.A, supra, which ---------considered in making that determination. 
CA? gave short shrift to these factors. First, it 
ruled that the fact that the article was published for 
profit was legally irrelevant because the use offered some 
benefit to the public. Second, CA2 ruled that the nature of 
I 
the copyrighted work was primarily factual, and hence, not 
subject to copyright protection for the reasons discussed 
earlier in its opinion. Third, CA2 ruled that an 
insubstantial part of the manuscript was used, relying on 
its conclusion that only 300 copyrightable words had been 
~ 
• 
-
used by the Nation. Finally, 
economic impact of such a small 
- 11. 
CA2 concluded that the 
use was dubious and that 
"the copyright owner's monopoly must not be permitted to 
prevail over a journalist's communication" where "important 
matters of state" are concerned. (CA2's opinion, Petn App. 
at A-29.) 
CA2 's consideration of the fair use factors has 
) ~ 
~Cit- /been '1taint~d i by what I believe to be its erroneous 
~,,\~conclusion about what constitutes infringement. Considering 
~~ the use by the Nation to have been an infringement, for the 
~ 
k 
• 
reasons discussed above in Part II.A, supra, the proper 
analysis is to employ the fair use factors to determine 
whether that infringement should nonetheless be tolerated to 
strike the necessary balance between copyright's 
restrictions on public access and the First Amendment. 
Under this analysis, it must be acknowledged for 
purposes of the first factor that the nature of the use was 
commercial, not for nonprofit educational uses or other 
similarly purely altiuistic desi r es to expose the public to 
the information. Navasky admitted at t r ial that his purpose 
and haste in publishing the article was to "scoop" Harper & 
Row and Time. 
Second, the nature of the copyrighted work is, as 
noted, biographical nonfiction, in which the public 
is considered to have the greatest interest in 
access. Countervailing this second factor, however, is the 
third criterion--the amount and substantiality of the 
(!) 
@ 
- - ~ 
·~~~:J 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
As discussed above, the testimony at trial was, and 
L --------------- , comparison of the works reveals, that the Nation effectively 3 
~ 3Jie ~ s ~n~! ~ ~ rd~ s= ~ uscripi) - Fi;;;ily, the 
effect of the Nation's use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work was to ~ l the author's a.. ~ t 
right of first publication and his ability to license that 
right, and consequently to decrease the copyright's value as 
a hitherto undisclosed first-hand view of important 
historical events. 
CA2's argument that uses such as the Nation's must 
be permitted to protect the public's right of access to such 
an important manuscript carries no weight in these i-------------
circumstances, where the ~Time article was scheduled 
published within two weeks of the Nation article, and the 
book was sc fl eauled ~ be released shortly thereafter. 
Moreover, CA2 failed to give effect to the fact that fair 
use is an equitable doctrine. s. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976). Nation knew that it received the 
,()~ , manuscript from an unauthorized sou~ . Its stated purpose 
\ 1/vO . h t'l . h . h ~ in as i y preparing t e article was to "scoop" t e 
,
1 
copyright holders. These facts must be considered in 
deciding whether its use was fair. 
• 
Finally, CA2 failed to give proper weight to the 
fact that the manuscript was unpublished at the time the 
Nation used it. The legislative history makes clear that 
• 
• 
- - 13. 
the fair use defense must be construed narrowly when the 
work is unpublished because "although the work is 
unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on 
the part of 
circumstances 
the 
the 
copyright 
copyright 
owner. 
owner's 
Under 
'right 
ordinary 
of first 
publication' would outweigh any needs of [fair use]." S. 
Rep. No. 94-473, supra, at 64. 2 This approach is reasonable 
not only because the statute recognizes the author's 
exclusive right to first publication, see §106(3), but 
because it protects the author's right to publish only his 
finished product. Permitting another to publish first an 
unauthorized unpublished manuscript carries with it the risk 
that the author has not finished the work. Finally, in this 
case, there was no danger that the public would not be 
permitted access to important historical information. Most 
of the facts were already public, and Ford's impressions of 
those facts as revealed in the manuscript were shortly to be 
published, as the Nation well knew. Therefore, the First 
Amendment interests with which CA2 was so ardently concerned 
were not even at risk. 
2Resps and one amicus contend that because the Senate 
Report's statement does not appear in the House Report, in 
fact the fair use doctrine should not be applied more 
narrowly in the case of unpublished works. As petrs point 
out in their reply brief, however, the House had endorsed 
this concept in two prior reports, and in the 1976 Report, 
referred to the prior reports's analysis of the fair use 
doctrine as still applicable. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra, 
at 67 • 
• 
- - 14. 
Conclusion 
CA2 is surely right that a balance must be struck 
between the author's interest in exclusive rights to his 
copyright and the public's right to access guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. But in a case in which the First Amendment 
t---------- ---------
concerns are not at risk, it makes no sense to deprive the 
author of the r~~~~~ publication of his hard work 
and creativity, when that work is copyrightable. BecauseJ 
CA2 misconstrued the requirements of the copyright law and ~ 
misperceived the nature of the balance that must be struck 
in this case, I recommend that you vote to reverse • 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1632 
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. AND THE READ-
ER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONERS 
v. NATION ENTERPRISES AND THE NATION 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[January - , 1985] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider to what extent the "fair 
use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 
U. S. C. § 107 (hereinafter the Copyright Act) , sanctions the 
unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpub-
lished manuscript. In April 1977, an undisclosed source pro-
vided The Nation magazine with the unpublished manuscript 
of "A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford." 
Working directly from the :e_urloined manu~ t, an editor of 
The Nation produced a short piece entitled "The Ford Mem-
oirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon." The piece was timed to 
"scoop" an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time maga-
zine. Time had agreed to purchase the exclusive right to 
print prepublication excerpts from the copyright holders, 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (hereinafter Harper & Row) 
and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (hereinafter Reader's 
Digest). As a result of The Nation article, Time cancelled its 
agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright ac-
tion against The Nation. ~ ~~ ~ SP~o~ Circuit re-
versed the lower court'sf"pn in ;r(nfijnymen( olding that 
The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use' of the copy-
righted material. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --
(1984), and we now reverse. 
,, 
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I 
In February 1977, shortly after leaving the White House, 
former President Gerald R. Ford contracted with petitioners 
Harper & Row and The Reader's Digest, to publish his as yet 
unwritten memoirs. The memoirs were to contain "signifi-
cant hitherto unpublished material" concerning the Water-
gate crisis, Mr. Ford's pardon of former President Nixon and 
"Mr. Ford's reflections on this period of history, and the mo-
rality and personalities involved." App. to Petn for Cert. 
C-14 - C-15. In addition to the right to publish the Ford 
memoirs in book form, the agreement gave petitioners the 
exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts, known in 
the trade as "first serial rights." Two years later, as the 
memoirs were nearing completion, petitioners · negotiated a 
prepublication licensing agreement with Time, a weekly 
news magazine. Time agreed to pay $25,000, $12,500 in ad-
vance .and an additional $12,500 at publication, in exchange 
for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's account 
of the Nixon pardon. The issue featuring the excerpts was 
timed to appear approximately one week before shipment of 
the full length book version to bookstores. Exclusivity was 
an important consideration; Harper & Row instituted proce-
dures designed to maintain the confidentiality of the manu-
script, and Time retained the right to renegotiate the second 
payment should the material appear in print prior to its re-
lease of the excerpts. 
Two to three weeks before the Time article's scheduled re-
lease, an unidentified person secretly brought a copy of the 
Ford manuscript to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, a 
political commentary magazine. Mr. N avasky knew that his 
possession of the manuscript was not authorized and that the 
manuscript must be returned quickly to his "source" to avoid 
discovery. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (SDNY 1983). He hast-
ily put together what he believed was "a real hot news story'' 
composed of quotes , paraphrases and facts drawn exclusively 
from the manuscript. Ibid. Mr. Navasky attempted no in-
#/ 
> 
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dependent commentary, research or criticism, in part be-
cause of the need for speed if he was to "make news" by "pub-
lish[ing] in advance of the publication of the Ford book." 
App. 416-417. The 2,250 word article, reprinted in the Ap-
pendix to this opinion, appeared on April 3, 1979. As a re-
sult of The Nation's article, Time cancelled its piece and re-
fused to pay the remaining $12,500. 
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, alleging conversion, tortious 
interference with contract and violations of the Copyright 
Act. After a six day bench trial, the District Judge found 
that "A Time to Heal" was protected by copyright at the time 
of The Nation publication and that respondent's use of the 
copyrighted material constituted an infringement under the 
Copyright Act, § 106 (1),(2)/and (3), protecting respectively 
the right to reproduce the work, the right to license prepara-
tion of derivative works, and the right of first distribution of 
the copyrighted work to ·the public. App. to Petn for Cert. 
C-29-C-30. The District Court rejected respondent's argu-
ment that The Nation's piece was a "fair use" sanctioned by 
§ 107 of the Act. Though billed as "hot news," the article 
contained no new facts. The magazine had "published its ar-
ticle for profit," taking "the heart" of "a soon-to-be-pub-
lished" work. This unauthorized use "caused the agreement 
with Time to be aborted and thus diminished the value of the 
copyright." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. Although certain ele-
ments of the Ford memoir, such as historical facts and memo-
randa, were not per se copyrightable, the District Court held 
that it was "the totality of these facts and memoranda col-
lected together with Ford's reflections that made them of 
value to The Nation, [and] this totality ... is protected by 
the copyright laws." Id., at 1072-1073. The court awarded 
actual damages of $12,500. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- ~ 
cuit reversed. The majority recognized that Mr. Ford's ver-
batim "reflections" were original "expression" protected by --~---:. ___ . 
~ 
,I 
~A'"2-...._____, 
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C2Pyright. ~ it held that the District Court had erred in 
assuimng the coupling [of these reflections] with 
uncopyrightable facttransformed that information into a 
copyrighted 'totality."' 723 F. 2d 195, 205 (1983). The ma-
jority noted that copyright attaches to expression, not facts 
or ideas. It concluded that, to avoid granting a copyright 
monopoly over the facts underlying history and news, "'ex-
pression' [in such works must be confined] to its barest ele-
ments-the ordering and choice of the words themselves." 
Id., at 204. Thus similarities between the original and the 
challenged work traceable to the copying or paraphrasing of 
uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memo-
randa and other public documents, and quoted remarks of 
third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating whether the 
second author's use was fair or infringing. 
"When the uncopyrighted material is stripped away, the 
article in The Nation contains, at most, approximately 
. 300 words that are copyrighted. · These remaining para-
graphs and scattered phrases are all verbatim quotations 
from the memoirs which had not appeared previously in 
other publications. They include a short segment of 
Ford's conversations with Henry Kissinger and several 
other individuals. Ford's impressionistic depictions of 
Nixon, ill with phlebitis after the resignation and pardon 
and of Nixon's character, constitute the major portion of 
this material. It is these parts of the magazine piece on 
which [the court] must focus in [its] examination of the 
question whether there was a 'fair use' of the copy-
righted matter." Id., at 206. 
Examining the four factors enumerated in§ 107, see infra, at 
--, the majority found the purpose of the article was "news 
reporting," the original work was essentially factual in na-
ture, the 300 words appropriated were insubstantial in rela-
tion to the 2,250 word piece, and the impact on the market for 
the original was minimal as "the evidence [did] not support a 
finding that it was the very limited use of expression per se 
- -
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which led to Time's decision not to print the excerpt." The 
Nation's borrowing of verbatim quotations merely "len[t] 
authenticity to this politically significant material . . . com-
plementing the reporting of the facts." Id. , at 208. The 
Court of Appeals was especially influenced by the "politically 
significant" nature of the subject matter and its conviction 
that it is not "the purpose of the Copyright Act to impede 
that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a democratic 
state" or "chill the activities of the press by forbidding a cir-
cumscribed use of copyrighted words." Id., at 197, 208. 
II 
A 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that copm ght is in-
tended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowl-
edge. But we believe , the S~cond Circuit gave insufficient 
deference to the'~cheme established by the Copyright Act for 
fosterin the original works that provide the seed ana s b-
stance of this harvest. The rights conferred y copyright 
are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge 
a fair return for their labors. Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1976). In using gener-
ous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript 
to lend authenticity to its account of the forthcoming mem-
oirs, The Nation~ ffectiv~.11,rrogated to itself the rig1it of 
firs~ on, an important marketable subsidiary right. 
Dimer the ~crrcumstances of this case, we find that The Na-
tion's use of the copyrighted manuscript, even stripped to the 
verbatim quotes conceded by The Nation to be copyrightable 
expression, W§_neitber aiair use of the copyrightable mate-
rial nor necessary to advance the public interest in dissemina-
tion of informat10n. 
.Alticle I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that: 
"The Congress shall have the power ... to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
J1'l 
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ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
As we noted last Term, "[this] limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their gen~ after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., -- U.S. --, -- (1984). 
"The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the indi-. 
vidual author in order to benefit the public." Id., at --
( dissenting opinion). This principle applies equally to works 
of fiction and non-fiction. The book at issue here, for exam-
ple, was two years in the making, and began with a contract 
giving the author's copyright to the publishers in exchange 
for their services in producing and marketing the work. In 
preparing the book, Mr. Ford drafted essays and word por-
traits of public figures and participated in hundreds of taped 
interviews that were later distilled to chronicle his personal 
viewpoint. It is evident that the_monopoly granted by cq_py-
ri ht actively served its inte d urpose of inducing ' ' 
ation of new material of otential historical va ue. 
ec 10n o e opyright Act confers a bundle of exclu-
sive rights to the owner of the copyright. 1 Under the Copy-
right Act, these rights-to publish, copy, and distribute the 
author's work-vest in the author of an original work from 
the time of its creation . ..1.d- § 106. In practice, the author 
commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer royalties in 
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the 
author's work. The copyright owner's rights, however, are 
' Section 106 provides in pertinent part: 
"Subject to section 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ... ; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public . . . . " 
J-J 
./--; 
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subject to L£t.,rtain statutoE{_ !l_Xce~ ns. Jfrt:"- §§ 107-118. 
Among these is § 107 wliich codifies the traditional privilege 
of other authors to make "fair use" of an earlier writer's 
work. 2 In addition, no author may copyright facts or ideas. 
~ § 102. The copyright is limited to those aspects 
of the work-termed "expression"-that display the stamp of 
the author's originality. 
The statutory formulation of thf defense of fair us in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 reflects the intent o ongress to cod-
ify the common law doctrine. 3 M. Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 13.05 (1984 ed.) (hereinafter Nimmer). Section 107 re-
quires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use 
is fair, an e s a u no es our non-exclusive ac ors o be 
considered. This approach was "intended to restate the 
[pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, nar-
row, or enlarge it in any way." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 
p 66 (1976) (4ereinafter House Report). . 
-~ was traditionally defined as "a privilege in others 
t~ wner of the copyright to use the copyrighted mate-
rial in a reasonable manner without his consent." H. Ball, 
The Law of Copyright 260 (1944). "[T]he author's consent to 
a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] always been 
implied by the courts as a necessary i_ncident of the constitu-
:-Osection 107 states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work .. . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the 
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work. " 
/] 
/7 
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tional policy of promoting sciences and the useful arts, since a 
prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers from 
attempting to improve upon prior works and thus . . . frus-
trate the very ends sought to be attained." Ibid. Professor 
Latman, in a study of the doctrine of fair use commissioned 
by Congress for the revision effort, see Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., supra, at --, n. 9 (dissenting 
opinion), summarized prior law as turning on "the importance 
of the material copied or performed from the point of view of 
the reasonable copyright owner. In other words, would the 
reasonable copyright owner have consented to the use?" 
Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as 
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, 
Prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciaryr 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15 (1960). 3 °(' 
As early as 1841, Justice Story/ gave judicial recognition to 
the doctrine in a case that concerned the letters of another 
former President, George Washington. 
"[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original 
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages 
for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the 
other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most 
important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, 
but to supersede the use of the original work, and substi-
tute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a 
3 Professor Nimmer notes, "[perhaps] no more precise guide can be 
stated than Joseph McDonald's clever paraphrase of the Golden Rule: 
'Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you 
would be resentful if they so took from you."' 3 Nimmer § 13.05(A], 
/P· 13-66, quoting McDonald, "Non-infringing Uses," 9 Bull. Cr. · Soc'y 
466, 467 No.355 (1962). This equitable "rule of reason," Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. , -- U. S., at--, "permits courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle 
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State Uni-
versity v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F . 2d 57, 60 (CA2 1980). See 
generally, L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 18-48 (1978). 
7 
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piracy." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4,901, 
at 344-345 (C. C. D. Mass.) 
As Justice Story's hypothetical illustrates, the fair use doc- \ 
trine has always precluded a use that "supersede[s] the ob-
ject of the original." Ibid. Accord S. Rep. No. 94-473, 
p. 65 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). 
Perhaps because the fair use doctrine was predicated on 
the author's implied consent to "reasonable and customary'' 
use when he released his work for public consumption, fair 
use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges 
of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works. 4 
Under common law copyright, "[t]he property of the author 
... in his intellectual creation [ was] absolute until he volun-
tarily part[ed] with the same." American Tobacco Co. v. 
Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); 2 Nimmer§ 8.23, at 
8-273. This absolute rule, however, was tempered in prac-
tice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine. In a 
given case, factors such as implied consent through de facto 
publication on performance or dissemination of a work may 
tip the balance of equities in favor of prepublication use. See 
Copyright Law Revision-Part 2: Discussion and Comments 
on Report of the Registrar of Copyrights on General Revi-
' See Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as 
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1960); 
Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works (1957 re rinted as Stud N 
29 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos 20-35, Prepared for the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Sess., p. 4, n. 32 (1960) (citing 
cases); R. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States 67 (1950) ("there 
can be no 0fair use~ of unpublished material); H. Ball, Law of Copyright 
and Literary Property § 125, n. 5 (1944) ("the doctrine of fair use does not 
apply to unpublished works"); A. Weil, American Copyright Law. § 276 
(1917) (the aqthor of an unpublished work "has, probably, the right to pre-
vent even a ('Jfair usE0 of the work by others"). Cf.QM. Flint, A User's 
Guide to [United Kingdom] Copyright ,r 10.05 (1979) r1no fair dealing with 
unpublished works"); Beloff v. Pressman Ltd., [1973] All E. R. 241, 263 
(ch. 1972) (same). 
T 
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sion of the U. S. Copyright Law at 27 (H. R. Comm. Print, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. Feb. 1963) (discm€m suggesting works 
disseminated to the public in a form not constituting a tech-
nical "publication" should nevertheless be subject to fair use); 
3 Nimmer§ 13.05, p. 13-62, n. 2. But it has never been seri-
ously disputed that "the fact that the plaintiff's work is un-
published . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of fair 
use." Ibid. Publication of an author's expression before he 
has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the au-
thor's right to decide when and whether it will be made pub-
lic, a factor not present in fair use of published works. 5 Re-
spondents contend, however, that Congress, in including 
first publication among the rights enumerated in § 106, which 
are expressly subject to fair use under § 107, intended that 
fair use would apply in pari materia to published and unpub-
lished works. The Copyright Revision Act does not support 
this proposition. 
The Copyright Revision Act of_J].76 represents the cul-
mination 'or a major legislative reexamination of copyright 
doctrine. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, ante, at --; 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--, 
n. 9 (dissenting opinion). Among its other innovations, it 
eliminated publication "as a dividing line between common 
law and statutory protection," House Report, at 129, extend-
5 See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834) (distin-
guishing the author's common law right "to obtain redress against anyone 
who . . . by improperly obtaining a copy [of his unpublished work] endeav-
ors to realize a profit by its publication" from rights in a published work, 
which are prescribed by statute); Pres f}_J!ub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196, 
199 (CA2), aff'd, 164 U. S. 105 (1896); '(Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, 221 P. 2d 73, 77-78 (Cal. 1950) (en bane); Golding v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc., 193 P. 2d 153, 162 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), ("An ·unau-
thorized appropriation of [an unpublished work] is not to be neutralized on 
the plea that 'it is such a little one.'") , aff'd 221 P. 2d 95 (Cal. 1950); 
Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56, reh'g denied 254 N. Y. 
563, 173 N. E. 867 (N. Y. 1930) ("Since plaintiff has not published or pro-
duced her play, perhaps any use that others made ofit might be unfair."). 
-© 
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ing statutory protection to all works from the time of their 
creation. It also recognized for the first time a distinct stat-
utory right of first publication, which had previously been an 
element of the common law protections afforded unpublished 
works. The Report of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary confirms that "Clause (3) of section 106, establishes the 
exclusive right of publication .... Under this provision the 
copyright owner would have the right to control the first pub- . 
lie distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work." 
House Report, at 62. 
Though the right o t ublication, like the other rights /;--
enumerated in 106;-is expressly made subject to the fair use ) 
provision of§ 107, fair use analysis must alwa s be tailored to 
the --i_ndividual ca~. ouse eport, at 65; 3 1mmer 
§ 13.05[A]. The nature of the interest at stake is highly rele-
vant to whether a given use is fair. From the beginning, 
those entrusted with the task of revision recognized the 
"overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protec-
tion of undisseminated works until the author or his succes-
sor chooses to disclose them." Register of Copyrights, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess., General Revision of the U. S. Copyright 
Law 41 (Comm. Print 1961). The right of first publication 
implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in 
what form to release his work. First publication is inher-
ently different from other § 106 rights in that only one person 
can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time illus-
trates, the commercial value of the right lies primarily in 
exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the author 
from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publication 
right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substan-
tial, the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair 
use inevitably shifts. 
The Senate Report confirms that Congress intended the 
unpublished nature of the work to figure prominently in fair 
use analysis. In discussing fair use of photocopied materials 
in the classroom the Committee Report states: 
- -
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"A key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in 
fair use is whether or not the work is available to the po-
tential user. If the work is "out of print" and unavail-
able for purchase through normal channels, the user may 
have more justification for reproducing it . . . . The ap-
plicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works 
is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavail-
able, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part 
of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances, 
the copyright owner's 'right of first publication' would 
outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom pur-
poses. " Senate Report, at 64. 
Although the Committee selected photocopying of classroom 
materials to illustrate fair use, it emphasized that "the same 
general standards of fair use are applicable to all kinds of uses 
of copyrighted material." Id., at 65. We find unconvincing 
respondent's contention that the absence of the quoted pas-
sage from the House Report indic~tes an intent to abandon 
the traditional distinction between fair use of published and 
unpublished works. It appears instead that the the fair use 
discussion of photocopying of classroom materials was omit-
ted from the final report be.cause educators and publishers in 
the interim had negotiated a set of guidleines that rendered 
the discussion obsolete. House Report, at 67. The House 
Report nevertheless incorporates the discussion by refer-
ence, citing to the Senate Report and stating, "[T]he Com-
mittee has reviewed this discussion, and considers it still has 
value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use] prob-
lem." Ibid. 
Even if the legislative history were entirely silent, we } A 
would be bound to conclude from Congress's characterization Vt 
of section 107 as a "restatement" that its effect was to pre-
serve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works 
as of other types of protected works and not to "change, nar-
row, or enlarge it." House Report, at 66. We conclude that 
the unpublished nature of a work is "a key, though not neces-
(v 
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sarily determinative factor" tending to negate a defense of 
fair use. Senate Report, at 64. See 3 Nimmer§ 13.05, n. 2. 
We also find unpersuasive respondent's argument that fair 
use may be made of a soon-to-be-published manuscript on the 
ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest 
in nonpublication. This argument assumes that the unpub-
lished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to let-
ters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemina-
tion. It is true that common law copyright was often 
enlisted in the service of personal privacy. See Brandeis 
and Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 
198-199 (1890). In its commercial guise, however, an au-
thor's right to choose when he will publish is no less deserv-
ing of protection. The period encompassing the work's initi-
ation, its preparation, and its grooming for public 
dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor. The 
Copyrig}:lt Act, which accords the copyright owner the "right 
to control the first public distribution" of his work, House Re-
port, at 62, echcl the common law's concern that the author 
or copyright owner retain control throughout this critical 
stage. See generally Comment, The Stage of Publication as 
a "Fair Use" Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation 
Enterprises, 58 St. John's L. Rev. 583 (1984). The obvious 
benefit to author and public alike of assuring authors the lei-
sure to develop their ideas free from fear of expropriation 
outweighs any short term "news value" to be gained from 
premature publication of the author's expression. See 
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum L. 
Rev. 983, 1004-1006 (1970) (The absolute protection the com-
mon law accorded to soon-to-be published works "[ was] justi-
fied by its brevity and expedienc~~ - The author's control of 
first public distribution implicate: ot only his personal inter-
est in creative control but his property interest in exploita-
tion of prepublication rights, which are valuable in them-
selves and serve as a valuable adjunct to publicity and 
marketing. See Belushi v. Woodward, 10 Media L. Rep. 
@ 
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(BNA) 1870 (D DC 1984) (successful marketing depends on 
coordination of serialization and release to public); Marks, 
Subsidiary Rights and Permissions, from C. Grannis (ed.), 
What Happens in Book Publishing 230 (1967) (exploitation of 
subsidiary rights is necessary to financial success of new 
books). Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to 
control the first ublic a pearance of his undisseminateclex-
press10n will outweig a claim of fair use. 
B 
Respondent, however, contends that First Amendment 
values require a different rule under the circumstances of 
this case. The thrust of the decision below is that "the scope 
of [fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information con-
veyed relates to matters of high public concern." C onsum-
ers Union of the United States , Inc. v. General Signal Corp. , 
724 F. 2d 1044, 1050 (CA2 1983) (construing Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F . 2d 195 (1983), 
as allowing advertiser to quote Consumer Reports), cert. de-
nied, -- U. S. -- (1984). Respondent advances the sub-
stantial public import of the subject matter of the Ford mem-
oirs as grounds for excusing a use that would ordinarily not 
pass muster as a fair use-the piracy of verbatim quotations 
for the purpose of "scooping" the authorized first serializa-
tion. Respondent explains its copying of Mr. Ford's expres-
sion as essential to reporting the news story it claims the 
book itself represents. In respondent's view, not only the 
facts contained in Mr. Ford's memoirs, but "the precise man-
ner in which he expressed himself was as newsworthy as 
what he had to say." Brief for Respondent 39. Respondent 
argues that the public's interest in learning this news as fast 
as possible outweighs the right of the author to control its 
first publication. 
The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's 
idea/expression a 1cnot omy "strikes a definitional balance be-
tween the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by per-
77 · 
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mitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author's expression." 723 F. 2d, at 203. No author may 
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 17 U. S. C. 
§ 102 (b). See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, 726, n.* (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) 
(Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as 
copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas 
expressed); 1 Nimmer § 1.10[B][2]. As this Court long ago 
observed, "[T]he news element-the information respecting 
current events contained in the literary production-is not 
the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordi-
narily are publici juris; it is the history of the day." Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Pres3/248 U. S. 215, 234 
(1918). But copyright assures those who write and publish 
factual narratives such as "A' Time to Heal" that that they 
may at least enjoy the right to market-the original expression 
contained therein as just compensation for their investment. 
Respondent'~ heory, however, would expand fair usej o 
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protec~ion in 
the work of a public figure. Absent such protection, there 
would be little 1ncentive to create or profit in financing such 
memoirs and the public would be denied an important source 
of significant historical information. The promise of copy-
right would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by 
dubbing the infringement a fair use "news report" of the 
book. See Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp. , 558 F . 2d 91(CA21977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 
1014 (1978). 
Nor does respondent assert any actual necessity for 
circumventing the copyright scheme with respect to the 
types of works and users at issue here. 6 Where an author 
• It bears noting that Congress in the Copyright Act recognized a public 
interest warranting specific exemptions in a number of areas not within 
traditional fair use, see, e. g. , 17 U. S. C. § 115 (compulsory license for 
records); § 105 (no copyright in government works). No such exemption 
n;, 
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and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating 
an original work and are poised to release it to the public, no 
· legi~ate aim is served by preempting the right of first publi-
cation. The fact that the words the author has chosen to 
clothe his narrative may of themselves be "newsworthy'' is 
not an independent justification for unauthorized copying of 
the author's expression prior to publication. To paraphrase 
another recent Second Circuit decision: 
"[Respondent] possessed an unfettered right to use any 
factual information revealed in [the memoirs] for the 
purpose of enlightening its audience, but it can claim no 
need to 'bodily appropriate' [Mr. Ford's] 'expression' of 
that information by utilizing portions of the actual 
[manuscript] .... The public interest in the free flow of 
information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a 
valid copyright in facts. The fair use doctrine is not a 
license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore 
a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work 
contains material of possible public importance." Iowa 
State University v. American Broadcasting Company, 
Inc., 621 F . 2d 57, 61(CA21980) (citations omitted). 
Accord Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad-
casting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1980) 
("newsworthiness" of material copied does not justify copy-
ing), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 
(1982); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc. , 506 F. 
Supp. 554 (D DC 1981) (same). 
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgot-
ten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the en-
gine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the eco-
nomic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. This Court 
stated in Mazer v. Stein: 
limits copyright in personal narratives written by public servants after 
they leave government service. 
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"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual efforts by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through 
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the 
useful Arts."' 347 U. S. 201 , 219 (1954). 
And again in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken: 
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a 
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ulti-
mate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation 
of useful works] for the general public good." 422 U. S. 
151, 156 (1976). 
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to 
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest im-
portance tp the public. Such a notion ignores the major 
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. 
"[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whe.never the 'social 
value [of dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the 
artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of 
their right in their property precisely when they encounter 
those users who could afford to pay for it." Gordon, Fair 
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). And as one commentator has noted, 
"If every volume that was in the public interest could be pi-
rated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon] 
would have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and 
the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP 
Copyright Law Symp. 43, at 78 (1971). See generally Com-
ment, Copyright and the First Amendment; Where Lie~ the 
Public Interest?, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 133 (1985). 
Moreover, freedom of thought and expression "includes 
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U. S. 705, 714 
(1977) (BURGER, C. J.). We do not suggest this right not to 
/:f 
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speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monop-
oly as an instrument to suppress facts. But in the words of 
New York's Chief Judge Fuld: 
"The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to pro-
hibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expres-
sion of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or 
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is nec-
essarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomi-
tant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the 
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative 
aspect." Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 
N. Y. 2d 341, 348 (1968). 
Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, 
and the right of first publication in particular, serve this 
countervailing First Amendment value. See Schnapper v. 
Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981), cert. denied - U. S. 
- (1982); 1 Nimmer§ l.lO[B], p. 1-70, n. ~4. 
In view of the First Amendment protections already em-
bodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and 
ideas, and the latitide for scholarship and comment tradition-
ally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the 
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure 
exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a 
public figure's manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must 
be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use. 
III 
(YJ,ir use} is a mi~ estion of law and fac; . Pacific 
Southern Co./nc. v. Duncan, 744 F'. 2d 1490, 1495, n. 8 
(CAll 1984). Where the District Court has found facts suffi-
cient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate 
court "need not remand for further factfinding ... [but] may 
conclude as a matter of law that [the challenegd use] do[es] 
not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work." Id., at 
1495. Thus whether The Nation article constitutes fair U§e 
-
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under § 107 must be reviewed in light of the principles dis-
cussed above. The factors enumerated in the section are not 
meant to be exclusive: "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable 
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, 
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own 
facts." House Report, at 65. The four factors identified by 
Congress as especially relevant in determining whether the 
use was fair are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. We address each one separately. 
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identi-
fied news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation's 
use. News reporting is one of the enumerated purposes 
sanctioned by § 107 as presumptively advancing the public in-
terest in dissemination of information through fair use. We 
agree with the Second Circuit that the trial court erred in fix-
ing on whether the information contained in the memoir was 
actually new to the public. As Judge Meskill wisely noted, 
"[c]ourts should be chary of deciding what is and what is not 
news." 723 F. 2d, at 215 (Meskill, J ., dissenting). Cf., 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U. S. 323, 345-346 (1974). 
The fact that an article arguably is "news" and therefore is 
presumed to be a productive use is simply one factor in a fair 
use analysis. 
The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to 
non-profit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a 
finding of fair use. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the mo-
nopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright." 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. , supra, at--. 
In arguing that the purpose of news reporting is not purely 
commercial, The Nation misses the point entirely. The crux 
of the profit/non-profit distinction is not whether the sole mo-
tive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands 
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83-1632-0PINION 
20 HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES 
to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material with-
out paying the customary price. See Roy Export Co. Estab-
lishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 
1137, 1144 (SDNY 1980), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2 1980), 
cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982); 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A][l], 
n. 25.3. 
In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The 
Nation's stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hard-
cover and Time abstracts, thereby "mak[ing] news" or creat-
ing a "news event." App. to Petn for Cert. C-27. The Na-
tion's use had not merely the incidental effect but the 
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's com-
mercially valuable right of first publication. See Meredith 
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 
690 (SDNY), (purpose of text was to compete with original), 
aff'd 500 F. 2d 1221 (CA2 1974). Also relevant to the "char-
acter" of the use is "the propriety of the defendant's con-
duct." 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], at 63-72. "Fair use presup-
poses 'good faith' and 'fair dealing."' Time, Inc. v. Bernard 
Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting 
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 
53 Iowa L. Rev. 832 (1968). The Nation knowingly ex-
ploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of 
fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of con-
sent as justification. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was 
free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts from r: "A 
Time to Heal." Fair use "distinguishes between a true 
scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal 
profit."' Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp., supra, at 97, quoting from Hearings on Bills for 
t~heneral Revision of the Copyright Law Before House 
Co m. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. _3, at 
1 6 (1966) (Statement of John Schulman). 
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Second, the Act directs 
attention to the nature of the copyrighted work. "A Time to 
Heal" may be characterized as an unpublished historical nar-
/7 
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rative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes a 
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fic-
tion or fantasy. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications 
for Copyright, 29 J. Cop. Soc. 560, 561 (1981-1982). 
"[E]ven within the field of fact works, there are grada-
tions as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy. 
One may move from sparsely embellished maps and di-
rectories to elegantly written biography. The extent to 
which one must permit expressive language to be copied, 
in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts, 
will thus vary from case to case." Id. , at 563. 
Some of the brief er quotes from the memoir are arguably 
necessary adequately to convey the facts; for example, Mr. 
Ford's characterization of the White House tapes as the 
"smoking gun" is perhaps so integral to the idea expressed as 
to be inseparable from it. Cf. 1 Nimmer§ 1.l0[C]. But The 
Nation did not stop. at isolated phrases and instead .excerpted 
subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures whose 
power lies in the author's individualized expression. Such 
use, focusing on the most expressive elements of the work, 
exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts. 
The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of 
its "nature." 3 Nimmer § 13. 05[A]; Comment, supra, 58 St. 
John's L. Rev., at 613. Our prior discussion establishes that 
the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished 
works. While even substantial quotations might qualify as 
fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a 
speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated 
to the press, see House Report, at 65, the author's right to 
choose when and how he will first make public his expression 
weighs against such use of the work before its release. 
Amount and Su bstantiality of the Portion Used. Next, 
the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were 
an insubstantial portion of "A Time to Heal." The district 
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court, however, found that "[T]he Nation took what was es-
sentially the heart of the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. We 
believe the Court of Appeals erred in overruling the district 
judge's evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking. 
See, e. g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (taking of 55 
seconds out of one hour and twenty-nine minute film deemed 
qualitatively substantial). A Time editor described the 
chapters on the pardon as "the most interesting and moving 
parts of the whole manuscript." Petrs' Reply Br. 16, n. 8. 
The portions actually quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky 
as among the most powerful passages in those chapters. 
Stripped to the verbatim quotes, 7 the direct takings from the 
unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the infring-
ing article. See M eeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1071 
(CA2 1977) (copyrighted letters constituted less than 1 % of 
infringing work but were prominently featured). The Na-
tion article is structured around the quoted excerpts which 
serve as its dramatic focal points. See Appendix, infra. In 
view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key 
role in the infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second 
Circuit that the "magazine took a meager, indeed an infinites-
imal amount of Ford's original language." 723 F. 2d, at 209. 
7 See Appendix, infra, at --. The Court of Appeals found that only 
"approximately 300 words" were copyrightable but did not specify which 
words. The court's discussion, however, indicates it excluded from con-
sideration those portions of The Nation's piece that, although copied verba-
tim from Ford's manuscript, were quotes attributed by Ford to third per-
sons and quotations from government documents. At oral argument, 
counsel for The Nation did not dispute that direct quotes and very close 
paraphrase could constitute infringement. Tr. 24-25. Thus the Appen-
dix identifies as potentially infringing only verbatim quotes or extr"emely 
close paraphrase and excludes from consideration government documents 
and words attributed to third persons. The Appendix is not intended to 
endorse any particular rule of copyrightability but is intended merely as an 
aid to facilitate our discussion. 
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Efj_ect on !!!e M~ . Finally, the Act focuses on "the ef-
fect of the use on the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." This last factor is undoubtedly the sin-
gle most important element of fair use. 8 See 3 Nimmer 
§ 13.05[A] p. 13-76, and cases cited therein. "Fair use, 
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which 
does not materially impair the marketability of the work 
which is copied." 1 Nimmer § 1,l0[D], p. 1-87. The trial 
court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the 
market. Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and 
its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of the in-
fringement. The Court of Appeals rejected this fact finding 
as clearly erroneous, noting that the record did not establish 
a causal relation between Time's nonperformance and re-
spondent's unauthorized publication of Mr. Ford's expression 
as opposed to the facts taken from the memoirs. We dis-
agree. Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present 
such clear cut evidence of actual damage. Petitioners as-
sured Time that there would be no other authorized publica-
tion of any portion of the unpublished manuscript prior to 
April 23, 1979. Any publication of material from chapters 1 
and 3 would permit Time to renegotiate its final payment. 
Time cited The Nation's article, which contained verbatim 
quotes from the unpublished manuscript, as a reason for its 
nonperformance. Petitioners established a prima facie case 
8 Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use excep-
tion should come into play only in those situations in which the market fails 
or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero. See, e. g., Bren-
nan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, Dept. 
of Justice Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, 13-17 (1984); Gordon, 
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis _of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). 
As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully functioning market that en-
courages the creation and dissemination of memoirs of public figures. In 
the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal copyright 
channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public 
benefit. 
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of actual damage thatt:e pondent failed to rebut. See Ste-
vens Linen Association nc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F. 2d 
11, 15 (CA2 1981). T e trial court properly awarded actual 
damages and profits. See 17 U. S. C. § 505. 
More important, to negate fair use one need only show that 
if the challenged use "should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted 
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, 
at -- (emphasis added); id., at--, and n. 36 (collecting 
cases) (dissenting opinion). This inquiry must take account 
not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the mar-
ket for derivative works. See Iowa State University Re-
search Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F. 
2d 57 (CA2 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, supra, at 1070; Roy Ex-
port v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 
1146. "If the defendant's work adversely affects the value of 
any of the rights in the copyrighted work (in this case the ad-
aptation [and serialization] right) the use is not fair." 3 
Nimmer§ 13.05[B], pp. 13-77-13-78. 
It is undisputed that the factual material in the balance of n 
The Nation's article, besides the verbatim quotes at issue 
here, was drawn exclusively from the chapters on the par-
don. The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a 
story about the Nixon pardon-precisely the use petiy{ners {; 
had licensed to Time. The borrowing of these verbatim 
quotes from the unpublished manuscript lent The Nation's 
piece a special air of authenticity-as Navasky expressed it, 
the reader would know it was Ford speaking and not The Na-
tion. App. 300c. Thus it directly competed for a share of 
the market for prepublication excerpts. The Senate Report 
states: 
''With certain special exceptions . . . a use that supplants 
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted wor'-
would ordinarily be considered an infringement." I d./t 
65. 
1f I 
71 
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Placed in a broader perspective, a fair use doctrine that per-
mits extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased 
manuscript without the copyright owner's consent poses sub-
stantial potential for damage to the marketability of first 
serialization rights in general. "Isolated instances of minor 
infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the 
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be pre-
vented." Senate Report, at 65. 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that The Nation's 
use of the copyrighted material was excused by the public's 
interest in the subject matter. It erred, as well, in overlook-
ing the unpublis_hed nature of the work and the resulting im-
pact on the potential market for first serial rights of permit-
ting unauthorized prepublication excerpts under the rubric of 
fair use. Finally, in finding the taking "infinitesimal," the 
Court of Appeals accorded too little weight to the qualitative 
importance of the quoted passages of original expression. In 
sum, the traditional doctrine of fair use, as embodied in the 
Copyright Act, does not sanction the use made by The Nation 
of these copyrighted materials. Any copyright infringer 
may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to 
the copyrighted work. See Pacific and Southern Co. v. 
Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1499-1500 (CAll 1984). But Con- ·) 
gress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially 
imposing, a "compulsory license" permitting unfettered 
access to the unpublished copyrighted expression of public 
figures. 
IV 
The Nation conceded that its verbatim co · g of some 300 
words o 1rect quo at10n om the Ford manuscript would 
constitute an.infringement unless excused as a fair use. 1 e-
cause we nncftlnit-Tne"Nat1on7s use orurese verbatim ex-
cerpts from the unpublished manuscript w·as ~ se, 
we do not address the appellate court's conclusions concern-
ing various issues of copyrightability. We observe, how-
ever, that the law concerning the copyrightability ~ ual 
'-------
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narrative and its component parts is currently unsettled and 
we believe these issues of copyri ht ility are best left to fur-
ther developmen y e courts, on full ac ua recor sand in 
the co ex cases at turn on the such issues and not, as 
do~ ne, on t4e doct~ use. -
The judgment of theeourt of Appeals is reversed and re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT 
The portions of The Nation article which were copied verbatim from "A 
Time to Heal," excepting quotes from government documents and quotes 
attributed by Ford to third persons, are identified in bold face in the text. 
Seen. 7, ante, at--. The corresponding passages in the Ford manu-
script are footnoted. 
THE FORD MEMOIRS 
BEHIND THE NIXON PARDON 
In his memoirs, A Time To Heal , which Harper & Row will 
publish in late May or early June, former President Gerald R. 
Ford says that the idea of giving a blanket pardon to Richard 
M. Nixon was raised before Nixon resigned from the Presi-
dency by Gen. Alexander Haig, who was then the White 
House chief of staff. 
Ford also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he 
might have selected Ronald Reagan as his 1976 running 
mate, that Washington lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, a 
Democrat, was his choice for head of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, that Nixon was the one who first proposed Rocke-
feller for Vice President, and that he regretted his "coward-
ice" 1 in allowing Rockefeller to remove himself from Vice 
Presidential contention. Ford also describes his often 
prickly relations with Henry Kissinger. 
The Nation obtained the 655-page typescript before publi-
cation. Advance excerpts from the book will appear in Time 
in mid-April and in The Reader's Digest thereafter. Al-
though the initial print order has not been decided, the figure 
is tentatively set at 50,000; it could change, depending upon 
the public reaction to the serialization. 
Ford's account of the Nixon pardon contains significant 
new detail on the negotiations and considerations that sur-
rounded it. According to Ford's version, the subject was 
1 I was angry at myself for showing cowardice in not saying to the ultra-
conservatives, "It's going to be Ford and Rockefeller, whatever the conse-
quences. " p. 496. 
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first broached to him by General Haig on August 1, 1974, a 
week before Nixon resigned. General Haig revealed that 
the newly transcribed White House tapes were the equiva-
lent of the "smoking gun" 2 and that Ford should prepare 
himself to become President. 
Ford was deeply hurt by Haig's revelation: "Over the past 
several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he 
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would 
prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from 
view." 3 Ford had believed him, but he let Haig explain the 
President's alternatives. 
He could "ride it out" 4 or he could resign, Haig said. He 
then listed the different ways Nixon might resign and con-
cluded by pointing out that Nixon could agree to leave in re-
turn for an agreement that the new President, Ford, 
would pardon him. 5 Although Ford said it would be im-
proper for him to make any recommendation, he basically 
agreed with Haig's assessment and adds, "Because of his 
references to the pardon authority, I did ask Haig about 
the extent of a President's pardon power." 6 
"It's my understanding from a White House lawyer," Haig 
replied, "That a President does have authority to grant a par-
don even before criminal action has been taken against an 
individual." 
' [I]t contained the so-called smoking gun. p. 3. 
3 Over the past several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he 
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would prove his inno-
cence, that the matter would fade from view. p. 7. 
•The first [option] was that he could try to "ride it out" by letting im-
peachment take its natural course through the House and the Senate trial, 
fighting against conviction all the way. p. 4. 
5 Finally, Haig said that according to some on Nixon's White House 
staff, Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new 
President-Gerald Ford-would pardon him. p. 5. 
' Because of his references to pardon authority, I did ask Haig about the 
extent of a President's pardon power. pp. 5-6. 
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But because Ford had neglected to tell Haig he thought the 
idea of a resignation conditioned on a pardon was improper, 
his press aide, Bob Hartmann, suggested that Haig might 
well have returned to the White House and told President 
Nixon that he had mentioned the idea and Ford seemed com-
fortable with it. "Silence implies assent." 
Ford then consulted with White House special counsel 
James St. Clair, who had no advice one way or the other on 
the matter more than pointing out that he was not the lawyer 
who had given Haig the opinion on the pardon. Ford also 
discussed the matter with Jack Marsh, who felt that the men-
tion of a pardon in this context was a "time bomb," and with 
Bryce Harlow, who had served six Presidents and who 
agreed that the mere mention of a pardon "could cause a 
lot of trouble." 7 
As a result of these various conversations, Vice President 
Ford called Haig and read him a written statement: "I want 
you to understand that I have no intention of recommending 
what the President should do about resigning or not resign-
ing and that nothing we talked about yesterday afternoon 
should be given any consideration in whatever decision the 
President may wish to make." 
Despite what Haig had told him about the "smoking gun" 
tapes, Ford told a Jackson, Mich., luncheon audience later 
in the day that the President was not guilty of an im-
peachable offense. "Had I said otherwise at the mo-
ment," he writes, "the whole house of cards might have 
collapsed." 8 
In justifying the pardon, Ford goes out of his way to assure 
the reader that "compassion for Nixon as an individual 
7 Only after I had finished did [Bryce Harlow] let me know in no uncer-
tain terms that he agreed with Bob and Jack, that the mere mention of the 
pardon option could cause a lot of trouble in the days ahead. p. 18. 
8 During the luncheon I repeated my assertion that the President was 
not guilty of an impeachable offense. Had I said otherwise at that mo-
ment, the whole house of cards might have collapsed. p. 21. 
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hadn't prompted my decision at all." 9 Rather, he did it 
because he had "to get the monkey off my back one way or 
the other." 10 
The precipitating factor in his decision was a series of 
secret meetings his general counsel, Phil Buchen, held with 
Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski in the Jefferson 
Hotel, where they were both staying at the time. Ford at-
tributes Jaworski with providing some "crucial" informa-
tion 11-i. e., that Nixon was under investigation in ten 
separate areas·, and that the court process could "take 
years." 12 Ford cites a memorandum from J aworski's assist-
ant, Henry S. Ruth Jr., as being especially persuasive. 
Ruth had written: 
"If you decide to recommend indictment I think it is fair 
and proper to notify Jack Miller and the White House suffi-
ciently in advance so that pardon action could be taken before 
the indictment." He went on to say: "One can make a strong 
argument for leniency and if President Ford is so inclined, I 
think he ought to do it early rather than late." 
Ford decided that court proceedings against Nixon might 
take six years, that Nixon "would not spend time quietly in 
San Clemente," 13 and "it would be virtually impossible 
for me to direct public attention on anything else." 14 
Buchen, Haig and Henry Kissinger agreed with him. 
Hartmann was not so sure. 
9 But compassion for Nixon as an individual hadn't prompted my decision 
at all. p. 266. 
10 I had to get the monkey off my back one way or another. p. 236. 
"Jaworski gave Phil several crucial pieces of information. p. 246. 
12 And if the verdict was Guilty, one had to assume that Nixon would ap-
peal. That process would take years. p. 248. 
13 The entire process would no doubt require years: a minimum of two, a 
maximum of six. And Nixon would not spend time quietly in San Cle-
mente. p. 238. 
1
• It would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on 
anything else. p. 239. 
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Buchen wanted to condition the pardon on Nixon agreeing 
to settle the question of who would retain custody and control 
over the tapes and Presidential papers that might be relevant 
to various Watergate proceedings, but Ford was reluctant to 
do that: 
At one point a plan was considered whereby the Presiden-
tial materials would be kept in a vault at a Federal facility 
near San Clemente, but the vault would require two keys to 
open it. One would be retained by the General Services Ad-
ministration, the other by Richard Nixon. 
The White House did, however, want Nixon to make a full 
confession on the occasion of his pardon or, at a minimum, ex-
press true contrition. Ford tells of the negotiation with Jack 
Miller, Nixon's lawyer, over the wording of Nixon's state-
ment. But as Ford reports Miller's response. Nixon was 
not likely to yield. "His few meetings with his client had 
shown him that the former President's ability to discuss 
Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent." 15 
The statement they really wanted was never forthcoming. 
As soon as Ford's emissary arrived in San Clemente, he was 
confronted with an ultimatum by Ron Zeigler, Nixon's for-
mer press secretary. "Lets get one thing straight immedi-
ately," Zeigler said. "President Nixon is not issuing any 
statement whatsoever regarding Watergate, whether Jerry 
Ford pardons him or not." Zeigler proposed a draft, which 
was turned down on the ground that "no statement would 
be better than that." 16 They went through three more 
drafts before they agreed on the statement Nixon finally 
made, which stopped far short of a full confession. 
When Ford aide Benton Becker tried to explain to Nixon 
that acceptance of a pardon was an admission of guilt, he felt 
15 But [Miller] wasn't optimistic about getting such a statement. His few 
meetings with his client had shown him that the former President's ability 
to discuss Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent. p. 246. 
16 When Zeigler asked Becker what he thought of it, Becker replied that 
no statement would be better than that. p. 251. 
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the President wasn't really listening. Instead, Nixon 
wanted to talk about the Washington Redskins. And when 
Becker left, Nixon pressed on him some cuff links and a tie pin 
"out of my own jewelry box." 
Ultimately, Ford sums up the philosophy underlying his 
decision as one he picked up as a student at Yale Law School 
many years before. "I learned that public policy often 
took precedence over a rule oflaw. Although I respected 
the tenet that no man should be above the law, public pol-
icy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind 
us as quickly as possible." 11 
Later, when Ford learned that Nixon's phlebitis had acted 
up and his health was seriously impaired, he debated 
whether to pay the ailing former President a visit. "If I 
made the trip it would remind everybody of Watergate and 
the pardon. If I didn't, people would say I lacked compas-
sion." 18 Ford went: 
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were 
tubes in his nose and mouth, and wires led from his arms, 
chest and legs to machines with orange lights that blinked 
on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I had never 
seen anyone closer to death. 19 
The manuscript made available to The Nation includes 
many references to Henry Kissinger and other personalities 
who played a major role during the Ford years. 
11 Years before, at Yale Law School, I'd learned that public policy often 
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected the tenet that 
no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon-
and Watergate-behind us as quickly as possible. p. 256. 
18 My staff debated whether or not I ought to visit Nixon at the Long 
Beach Hospital, only half an hour away. If I made the trip, it would re-
mind everyone of Watergate and the pardon. If I didn't, people would say 
I lacked compassion. I ended their debate as soon as I found out it had 
begun. Of course I would go. p. 298. 
19 He was stretched out flat on his back. There were tubes in his nose 
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with 
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On Kissinger. Immediately after being informed by 
Nixon of his intention to resign, Ford returned to the Execu-
tive Office Building and phoned Henry Kissinger to let him 
know how he felt. "Henry," he said, "I need you. The 
country needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do every-
thing I can to work with you." 20 
"Sir," Kissinger replied, "it is my job to get along with you 
and not yours to get along with me." 
"We'll get along," Ford said. "I know we'll get along." 
Referring to Kissinger's joint jobs as Secretary of State and 
National Security Adviser to the President, Ford said, "I 
don't want to make any change. I think it's worked out 
well, so let's keep it that way." 21 
Later Ford did make the change and relieved Kissinger of 
his responsibilities as National Security Adviser at the same 
time that he fired James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense. 
Shortly thereafter, he reports, Kissinger presented him with 
a "draft" letter of resignation, which he said Ford could call 
upon at will if he felt he needed it to quiet dissent from con-
servatives who objected to Kissinger's role in the firing of 
Schlesinger. 
On John Connally. When Ford was informed that Nixon 
wanted him to replace Agnew, he told the President he had 
"no ambition to hold office after January 1977." 22 Nixon 
replied that that was good since his own choice for his run-
orange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I 
had never seen anyone cloer to death. p. 299. 
20 "Henry," I said when he came on the line, "I need you. The country 
needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with 
you." p. 46. 
21 We'll get along," I said. "I know we can get along." We talked about 
the two hats he wore, as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor 
to the President. "I don't want to make any change," I said. "I think it's 
worked out well, so let's keep it that way." p. 46. 
22 I told him about my promise to Betty and said that I had no ambitions 
to hold office after January 1977. p. 155. 
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ning mate in 1976 was John Connally. "He'd be excellent," 
observed Nixon. Ford says he had "no problem with that." 
On the Decision to Run Again. Ford was, he tells us, so 
sincere in his intention not to run again that he thought he 
would announce it and enhance his credibility in the country 
and the Congress, as well as keep the promise he had made to 
his wife, Betty. 
Kissinger talked him out of it. "You can't do that. It 
would be disastrous from a foreign policy point of view. For 
the next two and a half years foreign governments would 
know that they were dealing with a lame-duck President. 
All our initiatives would be dead in the water, and I wouldn't 
be able to implement your foreign policy. It would probably 
have the same consequences in dealing with the Congress on 
domestic issues. You can't reassert the authority of the 
Presidency if you leave yourself hanging out on a dead limb. 
You've got to be an affirmative President." 
On David Kennerly, the White House photographer. 
Schlesinger was arguing with Kissinger and Ford over the 
appropriate response to the seizure of the M ayaguez. At 
issue was whether airstrikes against the Cambodians were 
desirable; Schlesinger was opposed to bombings. Following 
a lull in the conversation, Ford reports, up spoke the 30-year-
old White House photographer, David Kennerly, who had 
been taking pictures for the last hour. 
"Has anyone considered," Kennerly asked, "that this might 
be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just 
taken it into his own hands to stop any ship that comes by?" 
Nobody, apparently, had considered it, but following several 
seconds of silence, Ford tells us, the view carried the day. 
"Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill," Ford 
decided. "It would be far better to have Navy jets from 
the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific 
targets." 23 
23 Subjectively, I felt that what Kennerly had said made a lot of sense. 
Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill. It would be far better to 
• 
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On Nixon's Character. Nixon's flaw, according to Ford, 
was "pride." "A terribly proud man," writes Ford, "he 
detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him 
speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to be soft and 
expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was 
weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He 
knew they didn't like him, and he responded with recipro-
cal disdain.)" 24 
Nixon felt disdain for the Democratic leadership of the 
House, whom he also regarded as weak. According to Ford, 
"His pride and personal contempt for weakness had over-
come his ability to tell the difference between right and 
wrong," 25 all of which leads Ford to wonder whether Nixon 
had known in advance about Watergate. 
On hearing Nixon's resignation speech, which Ford felt 
lacked an adequate plea for forgiveness, he was persuaded 
that "Nixon was out of touch with reality." 26 
In February of last year, when The Washington Post ob-
tained and printed advance excerpts from H. R. H.aldeman's 
memoir, The Ends of Power, on the eve of its publication by 
Times Books, The New York Times called The Post's feat "a 
second-rate burglary." 
The Post disagreed, claiming that its coup represented 
"first-rate enterprise" and arguing that it had burglarized 
nothing, that publication of the Haldeman memoir came 
have Navy jets from the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific 
targets in the vicinity of Kompong Som. p. 416. 
24 In Nixon's case, that flaw was pride. A terribly proud man, he de-
tested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly 
of those whom he felt to be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel 
that the press was weak. Reporters , he sensed, were his adversaries. 
He knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain. ) 
p. 53. 
25 His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability 
to tell the difference between right and wrong. p. 54. 
26 The speech lasted fifteen minutes , and at the end I was convinced 
Nixon was out of touch with reality. p. 57. 
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under the Fair Comment doctrine long recognized by the 
courts, and that "There is a fundamental journalistic principle 
here-a First Amendment principle that was central to the 
Pentagon Papers case." 
In the issue of The Nation dated May 5, 1979, our special 
Spring Books number, we will discuss some of the ethical 
problems raised by the issue of disclosure. 
• 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
This case requires us to consider to what extent the "fair 
use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 
U. S. C. § 107 (hereinafter the Copyright Act), sanctions the 
unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpub-
lished manuscript. In April 1977, an undisclosed source pro-
vided The Nation magazine with the unpublished manuscript 
of "A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford." 
Working directly from the purloined manuscript, an editor of 
The Nation produced a short piece entitled "The Ford Mem-
oirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon. " The piece was timed to 
"scoop" an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time maga-
zine. Time had agreed to purchase the exclusive right to 
print prepublication excerpts from the copyright holders, 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (hereinafter Harper & Row) 
and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (hereinafter Reader's 
Digest). As a result of The Nation article, Time cancelled its 
agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright ac- \ 
Z:.-1-:(/ 
/ 2/z~/£L.f. 
tion against The Nation. On appeal, the Second Circuit re- ~ 
versed the lower court's finding of infringement, holding that 
The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use" of the copy-
righted material. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --
(1984), and we now reverse. 
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I 
In February 1977, shortly after leaving the White House, 
former President Gerald R. Ford contracted with petitioners 
Harper & Row and The Reader's Digest, to publish his as yet 
unwritten memoirs. The memoirs were to contain "signifi-
cant hitherto unpublished material" concerning the Water-
gate crisis, Mr. Ford's pardon of former President Nixon and 
"Mr. Ford's reflections on this period of history, a.nd the mo-
rality and personalities involved." App. to Petn for Cert. 
C-14 - C-15. In addition to the right to publish the Ford 
memoirs in book form, the agreement gave petitioners the 
exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts, known in 
the trade as "first serial rights." Two years later, as the 
memoirs were nearing completion, petitioners negotiated a 
prepublication licensing agreement with Time, a weekly 
news magazine. Time agreed to pay $25,000, $12,500 in ad-
vance and an additional $12,500 at publication, in exchange 
for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's account 
of the Nixon pardon. The issue featuring the excerpts was 
timed to appear approximately one week before shipment of 
the full length book version to bookstores. Exclusivity was 
an important consideration; Harper & Row instituted proce-
dures designed to maintain the confidentiality of the manu-
script, and Time retained the right to renegotiate the second 
payment should the material appear in print prior to its re-
lease of the excerpts. 
Two to three weeks before the Time article's scheduled re-
lease, an unidentified person secretly brought a copy of the 
Ford manuscript to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, a 
political commentary magazine. Mr. N avasky knew that his 
possession of the manuscript was not authorized and that the 
manuscript must be returned quickly to his "source" to avoid 
discovery. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (SDNY 1983). He hast-
ily put together what he believed was "a real hot news story" 
composed of quotes, paraphrases and facts drawn exclusively 
from the manuscript. Ibid. Mr. N avasky attempted no in-
ff I 
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dependent commentary, research or criticism, in part be-
cause of the need for speed if he was to "make news" by "pub-
lish[ing] in advance of the publication of the Ford book." 
App. 416-417. The 2,250 word article, reprinted in the Ap-
pendix to this opinion, appeared on April 3, 1979. As a re-
sult of The Nation's article, Time cancelled its piece and re-
fused to pay the remaining $12,500. 
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, alleging conversion, tortious 
interference with contract and violations of the Copyright 
Act. After a six day bench trial, the District Judge found 
that "A Time to Heal" was protected by copyright at the time 
of The Nation publication and that respondent's use of the 
copyrighted material constituted an infringement under the 
Copyright Act, § 106 (1),(2)}md (3), protecting respectively 
the right to reproduce the work, the right to license prepara-
tion of derivative works, and the right of first distribution of 
the copyrighted work to the public. . App. to Petn for Cert: 
C-29-C-30. The District Court rejected respondent's argu-
ment that The Nation's piece was a "fair use" sanctioned by 
§ 107 of the Act. Though billed as "hot news," the article 
contained no new facts. The magazine had "published its ar-
ticle for profit," taking "the heart" of "a soon-to-be-pub-
lished" work. This unauthorized use "caused the agreement 
with Time to be aborted and thus diminished the value of the 
copyright." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. Although certain ele-
ments of the Ford memoir, such as historical facts and memo-
randa, were not per se copyrightable, the District Court held 
that it was "the totality of these facts and memoranda col-
lected together with Ford's reflections that made them of 
value to The Nation, [and] this totality ... is protected by 
the copyright laws." Id., at 1072-1073. The court awarded 
actual damages of $12,500. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed: The .majority recognized that Mr. Ford's ver-
batim "reflections" were original "expression" protected by 
- -
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copyright. But it held that the District Court had erred in 
assuming "the coupling [of these reflections] with 
uncopyrightable fact transformed that information into a 
copyrighted 'totality."' 723 F. 2d 195, 205 (1983). The ma-
jority noted that copyright attaches to expression, not facts 
or ideas. It concluded that, to avoid granting a copyright 
monopoly over the facts underlying history and news, "'ex-
pression' [in such works must be confined] to its barest ele-
ments-the ordering and choice of the words themselves." 
Id., at 204. Thus similarities between the original and the 
challenged work traceable to the copying or paraphrasing of 
uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memo-
randa and other public documents, and quoted remarks of 
third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating whether the 
second author's use was fair or infringing. 
"When the uncopyrighted material is stripped away, the 
article in The Nation contains, at most, approximately 
300 words that are copyrighted. These remaining para-
graphs and scattered phrases are all verbatim quotations 
from the memoirs which had not appeared previously in 
other publications. They include a short segment of 
Ford's conversations with Henry Kissinger and several 
other individuals. Ford's impressionistic depictions of 
Nixon, ill with phlebitis after the resignation and pardon 
and of Nixon's character, constitute the major portion of 
this material. It is these parts of the magazine piece on 
which [the court] must focus in [its] examination of the 
question whether there was a 'fair use' of the copy-
righted matter." Id. , at 206. 
Examining the four factors enumerated in § 107, see infra, at 
--, the majority found the purpose of the article was "news 
reporting," the original work was essentially factual in na-
ture, the 300 words appropriated were insubstantial in rela-
tion to the 2,250 word piece, and the impact on the market for 
the original was minimal as "the evidence [did] not support a 
finding that it was the very limited use of expression per se 
- -
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which led to Time's decision not to print the excerpt." The 
Nation's borrowing of verbatim quotations merely "len[t] 
authenticity to this politically significant material . . . com-
plementing the reporting of the facts." Id., at 208. The 
Court of Appeals was especially influenced by the "politically 
significant" nature of the subject matter and its conviction 
that it is not "the purpose of the Copyright Act to impede 
that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a democratic 
state" or "chill the activities of the press by forbidding a cir-
cumscribed use of copyrighted words." Id., at 197, 208. 
II 
A 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is in-
tended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowl-
edge. But we believe the Second Circuit gave insufficient 
deferenc~ to the scheme established by the Copyright Act for 
fostering the original works that provide the seed and sub-
stance of this harvest. The rights conferred by copyright 
are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge 
a fair return for their labors. Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1976). In using gener-
ous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript 
to lend authenticity to its account of the forthcoming mem-
oirs, The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right of 
first publication, an important marketable subsidiary right. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that The Na-
tion's use of the copyrighted manuscript, even stripped to the 
verbatim quotes conceded by The Nation to be copyrightable 
expression, was neither a fair use of the copyrightable mate-
rial nor necessary to advance the public interest in dissemina-
tion of information. 
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that: 
"The Congress shall have the power . . . to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
- -
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ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
As we noted last Term, "[this] limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios , Inc., -- U. S. --, -- (1984). 
"The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the indi-
vidual author in order to benefit the public. " Id., at --
( dissenting opinion). This principle applies equally to works 
of fiction and non-fiction. The book at issue here, for exam-
ple, was two years in the making, and began with a contract 
giving the author's copyright to the publishers in exchange 
for their services in producing and marketing the work. In 
preparing the book, Mr. Ford drafted essays and word por-
traits of public figures and participated in hundreds of taped 
interviews that were later distilled to chronicle his personal 
viewpoint. It is evident that the monopoly granted by copy-
right actively served its intended purpose of inducing the cre-
ation of new material of potential historical value. 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclu-
sive rights to the owner of the copyright. 1 Under the Copy-
right Act, these rights-to publish, copy, and distribute the 
author's work-vest in the author of an original work from 
the time of its creation. rI-4r-§ 106. In practice, the author ~ 
commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer royalties in 
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the 
author's work. The copyright owner's rights, however, are 
1 Section. 106 provides in pertinent part: 
"Subject to section 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . ; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public .... " 
/7 
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subject to certain statutory exceptions. -fd:: §§ 107-118. I 
Among these is § 107 which codifies the traditional privilege 
of other authors to make "fair use" of an earlier writer's 
work. 2 In addition, no author may copyright facts or ideas. 
-- 17 U. S. G. § 102. The copyright is limited to those aspects 
of the work-termed "expression"- that display the stamp of 
the author's originality. 
The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 reflects the intent of Congress to cod-
ify the common law doctrine. 3 M. Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 13.05 (1984 ed.) (hereinafter Nimmer). Section 107 re-
quires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use 
is fair, and the statute notes four non-exclusive factors to be 
considered. This approach was "intended to restate the 
[pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, nar-
row, or enlarge it in any way." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 
p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report). 
Fair use was traditionally defined as "a privilege in others 
than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted mate-
rial in a reasonable manner without his consent." H. Ball, 
The Law of Copyright 260 (1944). "[T]he author's consent to 
a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] always been 
implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the constitu-
2 ~ection 107 states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the 
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purpos~s; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work. " 
r; 
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tional policy of promoting sciences and the useful arts, since a 
prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers from 
attempting to improve upon prior works and· thus . . . frus-
trate the very ends sought to be attained." Ibid. Professor 
Latman, in a study of the doctrine of fair use commissioned 
by Congress for the revision effort, see Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., supra, at --, n. 9 (dissenting 
opinion), summarized prior law as turning on "the importance 
of the material copied or performed from the point of view of 
the reasonable copyright owner. In other words, would the 
reasonable copyright owner have consented to the use?" 
Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as 
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, 
Prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15 (1960). 3 
As early as 1841, Justice Story, gave judicial recognition to 
the doctrine in a case that concerned the letters of another 
former President, George Washington. 
"[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original 
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages 
for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the 
other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most 
important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, 
but to supersede the use of the original work, and substi-
tute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a 
3 Professor Nimmer notes, "[perhaps] no more precise guide can be 
stated than Joseph McDonald's clever paraphrase of the Golden Rule: 
'Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you 
would be resentful if they so took from you."' 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], 
0P· 13-66, quoting McDonald, "Non-infringing Uses," 9 Bull. Cr. · Soc'y 
466, 467 No.355 (1962). This equitable "rule of reason," Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., -- U. S., at--, "permits courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle 
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State Uni-
versity v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F . 2d 57, 60 (CA2 1980). See 
generally, L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 18-48 (1978). 
~ 
~ 
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piracy." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4,901, 
at 344-345 (C. C. D. Mass.) 
As Justice Story's hypothetical illustrates, the fair use doc-
trine has always precluded a use that "supersede[s] the ob-
ject of the original." Ibid. Accord S. Rep. No. 94-473, 
p. 65 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). 
Perhaps because the fair use doctrine was predicated on 
the author's implied consent to "reasonable and customary'' 
use when he released his work for public consumption, fair 
use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges 
of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works. 4 
Under common law copyright, "[t]he property of the author 
.. . in his intellectual creation [ was] absolute until he volun-
tarily part[ed] with the same." American Tobacco Co. v. 
Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); 2 Nimmer§ 8.23, at 
8-273. This absolute rule, however, was tempered in prac-
tice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine. In a 
given case, factors such as implied consent through de facto 
publication on performance or dissemination of a work may 
tip the balance of equities in favor of prepublication use. See 
Copyright Law Revision-Part 2: Discussion and Comments 
on Report of the Registrar of Copyrights on General Revi-
' See Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as 
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. , p. 7 (1960); 
Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works (1957), reprinted as Study No. 
29 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos 20-35, Prepared for the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4, n. 32 (1960) (citing 
cases); R. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States 67 (1950) ("there 
can be no '"fair usP of unpublished material); H. Ball, Law of Copyright 
and Literary Property § 125, n. 5 (1944) ("the doctrine of fair use does not 
apply to unpublished works"); A. Weil, American Copyright Law. § 276 
(1917) (the author of an unpublished work "has, probably, the right to pre-
vent even aG!air use!l>of the work by others"). Cf. , M. Flint, A User's 
Guide to [United Kingdom] Copyright ,r 10.05 (1979) ("no fair dealing with 
unpublished works"); Beloff v. Pressman Ltd. , (1973] All E. R. 241, 263 
(ch. 1972) (same). 
-- -
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sion of the U. S. Copyright Law at 27 (H. R. Comm. Print, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. Feb. 1963) (discusion suggesting works 
disseminated to the public in a form not constituting a tech-
nical "publication" should nevertheless be subject to fair use); 
3 Nimmer§ 13.05, p. 13-62, n. 2. But it has never been seri-
ously disputed that "the fact that the plaintiff's work is un-
published . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of fair 
use." Ibid. Publication of an author's expression before he 
has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the au-
thor's right to decide when and whether it will be made pub-
lic, a factor not present in fair use of published works. 5 Re-
spondents contend, however, that Congress, in including 
first publication among the rights enumerated in § 106, which 
are expressly subject to fair use under § 107, intended that 
fair use would apply in pari materia to published and unpub-
lished works. The Copyright Revision Act does not support 
this proposition. 
The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 represents the cul-
mination of a major legislative reexamination of copyright 
doctrine. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, ante, at--; 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--, 
n. 9 (dissenting opinion). Among its other innovations, it 
eliminated publication "as a dividing line between common 
law and statutory protection," House Report, at 129, extend-
5 See, e. g. , Wheaton v. Peters , 33 U. S. (8 Pet. ) 591, 657 (1834) (distin-
guishing the author's common law r ight "to obtain redress against anyone 
who . . . by improperly obtaining a copy [of his unpublished work] endeav-
ors to realize a profit by its publication" from rights in a published work, 
which are prescribed by statute); Press Pu b. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196, 
199 (CA2), aff'd, 164 U. S. 105 (1896); (St,a,nley v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, 221 P . 2d 73, 77-78 (Cal. 1950) (en bane); Golding v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc ., 193 P. 2d 153, 162 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), ("An ·unau-
thorized appropriation of [an unpublished work] is not to be neutralized on 
the plea that 'it is such a little one.' "), aff 'd 221 P. 2d 95 (Cal. 1950); 
Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56, reh'g denied 254 N. Y. 
563, 173 N. E . 867 (N. Y. 1930) ("Since plaintiff has not published or pro-
duced her play, perhaps any use that others made of it might be unfair."). 
- -
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ing statutory protection to all works from the time of their 
creation. It also recognized for the first time a distinct stat-
utory right of first publication, which had previously been an 
element of the common law protections afforded unpublished 
works. The Report of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary confirms that "Clause (3) of section 106, establishes the 
exclusive right of publication .... Under this provision the 
copyright owner would have the right to control the first pub-
lic distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work." 
House Report, at 62. 
Though the right of first publication, like the other rights 
enumerated in § 106 is expressly made subject to the fair use 
provision of§ 107, fair use analysis must always be tailored to 
the individual case. House Report, at 65; 3 Nimmer 
§ 13.05(A]. The nature of the interest at stake is highly rele-
vant to whether a given use is fair. From the beginning, 
those entrusted with the task of revision recognized the 
"overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protec-
tion of undisseminated works until the author or his succes-
sor chooses to disclose them." Register of Copyrights, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess., General Revision of the U. S. Copyright 
Law 41 (Comm. Print 1961). The right of first publication 
implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in 
what form to release his work. First publication is inher-
ently different from other § 106 rights in that only one person 
can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time illus-
trates , the commercial value of the right lies primarily in 
exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the author 
from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publication 
right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substan-
tial, the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair 
use inevitably shifts. 
The Senate Report confirms that Congress intended the 
unpublished nature of the work to figure prominently in fair 
use analysis. In discussing fair use of photocopied materials 
in the classroom the Committee Report states: 
- -
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"A key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in 
fair use is whether or not the work is available to the po-
tential user. If the work is "out of print" and unavail-
able for purchase through normal channels, the user may 
have more justification for reproducing it . . . . The ap-
plicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works 
is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavail-
able, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part 
of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances, 
the copyright owner's 'right of first publication' would 
outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom pur-
poses." Senate Report, at 64. 
Although the Committee selected photocopying of classroom 
materials to illustrate fair use, it emphasized that "the same 
general standards of fair use lre applicable to all kinds of uses 
of copyrighted material." Id., at 65. We find unconvincing 
respondent's contention that the absence of the quoted pas-
sage from the House Report indicates an intent to abandon 
the traditional distinction between fair use of published and 
unpublished works. It appears instead that the the fair use 
discussion of photocopying of classroom materials was omit-
ted from the final report because educators and publishers in 
the interim had negotiated a set of guidleines that rendered 
the discussion obsolete. House Report, at 67. The House 
Report nevertheless incorporates the discussion by refer-
ence, citing to the Senate Report and stating, "[T]he Com-
mittee has reviewed this discussion, and considers it still has 
value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use] prob-
lem." Ibid. 
Even if the legislative history were entirely silent, we 
would be bound to conclude from Congress's characterization 
of section 107 as a "restatement" that its effect was to pre-
serve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works 
as of other types of protected works and not to "change, nar-
row, or enlarge it." House Report, at 66. We conclude that 
the unpublished nature of a work is "a key, though not neces-
. ·. 
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sarily determinative factor" tending to negate a defense of 
fair use. Senate Report, at 64. See 3 Nimmer§ 13.05, n. 2. 
We also find unpersuasive respondent's argument that fair 
use may be made of a soon-to-be-published manuscript on the 
ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest 
in nonpublication. This argument assumes that the unpub-
lished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to let-
ters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemina-
. tion. It is true that common law copyright was often 
enlisted in the service of personal privacy. See Brandeis 
and Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 
198-199 (1890). In its commercial guise, however, an au-
thor's right to choose when he will publish is no less deserv-
ing of protection. The period encompassing the work's initi-
ation, its preparation, and its grooming for public 
dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor. The 
Copyright Act, which accords the copyright owner the "right 
to control the first public distribution" of his work, House Re-
port, at 62, echos the common law's concern that the author 
or copyright owner retain control throughout this critical 
stage. See generally Comment, The Stage of Publication as 
a "Fair Use" Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation 
Enterprises, 58 St. John's L. Rev. 583 (1984). The obvious 
benefit to author and public alike of assuring authors the lei-
sure to develop their ideas free from fear of expropriation 
outweighs any short term "news value" to be gained from 
premature publication of the author's expression. See 
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum L. 
Rev. 983, 1004-1006 (1970) (The absolute protection the com-
mon law accorded to soon-to-be published works "[ was] justi-
fied by its brevity and expedience"). The author's control of 
first public distribution implicates not only his personal inter-
est in creative control but his property interest in exploita-
tion of prepublication rights, which are valuable in them-
selves and serve as a valuable adjunct to publicity and 
marketing. See Belushi v. Woodward, 10 Media L. Rep. 
- -
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(BNA) 1870 (D DC 1984) (successful marketing depends on 
coordination of serialization and release to public); Marks, 
Subsidiary Rights and Permissions, from C. Grannis (ed.), 
What Happens in Book Publishing 230 (1967) (exploitation of 
subsidiary rights is necessary to financial success of new 
books). Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to 
control the first public appearance of his undisseminated ex-
pression will outweigh a claim of fair use. 
B 
Respondent, however, contends that First Amendment 
values require a different rule under the circumstances of 
this case. The thrust of the decision below is that "the scope 
of[fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information con-
veyed relates to matters of high public concern." Consum-
ers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 
724 F. 2d 1044, 1950 (CA2 1983) (construing Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises , 723 F. 2d 195 (1983), 
as allowing advertiser to quote Consumer Reports), cert. de-
nied, -- U. S. -- (1984). Respondent advances the sub-
stantial public import of the subject matter of the Ford mem-
oirs as grounds for excusing a use that would ordinarily not 
pass muster as a fair use-the piracy of verbatim quotations 
for the purpose of "scooping" the authorized first serializa-
tion. Respondent explains its copying of Mr. Ford's expres-
sion as essential to reporting the news story it claims the 
book itself represents. In respondent's view, not only the 
facts contained in Mr. Ford's memoirs, but "the precise man-
ner in which he expressed himself was as newsworthy as 
what he had to say." Brief for Respondent 39. Respondent 
argues that the public's interest in learning this news as fast 
as possible outweighs the right of the author to control its 
first publication. 
The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's 
idea/expression dichotomy "strikes a definitional balance be-
tween the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by per-
~ - -
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mitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author's expression." 723 F. 2d, at 203. No author may 
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 17 U. S. C. 
§ 102 (b). See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, 726, n.* (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) 
(Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as 
copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas 
expressed); 1 Nimmer § l.10[B][2]. As this Court long ago 
observed, "[T]he news element-the information respecting 
current events contained in the literary · production-is not 
the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordi-
narily are publici juris; it is the history of the day." Inter- /\ 
national News Service v. Associated Pres~48 U. S. 215, 234 ) 
(1918). But copyright assures those who write and publish 
factual narratives such as "A Time to Heal" that that they 
may at least enjoy the right to market the original expression 
contained therein as just compensation for their investment. 
Respondent's theory, however, would expand fair use to 
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in 
the work of a public figure. Absent such protection, there 
would be little incentive to create or profit in financing such 
memoirs and the public would be denied an important source 
of significant historical information. The promise of copy-
right would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by 
dubbing the infringement a fair use "news report" of the 
book. See Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp., 558 F. 2d 91 (CA21977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 
1014 (1978). 
Nor does respondent assert any actual necessity for 
circumventing the copyright scheme with respect to the 
types of works and users at issue here. 6 Where an author 
6 It bears noting that Congress in the Copyright Act recognized a public 
interest warranting specific exemptions in a number of areas not within 
traditional fair use, see, e. g. , 17 U. S. C. § 115 (compulsory license for 
records); § 105 (no copyright in government works). No such exemption 
" 
i/ 
• 
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and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating 
an original work and are poised to release it to the public, no 
legi~ate aim is served by preempting the right of first publi-
cation. The fact that the words the author has chosen to 
clothe his narrative may of themselves be "newsworthy'' is 
not an independent justification for unauthorized copying of 
the author's expression prior to publication. To paraphrase 
another recent Second Circuit decision: 
"[Respondent] possessed an unfettered right to use any 
factual information revealed in [the memoirs] for the 
purpose of enlightening its audience, but it can claim no 
need to 'bodily appropriate' [Mr. Ford's] 'expression' of 
that information by utilizing portions of the actual 
[manuscript]. . . . The public interest in the free flow of 
information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a 
valid copyright in facts. The fair use doctrine is not a 
license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore 
a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work 
contains material of possible public importance." Iowa 
State University v. American Broadcasting Company, 
Inc., 621 F. 2d 57, 61 (CA2 1980) (citations omitted). 
Accord Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad-
casting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1980) 
("newsworthiness" of material copied does not justify copy-
ing), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 
(1982); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. 
Supp. 554 (D DC 1981) (same). 
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgot-
ten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the en-
gine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the eco-
nomic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. This Court 
stated in Mazer v. Stein: 
limits copyright in personal narratives written by public servants after 
they leave government service. 
,. - -
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"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual efforts by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through 
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the 
useful Arts.'" 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954). 
And again in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken: 
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a 
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ulti-
mate aim is , by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation 
of useful works] for the general public good." 422 U. S. 
151, 156 (1976). 
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to 
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest im-
portance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major 
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. 
"[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whe.never the 'social 
value [of dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the 
artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of 
their right in their property precisely when they encounter 
those users who could afford to pay for it." Gordon, Fair 
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). And as one commentator has noted, 
"If every volume that was in the public interest could be pi-
rated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon] 
would have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and 
the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP 
Copyright Law Symp. 43, at 78 (1971). See generally Com-
ment, Copyright and the First Amendment; Where Lie~ the 
Public Interest?, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 133 (1985). 
Moreover, freedom of thought and expression "includes 
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 
(1977) (BURGER, C. J.). We do not suggest this right not to 
qi 
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speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monop-
oly as an instrument to suppress facts . But in the words of 
New York's Chief Judge Fuld: 
"The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to pro-
hibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expres-
sion of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or 
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is nec-
essarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomi-
tant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the 
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative 
aspect. " Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 
N. Y. 2d 341, 348 (1968). 
Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, 
and the right of first publication in particular, serve this 
countervailing First Amendment value. See Schnapper v. 
Foley , 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981), cert. denied - U. S. 
- (1982); 1 Nimmer § 1. lO[B], p. 1-70, n. 24. -
In view of the First Amendment protections already em-
bodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and 
ideas, and the latitide for scholarship and comment tradition-
ally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the 
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure 
exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a 
public figure's manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must 
be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use. 
III 
Fair use is l. mixed question of law and fact. Pacific 
Southern Co f ~:c. v. Duncan, 744 F . 2d 1490, 1495, n. 8 
(CAll 1984). Where the District Court has found facts suffi-
cient to evaluate each of the statutory factors , an appellate 
court "need not remand for further factfinding .. . [but] may 
conclude as a matter of law that [the challenegd use] do[es] 
not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work. " Id. , at 
1495. Thus whether The Nation article constitutes fair use 
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under § 107 must be reviewed in light of the principles dis-
cussed above. The factors enumerated in the section are not 
meant to be exclusive: "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable 
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, 
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own 
facts." House Report, at 65. The four factors identified by 
Congress as especially relevant in determining whether the 
use was fair are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. We address each one separately. 
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identi-
fied news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation's 
use. News reporting is one of the enumerateq purposes 
sanctioned by § 107 as presumptively advancing the public in-
terest in disseminatio~ of information through fair use. We 
agree with the Second Circuit that the trial court erred in fix-
ing on whether the information contained in the memoir was 
actually new to the public. As Judge Meskill wisely noted, 
"[c]ourts should be chary of deciding what is and what is not 
news. " 723 F. 2d, at 215 (Meskill, J. , dissenting). Cf., 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 345-346 (1974). 
The fact that an article arguably is "news" and therefore is 
presumed to be a productive use is simply one factor in a fair 
use analysis. 
The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to 
non-profit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a 
finding of fair use. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the mo-
nopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright. " 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--. 
In arguing that the purpose of news reporting is not purely 
commercial, The Nation misses the point entirely. The crux 
of the profit/non-profit distinction is not whether the sole mo-
tive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands 
- -
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to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material with-
out paying the customary price. See Roy E xport Co. Estab-
lishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 
1137, 1144 (SDNY 1980), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2 1980), 
cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982); 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A][l], 
n. 25.3. 
In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The 
Nation's stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hard-
cover and Time abstracts, thereby "mak[ing] news" or creat-
ing a "news event." App. to Petn for Cert. C-27. The Na-
tion's use had not merely the incidental effect but the 
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's com-
mercially valuable right of first publication. See Meredith 
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 
690 (SDNY), (purpose of text was to compete with original), 
aff'd 500 F. 2d 1221 (CA21974). Also relevant to the "char-
acter" of the use is "the propriety of the defendant's con-
duct." 3 Nimmer § 13.05[AJ, at 63-72. "Fair use presup-
poses 'good faith' and 'fair dealing."' Time , Inc. v. Bernard 
Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting 
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 
53 Iowa L. Rev. 832 (1968). The Nation knowingly ex-
ploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of 
fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of con-
sent as justification. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was 
free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts from~ "A /; 
Time to Heal." Fair use "distinguishes between a true 
scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal 
profit."' Wainwright Securities , Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp ., supra, at 97, quoting from Hearings on Bills for 
the General Revision of the Copyright Law Before House 
Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt . . 3, at 
1706 (1966) (Statement of John Schulman). 
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Second, the Act directs 
attention to the nature of the copyrighted work. "A Time to 
Heal" may be characterized as an unpublished historical nar-
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rative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes a 
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fic-
tion or fantasy. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications 
for Copyright, 29 J. Cop. Soc. 560, 561 (1981-1982). 
"[E]ven within the field of fact works, there are grada-
tions as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy. 
One may move from sparsely embellished maps and di-
rectories to elegantly written biography. The extent to 
which one must permit expressive language to be copied, 
in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts, 
will thus vary from case to case." Id., at 563. 
Some of the briefer quotes from the memoir are arguably 
necessary adequately to convey the facts; for example, Mr. 
Ford's characterization of the White 'House tapes as the 
"smoking gun" is perhaps so integral to the idea expressed as 
to be inseparable from it. Cf. 1 Nimmer§ l. l0[C]. But The 
Nation did not stop at isolated phrases and instead excerpted 
subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures whose 
power lies in the author's individualized expression. Such 
use, focusing on the most expressive elements of the work, 
exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts. 
The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of 
its "nature." 3 Nimmer§ 13.05[AJ; Comment, supra, 58 St. 
John's L. Rev., at 613. Our prior discussion establishes that 
the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished 
works. While even substantial quotations might qualify as 
fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a 
speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated 
to the press, see House Report, at 65, the author's right to 
choose when and how he will first make public his expression 
weighs against such use of the work before its release. 
Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Next, 
the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were 
an insubstantial portion of "A Time to Heal." The district 
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court, however, found that "[T]he Nation took what was es-
sentially the heart of the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. We 
believe the Court of Appeals erred in overruling the district 
judge's evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking. 
See, e. g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (taking of 55 
seconds out of one hour and twenty-nine minute film deemed 
qualitatively substantial). A Time editor described the 
chapters on the pardon as "the most interesting and moving 
parts of the whole manuscript." Petrs' Reply Br. 16, n. 8. 
The portions actually quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky 
as among the most powerful passages in those chapters. 
Stripped to the verbatim quotes, 7 the direct takings from the 
unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the infring-
ing article. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1071 
(CA2 1977) (copyrighted letters constituted less than 1 % of 
infringing work but were prominently featured). The Na-
tion article is structured around the quoted excerpts which 
serve · as its dramatic focal points. See Appendix, infra. In 
view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key 
role in the infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second 
Circuit that the "magazine took a meager, indeed an infinites-
imal amount of Ford's original language." 723 F. 2d, at 209. 
1 See Appendix, infra, at --. The Court of Appeals found that only 
"approximately 300 words" were copyrightable but did not specify which 
words. The court's discussion, however, indicates it excluded from con-
sideration those portions of The Nation's piece that, although copied verba-
tim from Ford's manuscript, were quotes attributed by Ford to third per-
sons and quotations from government documents. At oral argument, 
counsel for The Nation did not dispute that direct quotes and very close 
paraphrase could constitute infringement. Tr. 24-25. Thus the Appen-
dix identifies as potentially infringing only verbatim quotes or extremely 
close paraphrase and excludes from consideration government documents 
and words attributed to third persons. The Appendix is not intended to 
endorse any particular rule of copyrightability but is intended merely as an 
aid to facilitate our discussion. 
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Effect on the Market. Finally, the Act focuses on "the ef-
fect of the use on the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." This last factor is undoubtedly the sin-
gle most important element of fair use. 8 See 3 Nimmer 
§ 13.05[A] p. 13-76, and cases cited therein. "Fair use, 
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which 
does not materially impair the marketability of the work 
which is copied." 1 Nimmer § 1,l0[D], p. 1-87. The trial 
court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the 
market. Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and 
its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of the in-
fringement. The Court of Appeals rejected this fact finding 
as clearly erroneous, noting that the record did not establish 
a causal relation between Time's nonperformance and re-
spondent's unauthorized publication of Mr. Ford's expression 
as opposed to the facts taken from the memoirs. We dis-
agree. Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present 
such clear cut evidence of actual damage. Petitioners as-
sured Time that there would be no other authorized publica-
tion of any portion of the unpublished manuscript prior to 
April 23, 1979. Any publication of material from chapters 1 
and 3 would permit Time to renegotiate its final payment. 
Time cited The Nation's article, which contained verbatim 
quotes from the unpublished manuscript, as a reason for its 
nonperformance. Petitioners established a prima facie case 
8 Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use excep-
tion should come into play only in those situations in which the market fails 
or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero. See, e. g., Bren-
nan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, Dept. 
of Justice Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, 13-17 (1984); Gordon, 
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). 
As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully functioning market that en-
courages the creation and dissemination of memoirs of public figures. In 
the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal copyright 
channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public 
benefit. 
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of actual damage that respondent failed to rebut. See Ste-
vens Linen Association.inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F. 2d 
11, 15 (CA2 1981). Ttie trial court properly awarded actual 
damages and profits. See 17 U. S. C. § 505. 
More important, to negate fair use one need only show that 
if the challenged use "should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted 
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, 
at -- (emphasis added); id., at--, and n. 36 (collecting 
cases) (dissenting opinion). This inquiry must take account 
not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the mar-
ket for derivative works. See Iowa State University Re-
search Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F. 
2d 57 (CA2 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, supra, at 1070; Roy Ex-
port v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 
1146. "If the defendant's work adversely affects the value of 
any of the rights in the copyrighted work (in this case the ad-
aptation [and serialization] right) the use is not fair." 3 
Nimmer§ 13.05[B], pp. 13-77-13-78. 
It is undisputed that the factual material in the balance of 
The Nation's article, besides the verbatim quotes at issue 
here, was drawn exclusively from the chapters on the par-
don. The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a 
story about the Nixon pardon-precisely the use petit6ners 
had licensed to Time. The borrowing of these vlrbatim 
quotes from the unpublished manuscript lent The Nation's 
piece a special air of authenticity-as N avasky expressed it, 
the reader would know it was Ford speaking and not The Na-
tion. App. 300c. Thus it directly competed for a share of 
the market for prepublication excerpts. The Senate Report 
states: 
"With certain special exceptions ... a use that supplants 
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work 
would ordinarily be considered an infringement." Id /at 
65. . . 7'M 
!f I 
t/ 
IT 
• 
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Placed in a broader perspective, a fair use doctrine that per-
mits extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased 
manuscript without the copyright owner's consent poses sub-
stantial potential for damage to the marketability of first 
serialization rights in general. "Isolated instances of minor 
infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the 
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be pre-
vented." Senate Report, at 65. 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that The Nation's 
use of the copyrighted material was excused by the public's 
interest in the subject matter. It erred, as well, in overlook-
ing the unpublished nature of the work and the resulting im-
pact on the potential market for first serial rights of permit-
ting unauthorized prepublication excerpts under the rubric of 
fair use. Finally, in finding the taking "infinitesimal," the 
Court of Appeals accorded too little weight to the qualitative 
importance of the quoted passages of original expression. In 
sum, the traditional doctrine of fair use, as embodied in the 
Copyright Act, does not sanction the use made by The Nation 
or these copyrighted materials. Any copyright infringer 
may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to 
the copyrighted work. See Pacific and Southern Co. v. 
Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1499-1500 (CAll 1984). But Con-
gress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially 
imposing, a "compulsory license" permitting unfettered 
access to the unpublished copyrighted expression of public 
figures. 
IV 
The Nation conceded that its verbatim copying of some 300 
words of direct quotation from the Ford manuscript would 
constitute an infringement unless excused as a fair use. Be-
cause we find that The Nation's use of these verbatim ex-
cerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use, 
we do not address the appellate court's conclusions concern-
ing various issues of copyrightability. We observe, how-
ever, that the law concerning the copyrightability of factual 
- -
83-1632-0PINION 
26 HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES 
narrative and its component parts is currently unsettled and 
we believe these issues of copyrightability are best left to fur-
ther development by the courts , on full factual records and in 
the context of cases that turn on the such issues and not, as 
does this one, on the doctrine of fair use. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
- -
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT 
The portions of The Nation article which were copied verbatim from "A 
Time to Heal," excepting quotes from government documents and quotes 
attributed by Ford to third persons, are identified in bold face in the text. 
Seen. 7, ante, at--. The corresponding passages in the Ford manu-
script are footnoted. 
THE FORD MEMOIRS 
BEHIND THE NIXON PARDON 
• 
In his memoirs, A Time To Heal, which Harper & Row will 
publish in late May or early June, former President Gerald R. 
Ford says that the idea of giving a blanket pardon to Richard 
M. Nixon was raised before Nixon resigned from the Presi-
dency by Gen. Alexander Haig, who was then the White 
House chief of staff. 
Ford also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he 
might have selected Ronald Reagan as his 1976 running 
mate, that Washington lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, a 
Democrat, was his choice for head of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, that Nixon was the one who first proposed Rocke-
feller for Vice President, and that he regretted his "coward-
ice" 1 in allowing Rockefeller to remove himself from Vice 
Presidential contention. Ford also describes his often 
prickly relations with Henry Kissinger. 
The Nation obtained the 655-page typescript before publi-
cation. Advance excerpts from the book will appear in Time 
in mid-April and in The Reader's Digest thereafter. Al-
though the initial print order has not been decided, the figure 
is tentatively set at 50,000; it could change, depending upon 
the public reaction to the serialization. 
Ford's account of the Nixon pardon contains significant 
new detail on the negotiations and considerations that sur-
rounded it. According to Ford's version, the subject was 
1 I was angry at myself for showing cowardice in not saying to the ultra-
conservatives, "It's going to be Ford and Rockefeller, whatever the conse-
quences." p. 496. 
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first broached to him by General Haig on August 1, 1974, a 
week before Nixon resigned. General Haig revealed that 
the newly transcribed White House tapes were the equiva-
lent of the "smoking gun" 2 and that Ford should prepare 
himself to become President. 
Ford was deeply hurt by Haig's revelation: "Over the past 
several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he 
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would 
prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from 
view." 3 Ford had believed him, but he let Haig explain the 
President's alternatives. 
He could "ride it out" 4 or he could resign, Haig said. He 
then listed the different ways Nixon might resign and con-
cluded by pointing out that Nixon could agree to leave in re-
turn for an agreement that the new President, Ford, 
would pardon him. 5 Although Ford said it would be im-
proper for him to make any recommendation, he basically 
agreed with Haig's assessment and adds, "Because of his 
references to the pardon authority, I did ask Haig about 
the extent of a President's pardon power." 6 
"It's my understanding from a White House lawyer," Haig 
replied, "That a President does have authority to grant a par-
don even before criminal action has been taken against an 
individual." 
2 [l]t contained the so-called smoking gun. p. 3. 
3 Over the past several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he 
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would prove his inno-
cence, that the matter would fade from view. p. 7. 
4 The first [ option] was that he could try to "ride it out" by letting im-
peachment take its natural course through the House and the Senate trial, 
fighting against conviction all the way. p. 4. 
5 Finally, Haig said that according to some on Nixon's White House 
staff, Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new 
President-Gerald Ford-would pardon him. p. 5. 
• Because of his references to pardon authority, I did ask Haig about the 
extent of a President's pardon po.wer. pp. 5-6. 
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But because Ford had neglected to tell Haig he thought the 
idea of a resignation conditioned on a pardon was improper, 
his press aide, Bob Hartmann, suggested that Haig might 
well have returned to the White House and told President 
Nixon that he had mentioned the idea and Ford seemed com-
fortable with it. "Silence implies assent." 
Ford then consulted with White House special counsel 
James St. Clair, who had no advice one way or the other on 
the matter more than pointing out that he was not the lawyer 
who had given Haig the opinion on the pardon. Ford also 
discussed the matter with Jack Marsh, who felt that the men-
tion of a pardon in this context was a "time bomb," and with 
Bryce Harlow, who had served six Presidents and who 
agreed that the mere mention of a pardon "could cause a 
lot of trouble." 7 
As a result of these various conversations, Vice President 
Ford called Haig and read him a written statement: "I want 
you to understand that I have no intention of recommending 
what the President should do about resigning or not resign-
ing and that nothing we talked about yesterday afternoon 
should be given any consideration in whatever decision the 
President may wish to make." 
Despite what Haig had told him about the "smoking gun" 
tapes, Ford told a Jackson, Mich., luncheon audience later 
in the day that the President was not guilty of an im-
peachable offense. "Had I said otherwise at the mo-
ment," he writes, "the whole house of cards might have 
collapsed." 8 
In justifying the pardon, Ford goes out of his way to assure 
the reader that "compassion for Nixon as an individual 
7 Only after I had finished did [Bryce Harlow] let me know in no uncer-
tain terms that he agreed with Bob and Jack, that the mere mention of the 
pardon option could cause a lot of trouble in the days ahead. p. 18. 
8 During the luncheon I repeated my assertion that the President was 
not guilty of an impeachable offense. Had I said otherwise at that mo-
ment, the whole house of cards might have collapsed. p. 21. 
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hadn't prompted my decision at all." 9 Rather, he did it 
because he had "to get the monkey off my back one way or 
the other." 10 
The precipitating factor in his decision was a series of 
secret meetings his general counsel, Phil Buchen, held with 
Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski in the Jefferson 
Hotel, where they were both staying at the time. Ford at-
tributes Jaworski with providing some "crucial" informa-
tion 11-i. e., that Nixon was under investigation in ten 
separate areas, and that the court process could "take 
years." 12 Ford cites a memorandum from J aworski's assist-
ant, Henry S. Ruth Jr., as being especially persuasive. 
Ruth had written: 
"If you decide to recommend indictment I think it is fair 
and proper to notify Jack Miller and the White House suffi-
ciently in advance so that pardon action could be taken before 
the indictment." He went on to say: "One can make a strong 
argument for leniency and if President Ford is so ~nclined, I 
think he ought to do it early rather than late." 
Ford decided that court proceedings against Nixon might 
take six years, that Nixon "would not spend time quietly in 
San Clemente," 13 and "it would be virtually impossible 
for me to direct public attention on anything else." 14 
Buchen, Haig and Henry Kissinger agreed with him. 
Hartmann was not so sure. 
9 But compassion for Nixon as an individual ha<ln't prompted my decision 
at all. p. 266. 
10 I had to get the monkey off my back one way or another. p. 236. 
11 Jaworski gave Phil several crucial pieces of information. p. 246. 
12 And if the verdict was Guilty, one had to assume that Nixon would ap-
peal. That process would take years. p. 248. 
13 The entire process would no doubt require years: a minimum of two, a 
maximum of six. And Nixon would not spend time quietly in San Cle-
mente. p. 238. 
1
• It would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on 
~nything else. p. 239. 
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Buchen wanted to condition the pardon on Nixon agreeing 
to settle the question of who would retain custody and control 
over the tapes and Presidential papers that might be relevant 
to various Watergate proceedings, but Ford was reluctant to 
do that. 
At one point a plan was considered whereby the Presiden-
tial materials would be kept in a vault at a Federal facility 
near San Clemente, but the vault would require two keys to 
open it. One would be retained by the General Services Ad-
ministration, the other by Richard Nixon. 
The White House did, however, want Nixon to make a full 
confession on the occasion of his pardon or, at a minimum, ex-
press true contrition. Ford tells of the negotiation with Jack 
Miller, Nixon's lawyer, over the wording of Nixon's state-
ment. But as Ford reports Miller's response. Nixon was 
not likely to yield. "His few meetings with his client had 
shown him that the former President's ability to discuss 
Watergate objectively was almo.st nonexistent." 15 
The statement they really wanted was never forthcoming. 
As scion as Ford's emissary arrived in San Clemente, he was 
confronted with an ultimatum by Ron Zeigler, Nixon's for-
mer press secretary. "Lets get one thing straight immedi-
ately," Zeigler said. "President Nixon is not issuing any 
statement whatsoever regarding Watergate, whether Jerry 
Ford pardons him or not." Zeigler proposed a draft, which 
was turned down on the ground that "no statement would 
be better than that." 16 They went through three more 
drafts before they agreed on the statement Nixon finally 
made, which stopped far short of a full confession. 
When Ford aide Benton Becker tried to explain to Nixon 
that acceptance of a pardon was an admission of guilt, he felt 
15 But [Miller] wasn't optimistic about getting such a statement. His few 
meetings with his client had shown him that the former President's ability 
to discuss Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent. p. 246. 
16 When Zeigler asked Becker what he thought of it, Becker replied that 
no statement would be better than that. p. 251. 
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the President wasn't really listening. Instead, Nixon 
wanted to talk about the Washington Redskins. And when 
Becker left, Nixon pressed on him some cuff links and a tiepin 
"out of my own jewelry box." 
Ultimately, Ford sums up the philosophy underlying his 
decision as one he picked up as a student at Yale Law School 
many years before. "I learned that public policy often 
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected 
the tenet that no man should be above the law, public pol-
icy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind 
us as quickly as possible." 17 
Later, when Ford learned that Nixon's phlebitis had acted 
up and his health was seriously impaired, he debated 
whether to pay the ailing former President a visit. "If I 
made the trip it would remind everybody of Watergate and 
the pardon. If I didn't, people would say I lacked compas-
sion." 18 Ford went: 
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were 
tubes in his nose and mouth, and wires led from his arms, 
chest and legs to machines with orange lights that blinked 
on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I had never 
seen anyone closer to death. 19 
The manuscript made available to The Nation includes 
many references to Henry Kissinger and other personalities 
who played a major role during the Ford years. 
11 Years before, at Yale Law School, I'd learned that public policy often 
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected the tenet that 
no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon-
and Watergate-behind us as quickly as possible. p. 256. 
1
• My staff debated whether or not I ought to visit Nixon at the Long 
Beach Hospital, only half an hour away. If I made the trip, it would re-
mind everyone of Watergate and the pardon. If I didn't , people would say 
I lacked compassion. I ended their debate as soon as I found out it had 
begun. Of course I would go. p. 298. 
1
• He was stretched out flat on his back. There were tubes in his nose 
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with 
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On Kissinger. Immediately after being informed by 
Nixon of his intention to resign, Ford returned to the Execu-
tive Office Building and phoned Henry Kissinger to let him 
know how he felt. "Henry," he said, "I need you. The 
country needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do every-
thing I can to work with you." 20 
"Sir," Kissinger replied, "it is my job to get along with you 
and not yours to get along with me." 
"We'll get along," Ford said. "I know we'll get along." 
Referring to Kissinger's joint jobs as Secretary of State and 
National Security Adviser to the President, Ford said, "I 
don't want to make any change. I think it's worked out 
well, so let's keep it that way." 21 
Later Ford did make the change and relieved Kissinger of 
his responsibilities as National Security Adviser at the same 
time that he fired James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense. 
Shortly thereafter, he reports, Kissinger presented him with 
a "draft" letter of resignation, which he said Ford could call 
upon at will if he felt he needed it to quiet dissent from con-
servatives who objected to Kissinger's role in the firing of 
Schlesinger. 
On John Connally. When Ford was informed that Nixon 
wanted him to replace Agnew, he told the President he had 
"no ambition to hold office after January 1977." 22 Nixon 
replied that that was good since his own choice for his run-
orange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I 
had never seen anyone cloer to death. p. 299. 
20 "Henry," I said when he came on the line, "I need you. The country 
needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with 
you." p. 46. 
21 We'll get along," I said. "I know we can get along." We talked about 
the two hats he wore, as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor 
to the President. "I don't want to make any change," I said. "I think it's 
worked out well, so let's keep it that way." p. 46. 
22 I told him about my promise to Betty and said that I had no ambitions 
to hold office after January 1977. p. 155. 
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ning mate in 1976 was John Connally. "He'd be excellent," 
observed Nixon. Ford says he had "no problem with that." 
On the Decision to Run Again. Ford was, he tells us, so 
sincere in his intention not to run again that he thought he 
would announce it and enhance his credibility in the country 
and the Congress, as well as keep the promise he had made to 
his wife, Betty. 
Kissinger talked him out of it. "You can't do that. It 
would be disastrous from a foreign policy point of view. For 
the next two and a half years foreign governments would 
know that they were dealing with a lame-duck President. 
All our initiatives would be dead in the water, and I wouldn't 
be able to implement your foreign policy. It would probably 
have the same consequences in dealing with the Congress on 
domestic issues. You can't reassert the authority of the 
Presidency if you leave yourself hanging out on a dead limb. 
You've got to be an affirmative President." 
On David Kennerly, the White House photographer. 
Schlesinger was arguing with Kissinger and Ford over the 
appropriate response to the seizure of the Mayaguez . At 
issue was whether airstrikes against the Cambodians were 
desirable; Schlesinger was opposed to bombings. Following 
a lull in the conversation, Ford reports, up spoke the 30-year-
old White House photographer, David Kennerly, who had 
been taking pictures for the last hour. 
"Has anyone considered," Kennerly asked, "that this might 
be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just 
taken it into his own hands to stop any ship that comes by?" 
Nobody, apparently, had considered it, but following several 
seconds of silence, Ford tells us, the view carried the day. 
"Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill," Ford 
decided. "It would be far better to have Navy' jets from 
the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific 
targets." 23' 
23 Subjectively, I felt that what Kennerly had said made a lot of sense. 
Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill. It would be far better to 
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On Nixon's Character. Nixon's flaw, according to Ford, 
was "pride." "A terribly proud man," writes Ford, "he 
detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him 
speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to be soft and 
expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was 
weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He 
knew they didn't like him, and he responded with recipro-
cal disdain.)" 24 
Nixon felt disdain for the Democratic leadership of the 
House, whom he also regarded .as weak. According to Ford, 
"His pride and personal contempt for weakness had over-
come his ability to tell the difference between right and 
wrong," 25 all of which leads Ford to wonder whether Nixon 
had known in advance about Watergate. 
On hearing Nixon's resignation speech, which Ford felt 
lacked an adequate plea for forgiveness, he was persuaded 
that "Nixon was out of touch with reality." 26 
In February of last year, when The Washington Post ob-
tained and printed advance excerpts from H. R. Haldeman's 
memoir, The Ends of Power, on the eve of its publication by 
Times Books, The New York Times called The Post's feat "a 
second-rate burglary." 
rhe Post disagreed, claiming that its coup represented 
"first-rate enterprise" and arguing that it had burglarized 
nothing, that publication of the Haldeman memoir came 
have Navy jets from the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific 
targets in the vicinity of Kompong Som. p. 416. 
24 In Nixon's case, that flaw was pride. A terribly proud man, he de-
tested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly 
of those whom he felt to be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel 
that the press was weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. 
He knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain.) 
p. 53. 
25 His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability 
to tell the difference between right and wrong. p. 54. 
26 The speech lasted fifteen minutes, and at the end I was convinced 
Nixon was out of touch with reality. p. 57. 
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under the Fair Comment doctrine long recognized by the 
courts, and that "There is a fundamental journalistic principle 
here-a First Amendment principle that was central to the 
Pentagon Papers case." 
In the issue of The Nation dated May 5, 1979, our special 
Spring Books number, we will discuss some of the ethical 
problems raised by the issue of disclosure. 
- -
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M'E~ORANDUM 
TO: Lynda DATE: Dec. 27, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-1632 Harper & Row 
Sally will give you a copy of my dictated rough 
draft of a letter to ,Justice O'Connor. You have my author-
ity to make appropriate changes in my <lraft, and to have the 
letter circulated to the Conference on Thursday. T wou1a 
like to get it in circulation before other Justices take a 
position. If you think my letter is too stronq in part, vou 
have my a9proval of re-F.raming it. We must keep in mind, 
however, what I will write if Justlce o•ronnor leaves the 
opinion in substantially its present form. 
L .F.P., Jr . 
ss 
e 
CHAMl!IERS 01' 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL. JR. 
-
il1t1trnnt <qonrt of tl{t ~tb iltatt• 
jllasJringtcn, ~- (4. 20ffe~, 
December 27, 1984 
83-1632 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
Dear Sandra: 
I have read your opinion with special interest, 
and think your disposition of the "fair use" issue is ex-
tremely well written. At least for me, it is totally con-
vincing. 
As I read the opinion, I understood that you were 
assuming the validity of the copyright. In Part IV (pp. 25-
26), however, you expressly decline to address the "issues 
of copyrightability". 
I may have said at Conference that we could assume 
CA2 was correct on the copyright issues and just decide the 
fair use question. On further reflection, I think we should 
reverse CA2's holding, as I understand it, that only the 
300/400 words of President Ford were copyrightable. If only 
selected quotes of a biographer's personal reflections on 
events are protected, the writing of biography would be se-
riously chilled. Churchill's great autobiographies are 
filled with the great facts of history. My understanding is 
that they are no less protected by copyrights throughout the 
western world, and by copyrights that are not limited to 
Churchill's reflections. This is not to say, of course, 
that the facts themselves - out of the context of the auto-
biography - are subject to copyright. Of course, they are 
not. 
In sum, Sandra, the copyright issues are presented 
by this case, and I think we should decide them. The case 
properly affords the Court an opportunity to establish as a 
matter of copyright law that an effort like The Nation's in 
this case simply to "steal" two years of work by a biogra-
pher is a gross violation of copyright laws and contrary to 
the public interest. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
<~ 
~ 
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CHAMBERS 0,.. 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
-
.inprtmt <q.nttt of tlf t ~tb .ftatts 
jlas4ittgton. ,. ~ 20.;i'1-, 
December 27, 1984 
83-1632 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
Dear Sandra: 
I have read your opinion with special interest, 
and think your disposition of the "fair use" issue is ex-
tremely well written. At least for me, it is totally con-
vincing. 
As I read the opinion, I understood that you were 
assuming the validity of the copyright. In Part IV (pp. 25-
26), however, you expressly decline to address the "issues 
of copyrightability". 
I may have said at Conference that we could assume 
CA2 was correct on the copyright issues and just decide the 
fair use question. On further reflection, I think we should 
reverse CA2's holding, as I understand it, that only the 
300/400 words of President Ford were copyrightable. If only 
selected quotes of a biographer's personal reflections on 
events are protected, the writing of biography would be se-
riously chilled. Churchill's great autobiographies are 
filled with the great facts of history. My understanding is 
that they are no less protected by copyrights throughout the 
western world, and by copyrights that are not limited to 
Churchill's reflections. This is not to say, of course, 
that the facts themselves - out of the context of the auto-
biography - are subject to copyright. Of course, they are 
not. 
In sum, Sandra, the copyright issues are presented 
by this case, and I think we should decide them. The case 
properly affords the Court an opportunity to establish as a 
matter of copyright law that an effort like The Nation's in 
this case simply to "steal" two years of work by a biogra-
pher is a gross violation of copyright laws and contrary to 
the public interest. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
r~ 
..._.. 
CHAMl!IERS Of" 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-
~ant <!l!tUri Df flrt ~b iltatt• 
,ru~ ,. <II• 2Dffe,., 
December 27, 1984 
No. 83-1632 
-
Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, et al. 
Dear Sandra, 
I'll circulate a dissent in due 
course. I'm sorry, but it may take me a 
while. 
Sincerely, 
f,~ 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
V 
- -
.Supumt (!fourt of tlf t ~h i\bdts 
'IIJasJringhtn. ~. Of. 2.0'.?'t~ 
CHAMBE:RS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 27, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1632-Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
Dear Sandra: 
I await the dissent. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
r.,1,1. 
T.M. 
✓ 
CHAMBERS 0,-
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
- -
.hpTtm.t Qiourl of tlr.t 1{nittb ,jhd.t• 
,ruJrutgt~ ~- QI. 2Dffe'1, 
✓ 
December 28, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1632, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enter£rises 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
J:1--
"~~4--z,-:~.~ -
(11~ 
lgs December 28, 1984 
~~. 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
As you will see from the attached letter to the 
Conference, I made some substantial changes to your draft letter. 
After reviewing your Conference notesl the opinions below, and 
the briefs, it seemed to me that th~ lidity of the copyright on - ---------c.:--
Ford's book--in the sense of proper registration, etc., was not 
really at issue. Therefore, I minimized the letter's focus on 
-------------that point and emphasized instead what seemed to me to be the 
more crucial question, to which you had alluded at Conference, of 
Nb 
whether to assume CA2 was correct in holding only the 300-400 
~ 
words protected by copyright, or to reverse CA2 on that holding, 
as well. I hope that my changes did not misrepresent your 01:, 
position. I understood, however, that you wanted ~he letter to 
circulate yesterday, so I did the best I could. - M 
I learned today that Justice O'Connor will not be in 
until next week. I spoke to her clerk about the opinion, who 
told me that there were two primary reasons for not addressing 
the copyright issues. First, once she got into the record, it 
appeared that the DC's factual findings were too skimpy for this 
Court to do a proper job. Second, she did not believe Justice 
----
- -
O'Connor had a Court to reverse CA2's holding on the copyright 
issues, for several Justices who were in favor of reversing on 
the fair use point were in favor of affirming on the copyright 
holding. In any event, I suggested that at least a 
reorganization of the opinion, to explain more fully the 
relationship between the copyright issues and the fair use 
question, with something about the copyright issues up front, 
might make the opinion a little more palatable, although of 
course, I said I could not speak for what you would want done. 
Hope this all meets with your approval. Let me know if 
you want me to do something further at this point. 
~ 
J..bpe yatA-, ~ F4 ~ ~ 
r-
~ 
Wa_ 
CHAMBERS OF 
J USTICE SAN DRA D AY O'C ON NOR 
- -
j;uvr.tttt.t Q}ltltrt cf tq.t 'Juit.th j;tid.t,tr 
J hu~ftiugfon, 13. Q} . 2.tl~'!, 
January 2, 1985 
Re: 83-1632 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your letter concerning this case. I 
share your view that the Court of Appeals erred not only as 
to its treatment of fair use, but also in its treatment of 
copyrightability. As you will recall, at Conference I 
shared the Chief's view that more than merely the words 
underlined in the Appendix to the draft were copyrightable 
and were infringed. I thought "long and hard" about how to 
approach the opinion with respect to the copyrightability 
issue. As I count the votes, I think there are an 
insufficient number for a Court on my view of the 
copyrightability aspect in this case. It is likely to be 
only a 5/4 decision even if we limit it to the fair use 
question. The fair use issue is dispositive even if we 
assume arguendo that only the minimum number of words 
admittedly copied directly constituted the infringement. 
If we were to address the copyrightability issue 
in this case, because neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals made some of the necessary findings, a 
remand would be necessary. The District Court adopted a 
"totality" approach to copyrightability. Thus, neither the 
trial nor the appellate court really addressed the question 
whether an author's reconstruction of conversations is 
copyrightable. A majority of courts and commentators adopt 
the view that an author's reconstruction of dialogue 
constitutes protected expression, although verbatim quotes 
from a stenographic transcript are not. See 1 Nimmer 
§2.ll[B] at 2-160, N.11. Much of the quoted material in The 
Nation's article purports to be words spoken by persons 
other than Ford. The trial court, however, "decline[d] to 
enter the thicket of deciding which statements were exact 
quotations - and therefore not protected by copyright - and 
which were merely reconstructions of statements pieced 
together by Ford - and therefore copyrightable." Petn B-11. 
"The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that the quotations 
were literal, although in most instances it would seem that 
recollections of statements made by others in the past must 
of necessity involve reconstruction rather than literal 
repetition." 1 Nimmer §2.ll[B], at 2-161, n.11 (discussing 
this case). 
• . - - - 2 -
Even assuming the Court of Appeals departed from 
some well established principles in dealing with the 
copyrightability issue, I think it is advisable to limit our 
opinion in this case to the fair use issue which is 
dispositive. In view of the lack of votes, as well as the 
absence of adequate factfinding below, I think it best to 
save the copyrightability issue for another day. I hope you 
will feel comfortable with the present more limited 
approach. 
Sincerely, 
~~ 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
- -
~U.Vrttnt Qlllttrl .of tqt )tnittb .jbdt-&' 
Jht,s-lfingfon, ~. Ql • 2ll~Jt' 
January 2, 1985 
Re: 83-1632 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your letter concerning this case. I 
share your view that the Court of Appeals erred not only as 
to its treatment of fair use, but also in its treatment of 
copyrightability. As you will recall, at Conference I 
shared the Chief's view that more than merely the words 
underlined in the Appendix to the draft were copyrightable 
and were infringed. I thought "long and hard" about how to 
approach the opinion with respect to the copyrightability 
issue. As I count the votes, I think there are an 
insufficient number for a Court on my view of the 
copyrightability aspect in this case. It is likely to be 
only a 5/4 decision even if we limit it to the fair use 
question. The fair use issue is dispositive even if we 
assume arguendo that only the minimum number of words 
admittedly copied directly constituted the infringement. 
If we were to address the copyrightability issue 
in this case, because neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals made some of the necessary findings, a 
remand would be necessary. The District Court adopted a 
"totality" approach to copyrightability. Thus, neither the 
trial nor the appellate court really addressed the question 
whether an author's reconstruction of conversations is 
copyrightable. A majority of courts and commentators adopt 
the view that an author's reconstruction of dialogue 
constitutes protected expression, although verbatim quotes 
from a stenographic transcript are not. See 1 Nimmer 
§2.ll[B] at 2-160, N.11. Much of the quoted material in The 
Nation's article purports to be words spoken by persons 
other than Ford. The trial court, however, "decline[d] to 
enter the thicket of deciding which statements were exact 
quotations - and therefore not protected by copyright - and 
which were merely reconstructions of statements pieced 
together by Ford - and therefore copyrightable." Petn B-11. 
"The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that the quotations 
were literal, although in most instances it would seem that 
recollections of statements made by others in the past must 
of necessity involve reconstruction rather than literal 
repetition." 1 Nimmer §2.ll[B], at 2-161, n.11 (discussing 
this case). 
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Even assuming the Court of Appeals departed from 
some well established principles in dealing with the 
copyrightability issue, I think it is advisable to limit our 
opinion in this case to the fair use issue which is 
dispositive. In view of the lack of votes, as well as the 
absence of adequate factfinding below, I think it best to 
save the copyrightability issue for another day. I hope you 
will feel comfortable with the present more limited 
approach. 
Sincerely, 
s~ 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
.Bupumt (lfMtrl '1f tlft ~it~ ~hdtlT 
~•Jriughtn. ~. <If. 20ffe~, 
January 2, 1985 
Re: 83-1632 - Harper & Row v. Nation 
Enterprises 
Dear Sandra: 
Your opinion is extremely persuasive. Since I 
tentatively voted the other way at Conference, 
however, I shall wait for other writing. 
Respectfully, 
j ll 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
- -
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
..inprmtt <!f omi .of tltt ~b ..iudts 
-.uqinght~ J. QI. 20ffell' 
January 3, 1985 
r 
Re: No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises 
Dear Sandra, 
I have some of the same problems that Lewis indicated 
in his memo December 27. I see no real problem about 
ultimately joining you. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: Justice Powell 
, 
- .fu:pi-nnt <!}llltti nf tqt ~tb ~wt 
,ras£rtnghtn. ~. Cl}. 20.;;>1, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 4, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1632 Harper & Row v. Reader's Digest 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely~ 
-
-
- -
lgs January 22, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-1632 -- Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
We have received a response from Justice O'Connor 
concerning why she chose not to address in her opinion the issues 
of copyrightability presented by this case. As we surmised, her 
reasons were that (i) the courts below had not made the 
appropriate fact findings to enable a decision by this Court that 
would not entail a remand, and (ii) by her count, she did not 
have a Court for reversing CA2 on the copyrightability issues. 
In view of the lack of votes and the need for more factfinding, 
she concluded that it would be best to leave the copyrightability 
issues for another day, especially since her resolution of the 
fair use issue is dispositive of the case, no matter which way 
the copyright issues are viewed. Her letter is attached. 
Although I originally thought that the copyright issues 
should have been addressed, I am now not so sure. I had not 
previously focused on the fact that the fair use issue is 
dispositive, no matter how the copyrightability issues are dealt 
with. Moreover, having reexamined the lower court opinions and 
- Nimmer On Copyright, I am persuaded that Justice O'Connor is 
-
-
- -
correct that the issues could not be decided finally without 
additional fact finding. 
First, as Justice O'Connor notes, the DC adopted a 
broad "totality" approach to the issue of copyrightability under 
which the court "decline[d] to enter the thicket of deciding 
which statements [used by Ford and reproduced in the Nation 
article] were exact quotations [of other people]--and therefore 
not protected by copyright--and which were merely reconstructions 
of statements pieced together by Ford--and therefore 
copyrightable." App. to Petn for Cert, B-10 to B-11. As Justice 
O'Connor notes in her letter, much of the material copied by the 
Nation purports to be words spoken by persons other than Ford. A 
majority of courts have held that an author of a factual work may 
not claim copyright protection for the conversation or statements 
made by others, since the author may not claim originality as to 
such statements, as required by §102(a) of the Act for copyright 
protection to attach. See 1 Nimmer On Copyright §2.ll[BJ at 2-
160 n.9.1. On the other hand, most courts agree that an author's 
reconstruction of such conversations is copyrightable, see id., 
at 2-160 n.11, a view that seems reasonable given that the 
author's reconstruction contains the necessary element of 
originality needed for copyright protection to attach. CA2 
assumed that the quotations were literal, and ruled they were not 
protectible; logically, however, such recollections of statements 
made by others in the past would seem to consist more of 
- reconstruction than of literal quotation. See id., at 2-161 n.11 
(discussing this case). Thus, although this Court could decide 
-
-
- -
the general question whether statements attributed to others 
should be protected by copyright, it could not decide the final 
question of whether the statements copied by the Nation were 
copyrightable, because neither court below decided whether the 
statements were reconstructions or literal quotations. 
Likewise, CA2 ruled that only large-scale paraphrasing 
of "virtually an entire work" would constitute a copyright 
infringement, a view with which I disagree and to which there is 
opposition in the case law. E.g., Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-
Line Mfg. Co., 352 F.2d 546 (CA7 1965). Nonetheless, the DC did 
not embark on a detailed comparison of the two works in its fact-
findings, something that would be required to support a holding 
that too much paraphrasing had occurred. Thus, this Court could 
rule generally that CA2 had erred in holding that large-scale 
paraphrasing was required for copyright infringement, but it 
would either have to remand or do its own fact-finding to analyse 
how much paraphrasing occurred here. 
Writing an opinion for remand, with the chance that it 
would garner enough votes for a Court on the copyrightability 
issue, would ordinarily not be so bad; under the particular 
circumstances involved here, however, I am now persuaded it would 
be of dubious utility. In accepting CA2's concession that Ford's 
300/400 words of verbatim quotes were copyrightable and in 
reversing CA2's holding that the copying of these words was fair 
use, Justice O'Connor effectively grants judgment for Harper & 
- Row. A remand on the other issues of copyrightability thereby 
becomes completely unnecessary to the resolution of the case. 
-
-
-
- -
Given the difficulty of the issues involved, I can now appreciate 
why Justice O'Connor believed it might be just as well to 
sidestep them. 
Under these circumstances, I thought you might want to 
reconsider your decision to write in this case. If you should 
decide not to write separately on the copyrightability issues, I 
would nonetheless recommend that you request Justice O'Connor to 
make some minor stylistic changes geared to making plain early in 
the opinion how she views the copyright issues. I still believe 
that it is structurally illogical to decide the fair use question 
without first saying at least that the 300/400 words are 
copyrightable and why this is so. 
-
C H AMBERS OF 
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.iUJtrtlttt (!Jltlttt itf tlrt ~nitt~ .§taftg 
~it¼Y!p:ttgtcn:, J . QJ. 2llffe'-1$ 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
February 8, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row v . Nation Enterprises 
Dear Sandra: 
After further consideration of your op1n1on and 
your letter of January 2, 1985, I have concluded that there 
is considerable merit to leaving the copyright issues until 
another day, especially since the fair use issue is disposi -
tive of the case. Therefore, I am pleased to join your fine 
opinion. 
I wonder, however, if you would consider making 
some minor changes designed to make clear early in the opin-
ion how you view the copyright issues. It would help make 
the opinion clearer if you were to state up front that the 
copyright in the book as a whole was validly obtained, and 
no question is raised as its validity. The opinion might 
also be somewhat improved if it stated early on that the 
300/400 words quoted from Ford are copyrightable and why 
this is so. It seems more logical to me to establish first 
that some of what the Nation used was protected by copy-
right, and then to proceed to discuss why their use was not 
fair. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely 
1/ 
,, 
~ . ,. 
. . t ~ ,_,,,__ ,,,,._,, I ~c4,~ ::~~~~Q. ,- ---,7~~ . / u ''-' r ~
- -i_ ~4._, 
lgs February 8, 1985 
w Jlv ~ ~~d. 
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~~a<~~ rr~~~. 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
/ 
There is one minor bit of unfinished business on this 
case. When I spoke to you while you were in the hospital, we 
agreed, I think, that I would write a join note for you to 
Justice O'Connor since you decided that you would not write. 
After I hung up, I realized that I should recommend to you that 
you ask Justice O'Connor to make some minor stylistic changes 
designed to make plain early in the opinion how she views the 
copyright issues. I spoke to Justice O'Connor's clerk, who said 
she agreed with me and that she believed Justice O'Connor would 
be amenable to making such changes. I have not sent a letter, 
however, since I had not cleared all of this with you. 
Attached is a proposed draft of a letter to Justice 
O'Connor. 
}~ ~ ~ 
ref- /M<A-~K 
'L . r. (F 
- -
j\uprmtt QIDU.ri of tltt ~nitt~ .ttatt.e 
Jla~Itington, ~- <lf. 2ll.;r'1'' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
February 9, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
Dear Sandra: 
After further consideration of your opinion and 
your letter of January 2, 1985, I have concluded that there 
is considerable merit to leaving the copyright issues until 
another day, especially since the fair use issue is disposi-
tive of the case. Therefore, I am pleased to join your fine 
opinion. 
I wonder, however, if you would consider making 
some minor changes designed to make clear early in the opin-
ion how you view the copyright issues •. It would help make 
the opinion clearer if you were to state up front that the 
copyright in the book as a whole was validly obtained, and 
no question is raised as its validity. The opinion might 
also be somewhat improved if it stated early on that the 
300/400 words quoted from Ford are copyrightable and why 
this is so. It seems more logical to me to establish first 
that some of what the Nation used was protected by copy-
right, and then to proceed to discuss why their use was not 
fair. 
My join is not, however, conditioned upon your 
accepting the foregoing suggestions. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely 
L~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
- -
~Ulfrtmt ~o:urt itf t4t ~ittb .:§tidt,« 
Jl'R$4utgfon. ~. ~. 2.tlffe~~ 
February 11, 1985 
No. 83-1632 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
Dear Lewis, 
First, let me say how great it is to be receiving 
your communications again. 
Second, I am happy to have your joinder in this 
case as well as your suggestions. I will try to incorporate 
them in the next circulation. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
'Stylistic Changes Throughout • 
ft ~ 71J 9 (ff JC /9.
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To: The Chief Justice i 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White 
Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun 
Justice Powell 
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Justice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1632 
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. AND THE READ-
ER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONERS 
v. NATION ENTERPRISES AND THE NATION 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1985) 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to consider to what extent the "fair 
use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 
U. S. C. § 107 (hereinafter the Copyright Act), sanctions the 
unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpub-
lished manuscript. In April 1977, an undisclosed source pro-
vided The Nation magazine with the unpublished manuscript 
of "A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford." 
Working directly from the purloined manuscript, an editor of 
The Nation produced a short piece entitled "The Ford Mem-
oirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon." The piece was timed to 
"scoop" an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time maga-
zine. Time had agreed to purchase the exclusive right to 
print prepublication excerpts from the copyright holders, 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (hereinafter Harper & Row) 
and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (hereinafter Reader's 
Digest). As a result of The Nation article, Time cancelled its 
agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright 
action against The Nation. On appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed the lower court's finding of infringement, holding 
that The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use" of the 
copyrighted material. We anted certiorari, --·· U. S. 
-- (1984), and we now re erse. 
,neoe_ cl,t~s ~ ,,,.,-....,-~ ~ w--hA..-t Ll.>-L .RtuL. vy._) 
J: ~ . 
~ 
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I 
In February 1977, shortly after leaving the White House, 
former President Gerald R. Ford contracted with petitioners 
Harper & Row and The Reader's Digest, to publish his as yet 
unwritten memoirs. The memoirs were to contain "signifi-
cant hitherto unpublished material" concerning the Water-
gate crisis, Mr. Ford's pardon of former President Nixon and 
"Mr. Ford's reflections on this period of history, and the 
morality and personalities involved." App. to Petn for Cert. 
C-14 - C-15. In addition to the right to publish the Ford 
memoirs in book form, the agreement gave petitioners the 
exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts, known in 
the trade as "first serial rights." Two years later, as the 
memoirs were nearing completion, petitioners negotiated a 
prepublication licensing agreement with Time, a weekly 
news magazine. Time agreed to pay $25,000, $12,500 in 
advance and an additional $12,500 at publication, in exchange 
for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's account 
of the Nixon pardon. The issue featuring the excerpts was 
timed to appear approximately one week before shipment of 
the full length book version to bookstores. Exclusivity was 
an important consideration; Harper & Row instituted proce-
dures designed to maintain the confidentiality of the manu-
script, and Time retained the right to renegotiate the second 
payment should the material appear in print prior to its 
release of the excerpts. 
Two to three weeks before the Time article's scheduled 
release, an unidentified person secretly brought a copy of the 
Ford manuscript to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, a 
political commentary magazine. Mr. Navasky knew that his 
possession of the manuscript was not authorized and that the 
manuscript must be returned quickly to his "source" to avoid 
discovery. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (SDNY 1983). He hast-
ily put together what he believed was "a real hot news story'' 
composed of quotes, paraphrases and facts drawn exclusively 
from the manuscript. Ibid. Mr. Navasky attempted no 
' - -
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independent commentary, research or criticism, in part 
because of the need for speed if he was to "make news" by 
"publish[ing] in advance of the publication of the Ford book." 
App. 416-417. The 2,250 word article, reprinted in the 
Appendix to this opinion, appeared on April 3, 1979. As a 
result of The Nation's article, Time cancelled its piece and 
refused to pay the remaining $12,500. 
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, alleging conversion, tortious 
interference with contract and violations of the Copyright 
Act. After a six day bench trial, the District Judge found 
that "A Time to Heal" was protected by copyright at the time 
of The Nation publication and that respondent's use of the 
copyrighted material constituted an infringement under the 
Copyright Act, § 106 (1),(2), and (3), protecting respectively 
the right to reproduce the work, the right to license prepara-
tion of derivative works, and the right of first distribution of 
the copyrighted work to the public. App. to Petn for Cert. 
C-29-C-30. The District Court rejected respondent's argu-
ment that The Nation's piece was a "fair use" sanctioned by 
§ 107 of the Act. Though billed as "hot news," the article 
contained no new facts. The magazine had "published its 
article for profit," taking "the heart" of "a soon-to-be-
published" work. This unauthorized use "caused the agree-
ment with Time to be aborted and thus diminished the value 
of the copyright." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. Although certain 
elements of the Ford memoir, such as historical facts and 
memoranda, were not per se copyrightable, the District 
Court held that it was "the totality of these facts and memo-
randa collected together with Ford's reflections that made 
them of value to The Nation, [and] this totality . . . is pro-
tected by the copyright laws." Id., at 1072-1073. The 
court awarded actual damages of $12,500. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed. The majority recognized that Mr. Ford's ver-
batim "reflections" were original "expression" protected by 
' - -
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copyright. But it held that the District Court had erred in 
assuming "the coupling [of these reflections] with uncopy-
rightable fact transformed that information into a copy-
righted 'totality."' 723 F. 2d 195, 205 (1983). The majority 
noted that copyright attaches to expression, not facts or 
ideas. It concluded that, to avoid granting a copyright 
monopoly over the facts underlying history and news, 
"'expression' [in such works must be confined] to its barest 
elements-the ordering and choice of the words themselves." 
Id., at 204. Thus similarities between the original and the 
challenged work traceable to the copying or paraphrasing of 
uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memo-
randa and other public documents, and quoted remarks of 
third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating whether the 
second author's use was fair or infringing. 
"When the uncopyrighted material is stripped away, the 
article in The Nation contains, at most, approximately 
300 words that are copyrighted. These remaining para-
graphs and scattered phrases are all verbatim quotations 
from the memoirs which had not appeared previously in 
other publications. They include a short segment of 
Ford's conversations with Henry Kissinger and several 
other individuals. Ford's impressionistic depictions of 
Nixon, ill with phlebitis after the resignation and pardon 
and of Nixon's character, constitute the major portion of 
this material. It is these parts of the magazine piece on 
which [the court] must focus in [its] examination of the 
question whether there was a 'fair use' of the copy-
righted matter." Id., at 206. 
Examining the four factors enumerated in § 107, see infra, at 
--, the majority found the purpose of the article was "news 
reporting," the original work was essentially factual in 
nature, the 300 words appropriated were insubstantial in 
relation to the 2,250 word piece, and the impact on the mar-
ket for the original was minimal as "the evidence [did] not 
support a finding that it was the very limited use of expres-
' - -
83-1632-0PINION 
HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES 5 
sion per se which led to Time's decision not to print the ex-
cerpt." The Nation's borrowing of verbatim quotations 
merely "len[t] authenticity to this politically significant mate-
rial . . . complementing the reporting of the facts." Id., at 
208. The Court of Appeals was especially influenced by the 
"politically significant" nature of the subject matter and its 
conviction that it is not "the purpose of the Copyright Act to 
impede that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a demo-
cratic state" or "chill the activities of the press by forbidding 
a circumscribed use of copyrighted words." Id., at 197, 208. 
II 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is 
intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowl-
edge. But we believe the Second Circuit gave insufficient 
deference to the scheme established by the Copyright Act for 
fostering the original works that provide the seed and sub-
stance of this harvest. The rights conferred by copyright 
are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge 
a fair return for their labors. Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1976). 
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that: 
"The Congress shall have the power ... to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
As we noted last Term, "[this] limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow 
the public access to the products of their genius after the lim-
ited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., -- U. S. --, -- (1984). 
"The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the indi-
vidual author in order to benefit the public." Id., at --
' - -
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(dissenting opinion). This principle applies equally to works 
of fiction and non-fiction. The book at issue here, for exam-
ple, was two years in the making, and began with a contract 
giving the author's copyright to the publishers in exchange 
for their services in producing and marketing the work. In 
preparing the book, Mr. Ford drafted essays and word por-
traits of public figures and participated in hundreds of taped 
interviews that were later distilled to chronicle his personal 
viewpoint. It is evident that the monopoly granted by copy-
right actively served its intended purpose of inducing the cre-
ation of new material of potential historical value. 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclu-
sive rights to the owner of the copyright. 1 Under the Copy-
right Act, these rights-to publish, copy, and distribute the 
author's work-vest in the author of an original work from 
the time of its creation. § 106. In practice, the author com-
monly sells his rights to publishers who off er royalties in 
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the 
author's work. The copyright owner's rights, however, are 
subject to certain statutory exceptions. §§ 107-118. 
Among these is § 107 which codifies the traditional privilege 
of other authors to make "fair use" of an earlier writer's 
work. 2 In addition, no author may copyright facts or ideas. 
1 Section 106 provides in pertinent part: 
"Subject to section 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ... ; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public .... " 
2 Section 107 states: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the 
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include-
I - -
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§ 102. The copyright is limited to those aspects of the 
work-termed "expression"-that display the stamp of the 
author's originality. 
Creation of a nonfiction work, even a compilation of pure 
fact, entails originality. See, e. g., Schroeder v. William 
Morrow & Co., 566 F. 2d 3 (CA7 1977) (copyright in garden-
ing directory); cf. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 
111 U. S. 53, 58 (1884) (originator of a photograph may claim ~ 
copyright in his work). The copyrightholders of A Time to _ 10,.. r-..M;) · .efe · 
Heal complied with the relevant statutory procedure~ See 
§§ 106, 401, 408; App. to Petn for Cert. C-20. Thus t ere is 
no dispute that the unpublished manuscript of A Time to 
Heal, as a whole, was protected by § 106 from unauthorized 
reproduction. Nor do respondents dispute that verbatim 
copying of excerpts of the manuscript's original form of 
expression would constitute infringement unless excused as 
fair use. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright §2.ll[B], at 2-159 
(1984 ed.) (hereinafter Nimmer). Yet copyright does not 
prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's 
work those constituent elements that are not original-for 
example, quotations borrowed under the rubric of fair use 
from other copyrighted works, facts, or materials in the pub-
lic domain-as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate 
the author's original contributions. Id.; Latman, Fair Use of 
Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study No. 14 in 
Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 
p. 7 (1960) (hereinafter Latman). Perhaps the controversy 
between the lower courts in this case over copyrightability is 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work." 
' - -
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more aptly styled a dispute over whether the The Nation's 
appropriation of unoriginal and uncopyrightable elements 
encroached on the originality embodied in the work as a 
whole. Especially in the realm of factual narrative, the law 
is currently unsettled regarding the ways in which uncopy-
rightable elements combine with the author's original con-
tributions to form protected expression. Compare Wain-
wright Securities , Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 
F. 2d 91 (CA2 1977) (protection accorded author's analysis, 
structuring of material and marshalling of facts), with 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F. 2d 972 (CA2 
1980) (limiting protection to ordering ·and choice of words). 
See, e.g., 1 Nimmer §2.ll[D], at 2-164-2-165. 
We need not reach these issues, however, as the Nation 
has admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the author's origi-
nal language totalling between 300 and 400 words and con-
stituting some 13% of The Nation article. In using generous 
verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript to 
lend authenticity to its account of the forthcoming memoirs, 
The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right of first 
publication, an important marketable subsidiary right. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that this use of 
the copyrighted manuscript, even stripped to the verbatim 
quotes conceded by The Nation to be copyrightable expres-
sion, was not a fair use. 
III 
Fair use was traditionally defined as "a privilege in others 
\ 
than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted mate-
rial in a reasonable manner without his consent." H. Ball, 
The Law of Copyright 260 (1944) (hereinafter Ball). The 
statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copy-
right Act of 1976 reflects the intent of Congress to codify the 
common law doctrine. 3 Nimmer § 13.05. Section 107 re-
quires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use 
is fair, and the statute notes four non-exclusive factors to be 
' - -
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considered. This approach was "intended to restate the 
[pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, nar-
row, or enlarge it in any way." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 
66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report). 
l "[T]he author's consent to a reasonable use of his copy-righted works ha[d] always been implied by the courts as a 
necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting 
sciences and the useful arts, since a prohibition of such use 
would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting to improve 
upon prior works and thus . . . frustrate the very ends 
sought to be attained." Ball 260. Professor Latman, in a 
study of the doctrine of fair use commissioned by Congress 
for the revision effort, see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., supra, at--, n. 9 (dissenting opinion), summa-
rized prior law as turning on "the importance of the material 
copied or performed from the point of view of the reasonable 
copyright owner. In other words, would the reasonable 
copyright owner have consented to the use?" Latman, 15.3 
As early as 1841, Justice Sto~, gave JU 1cial recogrution to 
the doctrine in a case that cone rned the letters of another 
former President, George Washington. 
"[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original 
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages 
for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the 
other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most 
important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, 
3 Professor Nimmer notes, "[perhaps] no more precise guide can be 
stated than Joseph McDonald's clever paraphrase of the Golden Rule: 
'Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you 
would be resentful if they so took from you.'" 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], at 
13-66, quoting McDonald, "Non-infringing Uses," 9 Bull. Cr. Soc'y 466, 
467 No.355 (1962). This equitable "rule ofreason," Sony Corp. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., -- U. S., at--, "permits courts to avoid rigid 
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the 
very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State Univer-
sity v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F. 2d 57, 60 (CA21980). See gen-
erally, L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 18-48 (1978). 
' - -
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but to supersede the use of the original work, and substi-
tute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a 
piracy." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4,901, 
at 344-345 (C. C. D. Mass.) 
As Justice Story's hypothetical illustrates, the fair use 
doctrine has always precluded a use that "supersede[s] the 
object of the original." Ibid. Accord S. Rep. No. 94-473, 
p. 65 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). 
Perhaps because the fair use doctrine was predicated on 
the author's implied consent to "reasonable and customary'' 
use when he released his work for public consumption, fair 
use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges 
of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works. 4 
Under common law copyright, "[t]he property of the author 
... in his intellectual creation [ was] absolute until he volun-
tarily part[ed] with the same." American Tobacco Co. v. 
W erckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); 2 Nimmer § 8.23, at 
8-273. This absolute rule, however, was tempered in prac-
tice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine. In a 
given case, factors such as implied consent through de facto 
publication on performance or dissemination of a work may 
tip the balance 6f equities in favor of prepublication use. See 
4 See La~man, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as 
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1960); 
Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works (1957), reprinted as Study No. 
29 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos 20-35, Prepared for the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4, n. 32 (1960) (citing 
cases); R. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States 67 (1950) ("there 
can be no 'fair use' of unpublished material); H. Ball, Law of Copyright and 
Literary Property§ 125, n. 5 (1944) ("the doctrine of fair use does not apply 
to unpublished works"); A. Weil, American Copyright Law §276 (1917) 
(the author of an unpublished work "has, probably, the right to prevent 
even a 'fair use' of the work by others"). Cf., M. Flint, A User's Guide to 
[United Kingdom] Copyright ,r 10.05 (1979) ("no fair dealing with unpub-
lished works"); Beloff v. Pressman Ltd., [1973] All E. R. 241, 263 (ch. 
1972) (same). 
' - -
83-163~PINION 
HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES 11 
Copyright Law Revision-Part 2: Discussion and Comments 
on Report of the Registrar of Copyrights on General Revi-
sion of the U. S. Copyright Law at 27 (H. R. Comm. Print, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. Feb. 1963) (discussion suggesting 
works disseminated to the public in a form not constituting a 
technical "publication" should nevertheless be subject to fair 
use); 3 Nimmer§ 13.05, p. 13-62, n. 2. But it has never been 
seriously disputed that "the fact that the plaintiff's work is 
unpublished . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of 
fair use." Ibid. Publication of an author's expression 
before he has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes 
the author's right to decide when and whether it will be made 
public, a factor not present in fair use of published works. 5 
Respondents contend, however, that Congress, in including 
first publication among the rights enumerated in § 106, which 
are expressly subject to fair use under § 107, intended that 
fair use would apply in pari materia to published and unpub-
lished works. The Copyright Revision Act does not support 
this proposition. 
The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 represents the cul-
mination of a major legislative reexamination of copyright 
doctrine. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, ante, at --; 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--, 
n. 9 (dissenting opinion). Among its other innovations, it 
5 See, e. g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834) (distin-
guishing the author's common law right "to obtain redress against anyone 
who ... by improperly obtaining a copy [of his unpublished work] endeav-
ors to realize a profit by its publication" from rights in a published work, 
which are prescribed by statute); Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196, 
199 (CA2), aff'd, 164 U. S. 105 (1896); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, 221 P. 2d 73, 77-78 (Cal. 1950) (en bane); Golding v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc., 193 P. 2d 153, 162 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), ("An unau-
thorized appropriation of [an unpublished work] is not to be neutralized on 
the plea that 'it is such a little one.'"), aff'd 221 P. 2d 95 (Cal. 1950); 
Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56, reh'g denied 254 N. Y. 
563, 173 N. E. 867 (N. Y. 1930) ("Since plaintiff has not published or pro-
duced her play, perhaps any use that others made of it might be unfair"). 
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eliminated publication "as a dividing line between common 
law and statutory protection," House Report, at 129, extend-
ing statutory protection to all works from the time of their 
creation. It also recognized for the first time a distinct stat-
utory right of first publication, which had previously been an 
element of the common law protections afforded unpublished 
works. The Report of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary confirms that "Clause (3) of section 106, establishes the 
exclusive right of publication .... Under this provision the 
copyright owner would have the right to control the first pub-
lic distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work." 
House Report, at 62. 
Though the right of first publication, like the other rights 
enumerated in§ 106 is expressly made subject to the fair use 
provision of§ 107, fair use analysis must always be tailored to 
the individual case. House Report, at 65; 3 Nimmer 
§ 13.05[A]. The nature of the interest at stake is highly rele-
vant to whether a given use is fair. From the beginning, 
those entrusted with the task of revision recognized the 
"overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protec-
tion of undisseminated works until the author or his succes-
sor chooses to disclose them." Register of Copyrights, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess., General Revision of the U. S. Copyright 
Law 41 (Comm. Print 1961). The right of first publication 
implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in 
what form to release his work. First publication is inher-
ently different from other § 106 rights in that only one person 
can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time illus-
trates, the commercial value of the right lies primarily in 
exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the author 
from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publication 
right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substan-
tial, the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair 
use inevitably shifts. 
The Senate Report confirms that Congress intended the 
unpublished nature of the work to figure prominently in fair 
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use analysis. In discussing fair use of photocopied materials 
in the classroom the Committee Report states: 
"A key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in 
fair use is whether or not the work is available to the 
potential user. If the work is "out of print" and unavail-
able for purchase through normal channels, the user may 
have more justification for reproducing it . . . . The 
applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished 
works is narrowly limited since, although the work is un-
available, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the 
part of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circum-
stances, the copyright owner's 'right of first publication' 
would outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom 
purposes." Senate Report, at 64. 
Although the Committee selected photocopying of classroom 
materials to illustrate fair use, it emphasized that "the same 
general standards of fair use are applicable to all kinds of uses 
of copyrighted material." Id., at 65. We find unconvincing 
respondent's contention that the absence of the quoted pas-
sage from the House Report indicates an intent to abandon 
the traditional distinction between fair use of published and 
unpublished works. It appears instead that the the fair use 
discussion of photocopying of classroom materials was omit-
ted from the final report because educators and publishers in 
the interim had negotiated a set of guidleines that rendered 
the discussion obsolete. House Report, at 67. The House 
Report nevertheless incorporates the discussion by refer-
ence, citing to the Senate Report and stating, "[T]he Com-
mittee has reviewed this discussion, and considers it still has 
value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use] prob-
lem." Ibid. 
Even if the legislative history were entirely silent, we 
would be bound to conclude from Congress's characterization 
of section 107 as a "restatement" that its effect was to pre-
serve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works 
as of other types of protected works and not to "change, nar-
' - -
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row, or enlarge it." House Report, at 66. We conclude that 
the unpublished nature of a work is "a key, though not neces-
sarily determinative factor" tending to negate a defense of 
fair use. Senate Report, at 64. See 3 Nimmer § 13.05, n. 2; J ( . ~--
W. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 125 IJt.."'-' I 
(1985) (hereinafter Patry). 
We also find unpersuasive respondent's argument that fair 
use may be made of a soon-to-be-published manuscript on the 
ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest 
in nonpublication. This argument assumes that the unpub-
lished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to let-
ters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemina-
tion. It is true that common law copyright was of ten en-
listed in the service of personal privacy. See Brandeis and 
Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 198-199 
(1890). In its commercial guise, however, an author's right 
to choose when he will publish is no less deserving of protec-
tion. The period encompassing the work's initiation, its 
preparation, and its grooming for public dissemination is a 
crucial one for any literary endeavor. The Copyright Act, 
which accords the copyright owner the "right to control the 
first public distribution" of his work, House Report, at 62, 
echos the common law's concern that the author or copyright 
owner retain control throughout this critical stage. See gen-
erally Comment, The Stage of Publication as a "Fair Use" 
Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 58 
St. John's L. Rev. 583 (1984). The obvious benefit to author 
and public alike of assuring authors the leisure to develop 
their ideas free from fear of expropriation outweighs any 
short term "news value" to be gained from premature publi-
cation of the author's expression. See Goldstein, Copyright 
and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983, 1004-1006 
(1970) (The absolute protection the common law accorded to 
soon-to-be published works "[was] justified by its brevity and 
expedience"). The author's control of first public distribu-
tion implicates not only his personal interest in creative con-
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trol but his property interest in exploitation of prepublication 
rights, which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valu-
able adjunct to publicity and marketing. See Belushi v. 
Woodward, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1870 (D DC 1984) (suc-
cessful marketing depends on coordination of serialization 
and release to public); Marks, Subsidiary Rights and Permis-
sions, from C. Grannis (ed.), What Happens in Book Publish-
ing 230 (1967) (exploitation of subsidiary rights is necessary 
to financial success of new books). Under ordinary circum-
stances, the author's right to control the first public appear-
ance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim 
of fair use. 
B 
Respondent, however, contends that First Amendment 
values require a different rule under the circumstances of 
this case. The thrust of the decision below is that "the scope 
of [fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information con-
veyed relates to matters of high public concern." C onsum-
ers Union of the United States , Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 
724 F. 2d 1044, 1050 (CA2 1983) (construing Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F. 2d 195 (1983), 
as allowing advertiser to quote Consumer Reports), cert. 
denied, -- U.S. -- (1984). Respondent advances the 
substantial public import of the subject matter of the Ford 
memoirs as grounds for excusing a use that would ordinarily 
not pass muster as a fair use-the piracy of verbatim quota-
tions for the purpose of "scooping" the authorized first seri-
alization. Respondent explains its copying of Mr. Ford's ex-
pression as essential to reporting the news story it claims the 
book itself represents. In respondent's view, not only the 
facts contained in Mr. Ford's memoirs, but "the precise man-
ner in which he expressed himself was as newsworthy as 
what he had to say." Brief for Respondent 39. Respondent 
argues that the public's interest in learning this news as fast 
as possible outweighs the right of the author to control its 
first publication. 
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The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's 
idea/expression dichotomy "strikes a definitional balance 
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting 
an author's expression." 723 F. 2d, at 203. No author may 
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 17 U. S. C. 
§ 102 (b). See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U. S. 713, 726, n. * (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) 
(Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as 
copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas 
expressed); 1 Nimmer§ 1.10[B][2]. As this Court long ago 
observed, "[T]he news element-the information respecting 
current events contained in the literary production-is not 
the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordi-
narily are 'J)'Ublici juris; it is the history of the day." Inter-
national News Service v. Assocwted Press, 248 U. S. 215, 
234 (1918). But copyright assures those who write and pub-
lish factual narratives such as "A Time to Heal" that that 
they may at least enjoy the right to market the original , 
expression contained therein as just compensation for their . C cJ.,,, 
investment. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting / N ~uJ l 
Co., 433 U. S. 562, 575 (1977). 
Respondent's theory, however, would expand fair use to 
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in 
the work of a public figure. Absent such protection, there 
would be little incentive to create or profit in financing such 
memoirs and the public would be denied an important source 
of significant historical information. The promise of copy-
right would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by 
dubbing the infringement a fair use "news report" of the 
book. See Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp., 558 F. 2d 91(CA21977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 
1014 (1978). 
Nor does respondent assert any actual necessity for 
circumventing the copyright scheme with respect to the 
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types of works and users at issue here. 6 Where an author 
and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating 
an original work and are poised to release it to the public, no 
legitimate aim is served by preempting the right of first 
publication. The fact that the words the author has chosen 
to clothe his narrative may of themselves be "newsworthy'' is 
not an independent justification for unauthorized copying of 
the author's expression prior to publication. To paraphrase 
another recent Second Circuit decision: 
"[Respondent] possessed an unfettered right to use any 
factual information revealed in [the memoirs]. for the 
purpose of enlightening its audience, but it can claim no 
need to 'bodily appropriate' [Mr. Ford's] 'expression' of 
that information by utilizing portions of the actual 
[manuscript] .... The public interest in the free flow of 
information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a 
valid copyright in facts. The fair use doctrine is not a 
license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore 
a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work 
contains material of possible public importance." Iowa 
State University v. American Broadcasting Company, 
Inc., 621 F. 2d 57, 61 (CA2 1980) (citations omitted). 
Accord Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad-
casting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1980) ("news-
worthiness" of material copied does not justify copying), aff'd 
672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982); 
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 
(D DC 1981) (same). 
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgot-
ten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the 
6 It bears noting that Congress in the Copyright Act recognized a public 
interest warranting specific exemptions in a number of areas not within 
traditional fair use, see, e. g. , 17 U. S. C. § 115 (compulsory license for 
records); § 105 (no copyright in government works). No such exemption 
limits copyright in personal narratives written by public servants after 
they leave government service. 
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engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable 
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. This 
Court stated in Mazer v. Stein: 
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual efforts by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through 
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the 
useful Arts.'" 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954). 
And again in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken: 
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a 
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ulti-
mate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation 
of useful works] for the general public good." 422 U. S. 
151, 156 (1976). 
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to 
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest 
importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major 
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. 
"[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whenever the 'social 
value [of dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the 
artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of 
their right in their property precisely when they encounter 
those users who could afford to pay for it." Gordon, Fair 
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). And as one commentator has noted, 
"If every volume that was in the public interest could be 
pirated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon] 
would have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and 
the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 AS CAP 
Copyright Law Symp. 43, at 78 (1971). See generally Com-
ment, Copyright and the First Amendment; Where Lies the 
Public Interest?, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 133 (1985). 
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Moreover, freedom of thought and expression "includes 
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 
(1977) (BURGER, C. J.). We do not suggest this right not to 
speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monop-
oly as an instrument to suppress facts. But in the words of 
New York's Chief Judge Fuld: 
"The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to pro-
hibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expres-
sion of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or 
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is nec-
essarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomi-
tant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the 
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative 
aspect." Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 
N. Y. 2d 341, 348 (1968). 
Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, 
and the right of first publication in particular, serve this 
countervailing First Amendment value. See Schnapper v. 
Foley, 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981), cert. denied - U.S. 
-- (1982); 1 Nimmer § 1.lO[B], p. 1-70, n. 24; Patry 
140-142. 
In view of the First Amendment protections already 
embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and 
ideas, and the latitide for scholarship and comment tradition-
ally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the 
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure 
exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a 
public figure's manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must 
be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use. 
IV 
Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact. Pacific 
Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1495, n. 8 
(CAll 1984). Where the District Court has found facts suffi-
' 
l "' a, "' crt _,_---
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cient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate 
court "need not remand for further factfinding . . . [but] may 
conclude as a matter of law that [the challenged use] do[es] 
not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work." Id., at 
1495. Thus whether The Nation article constitutes fair use 
under § 107 must be reviewed in light of the principles dis-
cussed above. The factors enumerated in the section are not 
meant to be exclusive: "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable 
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, 
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own 
facts." House Report, at 65. The four factors identified by 
Congress as especially relevant in determining whether the 
use was fair are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. We address each one separately. 
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identi-
fied news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation's 
use. News reporting is one of the enumerated purposes 
sanctioned by § 107 as presumptively advancing the public 
interest in dissemination of information through fair use. 
We agree with the Second Circuit that the trial court erred in 
fixing on whether the information contained in the memoir 
was actually new to the public. As Judge Meskill wisely 
noted, "[c]ourts should be chary of deciding what is and what 
is not news." 723 F. 2d, at 215 (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
Cf., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 345-346 
(1974). The fact that an article arguably is "news" and 
therefore is presumed to be a productive use is simply one 
factor in a fair use analysis. 
The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to 
non-profit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a 
finding of fair use. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the 
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copy-
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right." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, 
at --. In arguing that the purpose of news reporting is 
not purely commercial, The Nation misses the point entirely. 
The crux of the profit/non-profit distinction is not whether 
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the 
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted 
material without paying the customary price. See Roy Ex-
port Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 
503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (SDNY 1980), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 
(CA2 1980), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982); 3 Nimmer 
§ 13.05[A][l], n. 25.3. 
In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The 
Nation's stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hard-
cover and Time abstracts, thereby "mak[ing] news" or creat-
ing a "news event." App. to Petn for Cert. C-27. The 
Nation's use had not merely the incidental effect but the 
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's com-
mercially valuable right of first publication. See Meredith 
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 
690 (SDNY), (purpose of text was to compete with original), 
aff'd 500 F. 2d 1221 (CA2 1974). Also relevant to the "char-
acter" of the use is "the propriety of the defendant's con-
duct." 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], at 63-72. "Fair use preaup-
poses 'good faith' and 'fair dealing.'" Time, Inc. v. Bernard 
Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting 
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 
53 Iowa L. Rev. 832 (1968). The Nation knowingly ex-
ploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of 
fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of con-
sent as justification. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was 
free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts from "A Time 
to Heal." Fair use "distinguishes between 'a true scholar 
and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit.' " 
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 
558 F. 2d, at 97, quoting from Hearings on Bills for the Gen-
eral Revision of the Copyright Law Before House Comm. on 
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Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 3, at 1706 (1966) 
(Statement of John Schulman). 
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Second, the Act directs 
attention to the nature of the copyrighted work. "A Time to 
Heal" may be characterized as an unpublished historical nar-
rative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes a 
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fic-
tion or fantasy. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications 
for Copyright, 29 J. Cop. Soc. 560, 561 (1981-1982). 
"[E]ven within the field of fact works, there are grada-
tions as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy. 
One may move from sparsely embellished maps and 
directories to elegantly written biography. The extent 
to which one must permit expressive language to be cop-
ied, in order to assure dissemination of the underlying 
facts, will thus vary from case to case." Id., at 563. 
Some of the brief er quotes from the memoir are arguably 
necessary adequately to convey the facts; for example, Mr. 
Ford's characterization of the White House tapes as the 
"smoking gun" is perhaps so integral to the idea expressed as 
to be inseparable from it. Cf. 1 Nimmer§ 1.lO[C]. But The 
Nation did not stop at isolated phrases and instead excerpted 
subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures whose 
power lies in the author's individualized expression. Such 
use, focusing on the most expressive elements of the work, 
exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts. 
The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of 
its "nature." 3 Nimmer§ 13.05[A]; Comment, 58 St. John's 
L. Rev., at 613. Our prior discussion establishes that the 
scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished 
works. While even substantial quotations might qualify as 
fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a 
speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated 
to the press, see House Report, at 65, the author's right to 
choose when and how he will first make public his expression 
weighs against such use of the work before its release. 
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Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Next, 
the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were 
an insubstantial portion of "A Time to Heal." The district 
court, however, found that "[T]he Nation took what was 
essentially the heart of the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. 
We believe the Court of Appeals erred in overruling the dis-
trict judge's evaluation of the qualitative nature of the tak-
ing. See, e. g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (taking of 55 
seconds out of one hour and twenty-nine minute film deemed 
qualitatively substantial). A Time editor described the 
chapters on the pardon as "the most interesting and moving 
parts of the whole manuscript." Petrs' Reply Br. 16, n. 8. 
The portions actually quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky 
as among the most powerful passages in those chapters. 
Stripped to the verbatim quotes, 7 the direct takings from the 
unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the infring-
ing article. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1071 
(CA2 1977) (copyrighted letters constituted less than 1 % of 
infringing work but were prominently featured). The 
Nation article is structured around the quoted excerpts 
which serve as its dramatic · focal points. See Appendix, 
7 See Appendix, infra, at --. The Court of Appeals found that only 
"approximately 300 words" were copyrightable but did not specify which 
words. The court's discussion, however, indicates it excluded from con-
sideration those portions of The Nation's piece that, although copied verba-
tim from Ford's manuscript, were quotes attributed by Ford to third per-
sons and quotations from government documents. At oral argument, 
counsel for The Nation did not dispute that verbatim quotes and very close 
paraphrase could constitute infringement. Tr. 24-25. Thus the Appen-
dix identifies as potentially infringing only verbatim quotes or very close 
paraphrase and excludes from consideration government documents and 
words attributed to third persons. The Appendix is not intended to 
endorse any particular rule of copyrightability but is intended merely as an 
aid to facilitate our discussion. · 
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infra. In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and 
their key role in the infringing work, we cannot agree with 
the Second Circuit that the "magazine took a meager, indeed 
an infinitesimal amount of Ford's original language." 723 F. 
2d, at 209. 
Effect on the Market. Finally, the Act focuses on "the 
effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." This last factor is undoubtedly the sin-
gle most important element of fair use. 8 See 3 Nimmer 
§ 13.05[A] p. 13-76, and cases cited therein. "Fair use, 
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which 
does not materially impair the marketability of the work 
which is copied." 1 Nimmer § 1,lO[D], p. 1-87. The trial 
court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the 
.market. Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and 
its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of the 
infringement. The Court of Appeals rejected this fact find-
ing as clearly erroneous, noting that the record did not estab-
lish a causal relation between Time's nonperformance and 
respondent's unauthorized publication of Mr. Ford's expres-
sion as opposed to the facts taken from the memoirs. We 
disagree. Rarely will a case of copyright infringement 
present such clear cut evidence of actual damage. Petition-
ers assured Time that there would be no other authorized 
publication of any portion of the unpublished manuscript 
8 Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use excep-
tion should come into play only in those situations in which the market fails 
or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero. See, e.g., Bren-
nan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, Dept. 
of Justice Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, 13-17 (1984); Gordon, 
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). 
As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully functioning market that 
encourages the creation and dissemination of memoirs of public figures. 
In the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal copyright 
channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public 
benefit. 
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prior to April 23, 1979. Any publication of material from 
chapters 1 and 3 would permit Time to renegotiate its final 
payment. Time cited The Nation's article, which contained 
verbatim quotes from the unpublished manuscript, as a rea-
son for its nonperformance. Petitioners established a prima 
facie case of actual damage that respondent failed to rebut. 
See Stevens Linen Association, Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 
656 F. 2d 11, 15 (CA2 1981). The trial court properly 
awarded actual damages and accounting of profits. See 17 
U. S. C. § 504(b). 
More important, to negate fair use one need only show that 
if the challenged use "should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted 
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios , Inc., supra, 
at -- (emphasis added); id. , at--, and n. 36 (collecting 
cases) (dissenting opinion). This inquiry must take account 
not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the mar-
ket for derivative works. See Iowa State University 
Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 
F . 2d 57 (CA2 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, supra, at 1070; Roy 
Export v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 
1137, 1146. "If the defendant's work adversely affects the 
value of any of the rights in the copyrighted work (in this 
case the adaptation [and serialization] right) the use is not 
fair.". 3 Nimmer§ 13.05[B], pp. 13-77-13-78. 
It is undisputed that the factual material in the balance of 
The Nation's article, besides the verbatim quotes at issue 
here, was drawn exclusively from the chapters on the par-
don. The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a 
story about the Nixon pardon-precisely the use petitoners 
had licensed to_ Time. The borrowing of these verbatim 
quotes from the unpublished manuscript lent The Nation's 
piece a special air of authenticity-as N avasky expressed it, 
the reader would know it was Ford speaking and not The 
Nation. App. 300c. Thus it directly competed for a share 
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of the market for prepublication excerpts. The Senate 
Report states: 
"With certain special exceptions . . . a use that supplants 
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work 
would ordinarily be considered an infringement." Id., 
at 65. 
Placed in a broader perspective, a fair use doctrine that per-
mits extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased 
manuscript without the copyright owner's consent poses sub-
stantial potential for damage to the marketability of first 
serialization rights in general. "Isolated instances of minor 
infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the 
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be pre-
vented." Senate Report, at 65. 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that The Nation's 
use of the copyrighted material was excused by the public's 
interest in the subject matter. It erred, as well, in over-
looking the unpublished nature of the work and the resulting 
impact on the potential market for first serial rights of 
permitting unauthorized prepublication excerpts under the 
rubric of fair use. Finally, in finding the taking "infinitesi-
mal," the Court of Appeals accorded too little weight to the 
qualitative importance of the quoted passages of original ex-
pression. In sum, the traditional doctrine of fair use, as em-
bodied in the Copyright Act, does not sanction the use made 
by The Nation of these copyrighted materials. Any copy-
right infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing 
public access to the copyrighted work. See Pacific and 
Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1499-1500 (CAll 
1984). But Congress has not designed, and we see no war-
rant for judicially imposing, a "compulsory license" permit-
ting unfettered access to the unpublished copyrighted ex-
pression of public figures. 
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V 
The Nation conceded that its verbatim copying of some 300 
words of direct quotation from the Ford manuscript would 
I 
constitute an infringement unless excused as a fair use. 
Because we find that The Nation's use of these verbatim 
excerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT 
The portions of The Nation article which were copied verbatim from "A 
Time to Heal," excepting quotes from government documents and quotes 
attributed by Ford to third persons, are identified in bold face in the text. 
Seen. 7, ante, at--. The corresponding passages in the Ford manu-
script are footnoted. 
THE FORD MEMOIRS 
BEHIND THE NIXON PARDON 
In his memoirs, A Time To Heal, which Harper & Row will 
publish in late May or early June, former President Gerald R. 
Ford says that the idea of giving a blanket pardon to Richard 
M. Nixon was raised before Nixon resigned from the Presi-
dency by Gen. Alexander Haig, who was then the White 
House chief of staff. 
Ford also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he 
might have selected Ronald Reagan as his 1976 running 
mate, that Washington lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, a 
Democrat, was his choice for head of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, that Nixon was the one who first proposed Rocke-
feller for Vice President, and that he regretted his "coward-
ice" 1 in allowing Rockefeller to remove himself from Vice 
Presidential contention. Ford also describes his of ten 
prickly relations with Henry Kissinger. 
The Nation obtained the 655-page typescript before publi-
cation. Advance excerpts from the book will appear in Time 
in mid-April and in The Reader's Digest thereafter. Al-
though the initial print order has not been decided, the figure 
is tentatively set at 50,000; it could change, depending upon 
the public reaction to the serialization. 
Ford's account of the Nixon pardon contains significant 
new detail on the negotiations and considerations that sur-
rounded it. According to Ford's version, the subject was 
1 I was angry at myself for showing cowardice in not saying to the ultra-
conservatives, "It's going to be Ford and Rockefeller, whatever the conse-
quences." p. 496. 
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first broached to him by General Haig on August 1, 1974, a 
week before Nixon resigned. General Haig revealed that 
the newly transcribed White House tapes were the equiva-
lent of the "smoking gun" 2 and that Ford should prepare 
himself to become President. 
Ford was deeply hurt by Haig's revelation: "Over the past 
several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he 
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would 
prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from 
view." 3 Ford had believed him, but he let Haig explain the 
President's alternatives. 
He could "ride it out" 4 or he could resign, Haig said. He 
then listed the different ways Nixon might resign and con-
cluded by pointing out that Nixon could agree to leave in re-
turn for an agreement that the new President, Ford, 
would pardon him. 5 Although Ford said it would be im-
proper for him to make any recommendation, he basically 
agreed with Haig's assessment and adds, "Because of his 
references to the pardon authority, I did ask Haig about 
the extent of a President's pardon power." 6 
"It's my understanding from a White House lawyer," Haig 
replied, "That a President does have authority to grant a par-
don even before criminal action has been taken against an 
individual." 
2 [I]t contained the so-called smoking gun. p. 3. 
3 Over the past several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he 
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would prove his inno-
cence, that the matter would fade from view. p. 7. 
' The first [option] was that he could try to "ride it out" by letting im-
peachment take its natural course through the House and the Senate trial} 
fighting against conviction all the way. p. 4. 
6 Finally, Haig said that according to some on Nixon's White House 
staff, Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new 
President-Gerald Ford-would pardon him. p. 5. 
6 Because of his references to pardon authority, I did ask Haig about the 
extent of a President's pardon power. pp. 5-6. 
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But because Ford had neglected to tell Haig he thought the 
idea of a resignation conditioned on a pardon was improper, 
his press aide, Bob Hartmann, suggested that Haig might 
well have returned to the White House and told President 
Nixon that he had mentioned the idea and Ford seemed com-
fortable with it. "Silence implies assent." 
Ford then consulted with White House special counsel 
James St. Clair, who had no advice one way or the other on 
the matter more than pointing out that he was not the lawyer 
who had given Haig the opinion on the pardon. Ford also 
discussed the matter with Jack Marsh, who felt that the men-
tion of a pardon in this context was a ''time bomb," and with 
Bryce Harlow, who had served six Presidents and who 
agreed that the mere mention of a pardon "could cause a 
lot of trouble." 7 
As a result of these various conversations, Vice President 
Ford called Haig and read him a written statement: "I want 
you to understand that I have no intention of recommending 
what the President should do about resigning or not resign-
ing and that nothing we talked about yesterday afternoon 
should be given any consideration in whatever decision the 
President may wish to make." 
Despite what Haig had told him about the "smoking gun" 
tapes, Ford told a Jackson, Mich., luncheon audience later 
in the day that the President was not guilty of an im-
peachable offense. "Had I said otherwise at the mo-
ment," he writes, "the whole house of cards might have 
collapsed." 8 
In justifying the pardon, Ford goes out of his way to assure 
the reader that "compassion for Nixon as an individual 
7 Only after I had finished did [Bryce Harlow] let me know in no uncer-
tain terms that he agreed with Bob and Jack, that the mere mention of the 
pardon option could cause a lot of trouble in the days ahead. p. 18. 
8 During the luncheon I repeated my assertion that the President was 
not guilty of an impeachable offense. Had I said otherwise at that mo-
ment, the whole house of cards might have collapsed. p. 21. 
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hadn't prompted my decision at all." 9 Rather, he did it 
because he had "to get the monkey off my back one way or 
the other." 10 
The precipitating factor in his decision was a series of 
secret meetings his general counsel, Phil Buchen, held with 
Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski in the Jefferson 
Hotel, where they were both staying at the time. Ford at-
tributes Jaworski with providing some "crucial" informa-
tion 11-i. e., that Nixon was under investigation in ten 
separate areas, and that the court process could "take 
years." 12 Ford cites a memorandum from Jaworski's assist-
ant, Henry S. Ruth Jr., as being especially persuasive. 
Ruth had written: 
"If you decide to recommend indictment I think it is fair 
and proper to notify Jack Miller and the White House suffi-
ciently in advance so that pardon action could be taken before 
the indictment." He went on to say: "One can make a strong 
argument for leniency and if President Ford is so inclined, I 
think he ought to do it early rather than late." 
Ford decided that court proceedings against Nixon might 
take six years, that Nixon "would not spend time quietly in 
San Clemente," 13 and "it would be virtually impossible 
for me to direct public attention on anything else." 14 
Buchen, Haig and Henry Kissinger agreed with him. 
Hartmann was not so sure. 
9 But compassion for Nixon as an individual hadn't prompted my decision 
at all. p. 266. 
10 I had to get the monkey off my back one way or another. p. 236. 
"Jaworski gave Phil several crucial pieces of information. p. 246. 
12 And if the verdict was Guilty, one had to assume that Nixon would ap-
peal. That process would take years. p. 248. 
13 The entire process would no doubt require years: a minimum of two, a 
maximum of six. And Nixon would not spend time quietly in San Cle-
mente. p. 238. 
1
• It would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on 
anything else. p. 239. 
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Buchen wanted to condition the pardon on Nixon agreeing 
to settle the question of who would retain custody and control 
over the tapes and Presidential papers that might be relevant 
to various Watergate proceedings, but Ford was reluctant to 
do that. 
At one point a plan was considered whereby the Presiden-
tial materials would be kept in a vault at a Federal facility 
near San Clemente, but the vault would require two keys to 
open it. One would be retained by the General Services Ad-
ministration, the other by Richard Nixon. 
The White House did, however, want Nixon to make a full 
confession on the occasion of his pardon or, at a minimum, ex-
press true contrition. Ford tells of the negotiation with Jack 
Miller, Nixon's lawyer, over the wording of Nixon's state-
ment. But as Ford reports Miller's response. Nixon was 
not likely to yield. "His few meetings with his client had 
shown him that the former President's ability to discuss 
Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent." 15 
The statement they really wanted was never forthcoming. 
As soon as Ford's emissary arrived in San Clemente, he was 
confronted with an ultimatum by Ron Zeigler, Nixon's for-
mer press secretary. "Lets get one thing straight immedi-
ately," Zeigler said. "President Nixon is not issuing any 
statement whatsoever regarding Watergate, whether Jerry 
Ford pardons him or not." Zeigler proposed a draft, which 
was turned down on the ground that "no statement would 
be better than that." 16 They went through three more 
drafts before they agreed on the statement Nixon finally 
made, which stopped far short of a full confession. 
When Ford aide Benton Becker tried to explain to Nixon 
that acceptance of a pardon was an admission of guilt, he felt 
16 But [Miller] wasn't optimistic about getting such a statement. His few 
meetings with his client had shown him that the former President's ability 
to discuss Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent. p. 246. 
16 When Zeigler asked Becker what he thought of it, Becker replied that 
rw statement would be better than that. p. 251. 
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the President wasn't really listening. Instead, Nixon 
wanted to talk about the Washington Redskins. And when 
Becker left, Nixon pressed on him some cuff links and a tie pin 
"out of my own jewelry box." 
Ultimately, Ford sums up the philosophy underlying his 
decision as one he picked up as a student at Yale Law School 
many years before. "I learned that public policy often 
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected 
the tenet that no man should be above the law, public pol-
icy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind 
us as quickly as possible." 17 
Later, when Ford learned that Nixon's phlebitis had acted 
up and his health was seriously impaired, he debated 
whether to pay the ailing former President a visit. "If I 
made the trip it would remind everybody of Watergate and 
the pardon. If I didn't, people would say I lacked compas-
sion." 18 Ford went: 
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were 
tubes in his nose and mouth, and wires led from his arms, 
chest and legs to machines with orange lights that blinked 
on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I had never 
seen anyone closer to death. 1' 
The manuscript made available to The Nation includes 
many references to Henry Kissinger and other personalities 
who played a major role during the Ford years. 
11 Years before, at Yale Law School, I'd learned that public policy often 
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected the tenet that 
no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon-
and Watergate-behind us as quickly as possible. p. 256. 
18 My staff debated whether or not I ought to visit Nixon at the Long 
Beach Hospital, only half an hour away. If I made the trip, it would re-
mind everyone of Watergate and the pardon. If I didn't, people would say 
I lacked compassion. I ended their debate as soon as I found out it had 
begun. Of course I would go. p. 298. 
19 He was stretched out flat on his back. There were tubes in his nose 
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with 
• 
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On Kissinger. Immediately after being informed by 
Nixon of his intention to resign, Ford returned to the Execu-
tive Office Building and phoned Henry Kissinger to let him 
know how he felt. "Henry," he said, "I need you. The 
country needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do every-
thing I can to work with you." 20 
"Sir," Kissinger replied, "it is my job to get along with you 
and not yours to get along with me." 
"We'll get along," Ford said. "I know we'll get along." 
Referring to Kissinger's joint jobs as Secretary of State and 
National Security Adviser to the President, Ford said, "I 
don't want to make any change. I think it's worked out 
well, so let's keep it that way." 21 
Later Ford did make the change and relieved Kissinger of 
his responsibilities as National Security Adviser at the same 
time that he fired James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense. 
Shortly thereafter, he reports, Kissinger presented him with 
a "draft" letter of resignation, which he said Ford could call 
upon at will if he felt he needed it to quiet dissent from con-
servatives who objected to Kissinger's role in the firing of 
Schlesinger. 
On John Connally. When Ford was informed that Nixon 
wanted him to replace Agnew, he told the President he had 
"no ambition to hold office after January 1977." 22 Nixon 
replied that that was good since his own choice for his run-
orange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I 
had never seen anyone cloer to death. p. 299. 
''"'Henry," I said when he came on the line, "I need you. The country 
needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with 
you." p. 46. 
21 We'll get along," I said. "I know we can get along." We talked about 
the two hats he wore, as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor 
to the President. "I don't want to make any change," I said. "I think it's 
worked out well, so let's keep it that way." p. 46. 
22 I told him about my promise to Betty and said that I had no ambitions 
to hold office after January 1977. p. 155. 
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ning mate in 1976 was John Connally. "He'd be excellent," 
observed Nixon. Ford says he had "no problem with that." 
On the Decision to Run Again. Ford was, he tells us, so 
sincere in his intention not to run again that he thought he 
would announce it and enhance his credibility in the country 
and the Congress, as well as keep the promise he had made to 
his wife, Betty. 
Kissinger talked him out of it. "You can't do that. It 
would be disastrous from a foreign policy point of view. For 
the next two and a half years foreign governments would 
know that they were dealing with a lame-duck President. 
All our initiatives would be dead in the water, and I wouldn't 
be able to implement your foreign policy. It would probably 
have the same consequences in dealing with the Congress on 
domestic issues. You can't reassert the authority of the 
Presidency if you leave yourself hanging out on a dead limb. 
You've got to be an affirmative President." 
On David Kennerly, the White House photographer. 
Schlesinger was arguing with Kissinger and Ford over the 
appropriate response to the seizure of the M ayaguez. At 
issue was whether airstrikes against the Cambodians were 
desirable; Schlesinger was opposed to bombings. Following 
a lull in the conversation, Ford reports, up spoke the 30-year-
old White House photographer, David Kennerly, who had 
been taking pictures for the last hour. 
"Has anyone considered," Kennerly asked, "that this might 
be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just 
taken it into his own hands to stop any ship that comes by?" 
Nobody, apparently, had considered it, but following several 
seconds of silence, Ford tells us, the view carried the day. 
"Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill," Ford 
decided. "It would be far better to have Navy jets from 
the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific 
targets." 23 
28 Subjectively, I felt that what Kennerly had said made a lot of sense. 
Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill. It would be far better to 
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On Nixon's Character. Nixon's flaw, according to Ford, 
was "pride." "A terribly proud man," writes Ford, "he 
detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him 
speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to be soft and 
expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was 
weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He 
knew they didn't like him, and he responded with recipro-
cal disdain.)" 24 
Nixon felt disdain for the Democratic leadership of the 
House, whom he also regarded as weak. According to Ford, 
"His pride and personal contempt for weakness had over-
come his ability to tell the difference between right and 
wrong," 25 all of which leads Ford to wonder whether Nixon 
had known in advance about Watergate. 
On hearing Nixon's resignation speech, which Ford felt 
lacked an adequate plea for forgiveness, he was persuaded 
that "Nixon was out of touch with reality." 26 
In February of last year, when The Washington Post ob-
tained and printed advance excerpts from H. R. Haldeman's 
memoir, The Ends of Power, on the eve of its publication by 
Times Books, The New York Times called The Post's feat "a 
second-rate burglary." 
The Post disagreed, claiming that its coup represented 
"first-rate enterprise" and arguing that it had burglarized 
nothing, that publication of the Haldeman memoir came 
have Navy jets from the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific 
targets in the vicinity of Kompong Som. p. 416. 
24 In Nixon's case, that flaw was pride. A terribly proud man, he de-
tested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly 
of those whom he felt to be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel 
that the press was weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. 
He knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain. ) 
p. 53. 
25 His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability 
to tell the difference between right and wrong. p. 54. 
211 The speech lasted fifteen minutes, and at the end I was convinced 
Nixon was out of touch with reality. p. 57. 
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under the Fair Comment doctrine long recognized by the 
courts, and that "There is a fundamental journalistic principle 
here-a First Amendment principle that was central to the 
Pentagon Papers case." 
In the issue of The Nation dated May 5, 1979, our special 
Spring Books number, we will discuss some of the ethical 
problems raised by the issue of disclosure. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1632 
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. AND THE READ-
ER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONERS 
v. NATION ENTERPRISES AND THE NATION 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
The Court holds that The Nation's quotation of 300 words 
from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript of President 
Gerald R. Ford infringed the copyright in that manuscript, 
even though the quotations related to a historical event of un-
doubted significance-the resignation and pardon of Presi-
dent Richard M. Nixon. Although the Court pursues the 
laudable goal of protecting "the economic incentive to create 
and disseminate ideas," ante, at 18, this zealous defense of 
the copyright owner's prerogative will, I fear, stifle the 
broad dissemination of ideas and information copyright is in-
tended to nurture. Protection of the copyright owner's eco-
nomic interest is achieved in this case through an exceedingly 
narrow definition of the scope of fair use. The progress of 
arts and sciences and the robust public debate essential to an 
enlightened citizenry are ill served by this constricted read-
ing of the fair use doctrine. See 17 U. S. C. § 107. I there-
fore respectfully dissent. 
I 
A 
This case presents two issues. First, did The Nation's use 
of material from the Ford manuscript in forms other than di-
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rect quotation from that manuscript infringe Harper & Row's 
copyright. Second, did the quotation of approximately 300 
words from the manuscript infringe the copyright because 
this quotation did not constitute "fair use" within the mean-
ing of§ 107 of the Copyright Act. 17 U. S. C. § 107. The 
Court finds no need to resolve the threshold copyrightability 
issue. The use of 300 words of quotation was, the Court 
finds, beyond the scope of fair use and thus a copyright 
infringement. 1 Because I disagree with the Court's fair 
use holding, it is necessary for me to decide the threshold 
copyrightability question. 
B 
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under 
the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural 
right the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground 
that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of 
science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to au-
thors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writ-
ings." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). 
Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copy-
right so as to serve the public welfare and not necessarily so 
as to maximize an author's control over his or her product. 
The challenge of copyright is to strike the "difficult balance 
between the interests of the authors and inventors in the con-
trol and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the 
one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of 
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., -- U. S. --, --
(1984). 
1 In bypassing the threshold issue, the Court certainly does not intimate 
that The Nation's use of ideas and information other than the quoted mate-
rial would constitute a violation of the copyright laws. At one point in its 
opinion the Court correctly states the governing principles with respect to 
the copyrightability question. See ante, at 16 ("No author may copyright 
his ideas or the facts he narrates"). 
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The "originality'' requirement now embodied in § 102 of the 
Copyright Act is crucial to maintenance of the appropriate 
balance between these competing interests. 2 Properly in-
terpreted in the light of the legislative history, this section 
extends copyright protection to an author's literary form but 
permits free use by others of the ideas and information the 
author communicates. See S. Rep. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 107-108 (1974) ("Copyright does not preclude others 
from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's 
work. It pertains to the literary ... form in which the au-
thor has expressed the intellectual concepts"); H. R. Rep. 
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976) (same); New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726, n.* 
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("the copyright laws, of 
course, protect only the form of expression and not the ideas 
expressed"). This limitation of protection to literary form 
precludes any claim of copyright in facts, including historical 
narration. 
"It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Con-
stitution, when they empowered Congress 'to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing 
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries' 
(Const., Art I, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one 
who might happen to be the first to report a historic 
event the exclusive right for any period to spr~ad the 
knowledge of it." International News Service, Inc. v. 
Associated Press , 248 U. S. 215, 234 (1918). 
2 Section 102(b) states: "In no case does copyright protection for an orig-
inal work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the 
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work." 17 U. S. C. § 102(b). The doctrines of fair use, see 17 U. S. C. 
§ 107, and substantial similarity, see 3M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 13.05 (1984), also function to accomodate these competing considerations. 
See generally Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications for Copyright, 29 J. 
Copyr. Soc. 560 (1982). 
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Accord Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 
366 F. 2d 303, 309 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1009 
(1967). See 1 Nimmer on Copyright §2.ll[A], at 2-158. 3 
The "promotion of science and the useful arts" requires this 
limit on the scope of an author's control. Were an author 
able to prevent subsequent authors from using concepts, 
ideas, or facts contained in his or her work, the creative proc-
ess would wither and scholars would be forced into unproduc-
tive replication of the research of their predecessors. See 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F. 2d 972, 979 
(CA2 1980). This limitation on copyright also ensures conso-
nance with our most important First Amendment values. 
Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 
562, 577 n. 13 (1977). Our "profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open," New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), leaves no room for a statutory 
monopoly over information and ideas. "The arena of public 
debate would be quiet, indeed, if a politician could copyright 
his speeches or a philosopher his treatise and thus obtain a 
monopoly on the ideas contained." Lee v. Runge, 404 U. S. 
887, 893 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). A broad dissemination of principles, ideas, and factual 
information is crucial to the robust public debate and in-
formed citizenry that are "the essence of self-government." 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964) .. · And 
every citizen must be permitted freely to marshall ideas and 
facts in the advocacy of particular political choices. 4 
3 By the same token, an author may not claim copyright in statements 
made by others and reported verbatim in the author's work. See Suid v. 
Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D. DC 1980); Rokeach v. Avco 
Embassy Pictures Corp. , 197 U. S. P. Q. 155, 161 (SDNY 1978). 
• It would be perverse to prohibit government from limiting the finan-
cial resources upon which a political speaker may draw, see FEC v. Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Committee, -- U. S. -- (1985), 
but to permit government to limit the intellectual resources upon which 
that speaker may draw. 
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It follows that infringement of copyright must be based on 
a taking of literary form, as opposed to the ideas or informa-
tion contained in a copyrighted work. Deciding whether an 
infringing appropriation of literary form has occurred is diffi-
cult for at least two reasons. First, the distinction between 
literary form and information or ideas is of ten elusive in prac-
tice. Second, infringement must be based on a substantial 
appropriation of literary form. This determination is equally 
challenging. Not surprisingly, the test for infringement has 
defied precise formulation. 5 In general, though, the inquiry 
proceeds along two axes: how closely has the second author 
tracked the first author's particular language and structure of 
presentation; and how much of the first author's language 
and structure has the second author appropriated. 6 
In the present case the infringement analysis must be ap-
plied to a historical biography in which the author has chroni-
cled the events of his White House tenure and commented on 
those events from his unique perspective. Apart from the 
quotations, virtually all of the material in The Nation's article 
5 The protection of literary form must proscribe more than merely word-
for-word appropriation of substantial portions of an author's work. Other-
wise a plagiarist could avoid infringement by immaterial variations. Nich-
ols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA2 1930). The step 
beyond the narrow and clear prohibition of wholesale copying is, however, 
a venture onto somewhat uncertain terrain. Compare Hoehling v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., 618 F. 2d 972, 974 (CA2 1980), with Wainwright 
Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F. 2d 91 (CA2 1977). 
See also 1 Nimmer on Copyright§ 1.10B, at 1-73-1-74 (''it is the particular 
selection and arrangement of ideas, as well as a given specificity in the 
form of their expression, which warrants protection"); Chafee, Reflections 
on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 119, 121 (''the line lies some-
where between the author's idea and the precise form in which he wrote it 
down. . . . [T]he protection covers the 'pattern' of the work"). Gorman, 
Fact or Fancy: Implications for the Law of Copyright, 29 J. Copyr. Soc. 
560, 593 (1983) ("too literal and substantial copying and paraphrasing of 
. . . language"). 
8 The inquiry into the substantiality of appropriation has a quantitative 
and a qualitative aspect . 
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indirectly recounted Mr. Ford's factual narrative of the 
Nixon resignation and pardon, his latter-day reflections on 
some events of his presidency, and his perceptions of the 
personalities at the center of those events. See ante, at 
28-37. No copyright can be claimed in this information qua 
information. Infringement would thus have to be based on 
too close and substantial a tracking of Mr. Ford's expression 
of this information. 7 
The Language. Much of the information The Nation con-
veyed was not in the form of paraphrase at all, but took the 
form of synopsis of lengthy discussions in the Ford manu-
script. 8 In the course of this summary presentation, The 
7 Neither the District Court nor the dissent in the court of appeals ap-
proached the question in this way. Despite recognizing that this material 
was not ''per se copyrightable," the district court held that the ''totality of 
these facts and memoranda collected together with Mr. Ford's reflections 
... is protected by the copyright laws." 557 F. Supp. , at 1072-1073. 
The dissent in the court of appeals signalled approval of this approach. 
723 F. 2d, at 213-214 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Such an approach must be 
rejected. Copyright protection cannot be extended to factual information 
whenever that information is interwoven with protected expression (pur-
portedly in this case Mr. Ford's reflections) into an expressive ''totality." 
Most works of history or biography blend factual narrative and reflective 
or speculative commentary in this way. Precluding subsequent use of 
facts so presented cannot be· squared with the specific legislative intent, 
expressed in both House and Senate reports, that "[c]opyright does not 
preclude others from using the ... information revealed by th~ author's 
work." See S. Rep. No. 983, supra, at 107-108; H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 
supra, at 56-57. The core purposes of copyright would be thwarted and 
serious First Amendment concerns would arise. An author could obtain a 
monopoly on narration of historical events simply by being the first to dis-
cuss them in a reflective or analytical manner. 
8 For example, the Ford manuscript expends several hundred words 
discussing relations between Mr. Ford and Ronald Reagan in the weeks 
before the Republican Convention of 1976: 
"About a month before the convention, my aides had met with Reagan's 
representatives to discuss the need for party unity. And they had reached 
an agreement. At the end of the Presidential ballotting, the winner would 
go to the loser's hotel suite and congratulate his opponent for waging a fine 
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Nation did use occasional sentences that closely resembled 
language in the original Ford manuscript. 9 But these lin-
guistic similarities are insufficient to constitute an infringe-
campaign. Together, they would appear at a press conference and urge all 
Republicans to put aside their differences and rally behind the ticket. 
That was the only way we could leave Kansas City with a hope of victory. 
When it appeared I was going to win, Sears conteacted Cheney and refined 
the scenario. He insisted on two conditions. The first was that I had to 
see Reagan alone; there could be no aides from either camp in the room. 
Secondly, under no circumstances should I offer him the nomination to be 
Vice President. Reagan had said all along that he wasn't interested in the 
job. He had meant what he said. If I tried to talk him out of it, he would 
have to turn me down, and that would be embarrassing because it would 
appear that he was refusing to help the GOP. When Cheney relayed those 
conditions to me, I agreed to go along with them. I would need Reagan's 
assistance in the fall campaign. It would be stupid to anger him or his 
followers at this moment. 
Later I was told that just before my arrival at the Californian's hotel, 
one of his closest advisors, businessman Justin Dart, had urged him to say 
yes if I asked him to be my running mate, Regardless of anything he'd 
said before, Dart had insisted, it was his patriotic duty to accept the num-
ber two post. Finally, according to Dart, Reagan had agreed. But at the 
time, no one mentioned this new development to me. Had I been aware of 
the Dart-Reagan conversation, would I have chosen him? I can't say for 
sure-I thought his challenge had been divisive, and that it would probably 
hurt the party in the fall campaign; additionally, l resented some of the 
things that he'd been saying about me and my Administration's policies-
but I certainly would have considered him." App. 628-629. 
The Nation encapsulated this discussion in the following sentence: "Ford 
also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he might have selected Ron-
ald Reagan as his 1976 running mate." App. 627. In most other in-
stances, a single sentence or brief paragraph in The Nation's article simi-
larly conveys the gist of a discussion in the Ford manuscript that runs into 
the hundreds of words. See generally Addendum B to Defendant's Post-
Trial Memorandum, App. 627-704. 
9 For example, at one point The Nation's article reads: "Ford told a 
Jackson, Mich. [sic], luncheon audience later in the day that the President 
was not guilty of an impeachable offfense." Ante, at 30. The portion of 
the Ford manuscript discussed stated: "Representative Thad Cochran ... 
escorted me to a luncheon at the Jackson Hilton Hotel. During the lun-
cheon I repeated my assertion that the President was not guilty of an im-
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ment for three reasons. First, some leeway must be given 
to subsequent authors seeking to convey facts because those 
"wishing to express the ideas contained in a factual work 
of ten can choose from only a narrow range of expression." 
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 
F . 2d 485, 488 (CA9 1984). Second, much of what The Na-
tion paraphrased was material in which Harper & Row could 
claim no copyright. 10 Third, The Nation paraphrased noth-
ing approximating the totality of a single paragraph, much 
less a chapter or the work as a whole. At most the Nation 
paraphrased disparate isolated sentences from the original. 
A finding of infringement based on paraphrase generally 
requires far more close and substantial a tracking of the origi-
nal language than occurred in this case. See, e.g., Wain-
wright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 
F. 2d 91 (CA2 1977). 
The Structure of Presentation. The article does not mimic 
Mr. Ford's structure. The information The Nation presents 
is drawn from scattered sections of the Ford work and does 
not appear in the sequence in which Mr. Ford presented it. 11 
peachable offense." App. 649. In several other places the language in 
The Nation's article parallels Mr. Ford's original expression to a similar 
degree. Compare ante, at 28-37, with App. 627-704. 
10 Often the paraphrasing was of statements others had made to Mr. 
Ford. E. g. , ante, at 29 ("He could 'ride it out' or he could resign, Haig 
said"). See generally ante, at 28-37. No copyright can be asserted in the 
verbatim representation of such statements of others. 17 U. S. 'C. § 102. 
See Sui,d v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (DC 1980); 
Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U. S. P. Q. 155, 161 
(SDNY 1978). Other paraphrased material came from government docu-
ments in which no copyright interest can be claimed. For example, the 
article quotes from a memorandum prepared by Henry S. Ruth, Jr., in his 
official capacity as assistant to Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon 
Jaworski. See ante, at 31. This document is a work of the United States 
government. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. 
11 According to an exhibit Harper & Row introduced at trial the pages in 
the Ford manuscript that correspond to consecutive sections of the article 
are as follows: 607-608, 401, 44, 496, 1, 2-3, 4, 8, 7, 4-5, 5, 5-6, 8, 14, 15, 
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Some of The Nation's discussion of the pardon does roughly 
track the order in which the Ford manuscript presents in-
formation about the pardon. With respect to this similarity, 
however, Mr. Ford has done no more than present the facts 
chronologically and cannot claim infringement when a sub-
sequent author similarly presents the facts of history in a 
chronological manner. Also, it is difficult to suggest that a 
2000-word article could bodily appropriate the structure of a 
200,000-word book. Most of what Mr. Ford created, and 
most of the history he recounted, was simply not represented 
in The Nation's article. 12 
When The Nation was not quoting Mr. Ford, therefore, its 
efforts to convey the historical information in the Ford manu-
script did not so closely and substantially track Mr. Ford's 
language and structure as to constitute an appropriation of 
literary form. 
II 
The Nation is thus liable in copyright only if the quotation 
of 300 words infringed any of Harper & Row's exclusive 
rights under § 106 of the Act. Section 106 explicitly makes 
the grant of exclusive rights "[s]ubject to section 107 through 
118." 17 U. S. C. § 106. Section 107 states: "[n]otwith-
16, 16, 18, 19, 21,266, 236, 246, 248,249,238-239,239,243,245, 246,250, 
250-251, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 298, 299, 46, 494,537, 155-156, 216,415, 
416, 416, 53-54, 57. See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, E-lto E-41. 
12 In one sense The Nation "copied" Mr. Ford's selection of facts because 
it reported on only those facts Mr. Ford chose to select for presentation. 
But this tracking of a historian's selection of facts generally should not sup-
ply the basis for a finding of infringement. See Myers v. Mail & Express 
Co. , 36 Copyr. Off. Bull. 478 (SDNY 1919) (L. Hand, J. ). To hold other-
wise would be to require a second author to duplicate the research of the 
first author so as to avoid reliance on the first author's judgment as to what 
facts are particularly pertinent. "It is just such wasted effort that the pro-
scription against the copyright of ideas and facts . . . are designed to pre-
vent." Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. , 650 F . 2d 1365, 1371, quot-
ing Roserrumt Enterprises , Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F. 2d 303, 
310. See Gorman, 29 J. Copyr. Soc., at 594-595. 
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standing the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright." Id., § 107. The question here is whether The 
Nation's quotation was a noninfringing fair use within the 
meaning of § 107. 
Congress "eschewed a rigid, bright line approach to fair 
use." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at 
--, n. 31. A court is to apply an "equitable rule of reason" 
analysis, id., at --, guided by four statutorily prescribed 
factors: 
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C .. § 107. 
These factors are not necessarily the exclusive determinants 
of the fair use inquiry and do not mechanistically resolve fair 
use issues; "no generally applicable definition is possible, and 
each case raising the question must be decided on its facts." 
H. R. Rep. No. 1476, supra, at 65. See also id., at 66 ("the 
endless variety of situations and combinations that can arise 
in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in 
the statute"); S. Rep. No. 473, supra, at 62. The statutory 
factors do, however, provide substantial guidance to courts 
undertaking the proper fact-specific inquiry. 
With respect to a work of history, particularly the memoirs 
of a public official, the statutorily-prescribed analysis cannot 
properly be conducted without constant attention to copy-
right's crucial distinction between protected literary form 
and unprotected information or ideas. The question must al-
ways be: was the subsequent author's use of literary form a 
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fair use within the meaning of§ 107, in light of the purpose 
for the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount 
of literary form used, and the effect of this use of literary 
form on the value of or market for the original. 
Limiting the inquiry to the propriety of a subsequent au-
thor's use of the copyright owner's literary form is not easy 
in the case of a work of history. Protection against only sub-
stantial appropriation of literary form does not ensure his-
torians a return commensurate with the full value of their 
labors. The literary form contained in works like "A Time to 
Heal" reflects only a part of the labor that goes into the book. 
It is the labor of collecting, sifting, organizing and reflecting 
that predominates in the creation of works of history such as 
this one. The value this labor produces lies primarily in the 
information and ideas revealed, and not in the particular 
collocation of words through which the information and ideas 
are expressed. Copyright thus does not protect that which 
is of ten of most value in a work of history and courts must 
resist the tendency to reject the fair use defense on the basis 
of their feeling that an author of history has been deprived of 
the full value of his or her labor. A subsequent author's tak-
ing of information and ideas is in no sense piratical because 
copyright law simply does not create any property interest in 
information and ideas. 
The urge to compensate for subsequent use of information 
and ideas is perhaps understandable. An inequity ·seems to 
lurk in the idea that much of the fruit of the historian's labor 
may be used without compensation. This, however, is not 
some unforeseen by-product of a statutory scheme intended 
primarily to ensure a return for works of the imagination. 
Congress made the affirmative choice that the copyright laws 
should apply in this way: "Copyright does not preclude others 
from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's 
work. It pertains to the literary . . . form in which the 
author expressed the intellectual concepts." H. R. Rep. No. 
1473, supra, at 56-57. This distinction is at the essence of 
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copyright. The copyright laws serve as the "engine of free 
expression," ante, at 18, only when the statutory monopoly 
does not choke off multifarious indirect uses and consequent 
broad dissemination of information and ideas. To ensure the 
progress of arts and sciences and the integrity of First 
Amendment values, ideas and information must not be 
freighted with claims of proprietary right. 13 
In my judgment, the Court's fair use analysis has fallen to 
the temptation to find copyright violation based on a minimal 
use of literary form in order to provide compensation for the 
appropriation of information from a work of history. The 
failure to distinguish between information and literary form 
permeates every aspect of the Court's fair use analysis and 
leads the Court to the wrong result in this case. Application 
of the statutorily prescribed analysis with attention to the 
distinction between information and literary form leads to a 
straightforward finding of fair use within the meaning of 
§ 107. 
The Purpose of the Use. The Nation's purpose in quoting 
300 words of the Ford manuscript was, as the Court acknowl-
edges, ·news reporting. See ante, at 20. The Ford work 
contained information about important events of recent 
history. Two principals, Mr. Ford and General Alexander 
Haig, were at the time of the Nation's publication in 1979 
widely thought to be candidates for the Presidency. That 
The Nation objectively reported the information in the Ford 
manuscript without independent commentary in no way di-
minishes the conclusion that it was reporting news. A typi-
cal news story differs from an editorial precisely in that it 
13 This congressional limitation on the scope of copyright does not 
threaten the production of history. That this limitation results in signifi-
cant diminution of economic incentives is far from apparant. In any event 
noneconomic incentives motivate much historical research and writing. 
For example, former public officials often have great incentive to 'tell their 
side of the story.' And much history is the product of academic scholar-
ship. Perhaps most importantly, the urge to preserve the past is as old as 
human kind. 
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presents newsworthy information in a straightforward and 
unelaborated manner. Nor does the source of the informa-
tion render The Nation's article any less a news report. 
Often books and manuscripts, solicited and unsolicited, are 
the subject matter of news reports. E.g., New York Times 
v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971). Frequently the 
manuscripts are unpublished at the time of the news report. 14 
Section 107 lists news reporting as a prime example of fair 
use of another's expression. Like criticism and all other pur-
poses Congress explicitly approved in § 107, news reporting 
informs the public; the language of § 107 makes clear that 
Congress saw the spread of knowledge and information as 
the strongest justification for a properly limited appropria-
tion of expression. The court of appeals was therefore cor-
rect to conclude that the purpose of The Nation's use-dis-
semination of the information contained in the quotations of 
Mr. Ford's work-furthered the public interest. 723 F. 2d, 
at 207-208. In light of the explicit congressional endorse-
ment in§ 107, the purpose for which Ford's literary form was 
borrowed strongly favors a finding of fair use. 
The Court concedes the validity of the news reporting pur-
pose 15 but then quickly offsets it against three purportedly 
"E.g. , The New York Times, August 2, 1984, p. C20, col. 5 (article 
about revelations in forthcoming biography of Cardinal Spellman); The 
New York Times, Dec. 10, 1981, p. A18, col. 1 (article about revelations in 
forthcoming book by John Erlichman); The New York Times, Sept. 29, 
1976, p. 1, col. 2 (article about revelations in forthcoming autobiography of 
President Nixon); The New York Times, March 27, 1976, p. 9, col. 1 (arti-
cle about revelations concerning President Nixon's resignation in forthcom-
ing book The Final Days); The New York Times, Sept. 23, 1976, p. 36, col. 
1 (article about revelations concerning President Ford in forthcoming book 
Blind Ambition by John Dean). 
15 The Court properly rejects the argument that this is not legitimate 
news. Courts have no business making such evaluations of journalistic 
quality. See ante, at 20. The Court also properly rejects the argument 
that this use is nonproductive. See ante, at 20. News reporting, which 
encompasses journalistic judgment with respect to selection, organization 
and presentation of facts and ideas, is certainly a productive use. See 
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countervailing considerations. First, the Court asserts that 
because The Nation publishes for profit, its publication of the 
Ford quotes is a presumptively unfair commercial use. Sec-
ond, the Court claims that The Nation's stated desire to cre-
ate a 'news event' signalled an illegitimate purpose of sup-
planting the copyright owner's right of first publication. Id., 
at 21. Third, The Nation acted in bad faith, the Court 
claims, because its editor "knowingly exploited a purloined 
manuscript." Ibid. 
The Court's reliance on the commercial nature of The Na-
tion's use as "a separate factor that tends to weigh against a 
finding of fair use," ante, at 20, is inappropriate in the 
present context. Many uses § 107 lists as paradigmatic ex-
amples of fair use, including criticism, comment and news re-
poning, are generally conducted for profit in this country, a 
fact of which Congress was obviously aware when it enacted 
§ 107. To negate any argument favoring fair use based on 
news reporting or criticism because that reporting or criti-
cism was published for profit is to render meaningless the 
congressional imprimatur placed on such uses. 16 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., -- U.S. , at -- (BLACK-
MUN, J., dissenting). 
'"To support this claim the Court refers to some language in Sony Corp. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supa, to the effect that "every commer-
cial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation." 
--U. S. , at--. See ante, at 20. Properly understood, this language 
does not support the Court's position in this case. The Court in Sony 
Cm-p. dealt with a use-video recording of copyrighted television programs 
for personal use-about which Congress had expressed no policy judg-
ment. When a court evaluates uses that Congress has not specifically ad-
dressed, the presumption articulated in Sony Corp. is appropriate to effec-
tuate the congressional instruction to consider "whether such use is of a 
commercial nature." 17 U. S. C. § 107(1). Also, the Court made that 
statement in the course of evaluating a use that appropriated the entirety 
of the copyrighted work in a form identical to that of the original; the 
presumption articulated may well have been intended to apply to takings 
under these circumstances. But, in light of the specific language of§ 107, 
this presumption is not appropriately employed to negate the weight Con-
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Nor should The Nation's intent to create a 'news event' 
weigh against a finding of fair use. Such a rule, like the 
Court's automatic presumption against news reporting for 
profit, would undermine the congressional validation of the 
news reporting purpose. A news business earns its reputa-
tion, and therefore its readership, through consistent prompt 
publication of news-and of ten through "scooping" rivals. 
More importantly, the Court's failure to maintain the distinc-
tion between information and literary form colors the analy-
sis of this point. Because Harper & Row had no legitimate 
copyright interest in the information and ideas in the Ford 
manuscript, The Nation had every right to seek to be the 
first to disclose these facts and ideas to the public. The 
record suggests only that The Nation sought to be the first to 
reveal the information in the Ford manuscript. The Nation's 
stated purpose of scooping the competition should under 
those circumstances have no negative bearing on the claim of 
fair use. Indeed the Court's reliance on this factor would 
seem to amount to little more than distaste for standard 
journalistic practice. 
The Court's reliance on The Nation's putative bad faith is 
equally unwarranted. No court has found that The Nation 
possessed the Ford manuscript illegally or in violation of 
any common law interest of Harper & Row; all common law 
causes of action have been abandoned or dismissed in this 
case. 723 F. 2d, at 199-201. Even if the manuscript had 
been "purloined" by someone, nothing in this record imputes 
culpability to The Nation. 17 On the basis of the record in this 
gress explicitly gave to news reporting as a justification for limited use of 
another's expression. 
11 This case is a far cry from Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 
F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), the only case the Court cites to support 
consideration of The Nation's purported bad faith. In that case the pub-
lisher claiming fair use had personally stolen film negatives from the offices 
of Time and then published graphic representations of the stolen photo-
graphic images. And the court found fair use despite these circumstances. 
293 F. Supp., at 146. 
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case, the most that can be said is that The Nation made use of 
the contents of the manuscript knowing the copyright owner 
would not sanction the use. 
At several points the Court brands this conduct thievery. 
See, e.g., ante, at 15, 21. This judgment is unsupportable, 
and is perhaps influenced by the Court's unspoken tendency 
in this case to find infringement based on the taking of in-
formation and ideas. With respect to the appropriation of 
information and ideas other than the quoted words, The Na-
tion's use was perfectly legitimate despite the copyright own-
er's objection because no copyright can be claimed in ideas or 
information. Whether the quotation of 300 words was an in-
fringement or a fair use within the meaning of § 107 is a close 
question that has produced sharp division in both this Court 
and the court of appeals. If the Copyright Act were held not 
to prohibit the use, then the copyright owner would have had 
no basis in law for objecting. The Nation's awareness of an 
objection that has a significant chance of being adjudged un-
founded cannot amount to bad faith. Imputing bad faith on 
the basis of no more than knowledge of such an objection, the 
Court impermissibly prejudices the inquiry and impedes ar-
rival at the proper conclusion that the "purpose" factor of the 
statutorily prescribed analysis strongly favors a finding of 
fair use in this case. 
The Nature of the Copyrighted Work. In Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, we stated th:rt "not all 
copyrights are fungible" and that "[c]opying a news broadcast 
may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion 
picture." -- U. S., at -- n. 40. These statements re-
flect the principle, suggested in § 107(2) of the Act, that the 
scope of fair use is generally broader when the source of bor-
rowed expression is a factual or historical work. See 3 
Nimmer on Copyright supra, § 13.05[A][2], at 13-73-13-74. 
"Informational works," like the Ford manuscript, "that 
readily lend themselves to productive use by others, are less 
protected." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
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supra, at -- (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Thus the second 
statutory factor also favors a finding of fair use in this case. 
The Court acknowledges that "the law generally recog-
nizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works 
of fiction or fantasy," ante, at 22, and that "some of the 
briefer quotations from the memoir are arguably necessary to 
convey the facts," i bid. But the Court discounts the force of 
this consideration, primarily on the ground that "the fact that 
a work is unpublished is a crucial element of its 'nature.'" 
Ante, at 22. 18 At this point the Court introduces into analy-
sis of this case a categorical presumption against prepublica-
tion fair use. See ante, at 15 ("Under ordinary circum-
stances, the author's right to control the first public 
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a 
claim of fair use"). 
This categorical presumption is unwarranted on its own 
terms and unfaithful to congressional intent. 19 Whether a 
18 The Court also discounts this factor in part because the appropriation 
of The Nation, "focusing on the most expressive elements of the work, ex-
ceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts." Ante, at 22. Whatever 
the propriety of this view of The Nation's use, it is properly analyzed under 
the third statutory fair use factor-the amount and substantiality of the 
expression taken in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, 17 
U. S. C. § 107(3}-and will be analyzed as such in this opinion. 
19 The Court lays claim to specific congressional intent supporting the 
presumption against prepublication fair use. See ante, at 13, quoting S. 
Rep. No. 473, at 64; ante, at 10 n. 4, 13-14. The argument based on con-
gressional intent is unpersuasive for three reasons. 
First, the face of the statute clearly allows for prepublication fair use. 
The right of first publication, like all other rights § 106 of the Act specifi-
cally grants copyright owners, is explicitly made "subject to section 107," 
the statutory fair use provision. See 17 U. S. C. § 106. 
Second, the language from the Senate Report on which the Court relies 
so heavily, see ante, at 13, simply will not bear the weight the Court places 
on it. The Senate Report merely suggests that prepublication photocopy-
ing for classroom purposes will not generally constitute fair use when the 
author has an interest in the confidentiality of the unpublished work, evi-
denced by the author's "deliberate choice" not to publish. Given that the 
face of § 106 specifically allows for prepublication fair use, it would be un-
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particular prepublication use will impair any interest the 
Court identifies as encompassed within the right of first 
publication, see ante, at 12-14,20 will depend on the nature of 
the copyrighted work, the timing of prepublication use, the 
amount of expression used and the medium in which the sec-
ond author communicates. Also, certain uses might be toler-
able for some purposes but not for others. See Sony Corp. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., -- U. S., at--, n. 40. 
Whereas Congress prescribed a specific inquiry into purpose, 
nature, amount and effect in § 107 to account for such pos-
sibilities, the Court's analysis presumes intolerable injury-
in particular the usurpation of the economic interest 21-based 
faithful to the intent of Congress to draw from this circumscribed sugges-
tion in the Senate Report a blanket presumption against any amount of 
prepublication fair use for any purpose and irrespective of the effect of that 
use on the copyright owner's privacy, editorial, or economic interests. 
Third, the Court's reliance on congressional adoption of the common law 
is also unpersuasive. The common law did not set up the monolithic bar-
rier to prepublication fair use that the Court wishes it did. See, e. g. , 
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462 (S. Ct. 
N. Y. Co.), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 633 (1st Dept. 1967), aff'd on other 
grounds, 23 N. Y. 2d 341 (1968). The statements of general principle the 
Court cites to support its contrary representation of the common law, see 
ante, at 10 n. 4, are themselves unsupported by reference to substantial 
judicial authority. Congressional endorsement of the common law of fair 
use should not be read as adoption of any rigid presumption against pre-
publication use. Ifread that way, the broad statement that the Copyright 
Act was intended to incorporate the common law would in eff~ct be given 
the force of nullifying Congress's repeated methodological prescription that 
definite rules are inappropriate and fact-specific analysis is required. The 
broad language adopting the common law approach to fair use is best un-
derstood as an endorsement of the essential fact-specificity and case-by-
case methodology of the common law of fair use. 
00 The Court finds the right of first publication particularly weighty be-
cause it encompasses three important interests: (i) a privacy interest in 
whether to make expression public at all; (ii) an editorial interest in ensur-
ing control over the work while it is being groomed for public dissemina-
tion; and (iii) an economic interest in capturing the full remunerative poten-
tial of initial release to the public. Ante, at 12-14. 
21 Perhaps most inappropriate is the Court's apocalyptic prophesy that 
permitting any prepublication use for news reporting will "effectively de-
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on no more than a quick litmus test for prepublication timing. 
Because "Congress has instructed us that fair use analysis 
calls for a sensitive balancing of interests," we held last Term 
that the fair use inquiry could never be resolved on the basis 
of such a "two dimensional" categorical approach. See Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--, n. 40 
(rejecting categorical requirement of "productive use"). The 
Court's path of analysis today departs significantly from that 
holding. 
Relying on the force of presumption, the Court at this 
point makes no inquiry into the actual or potential effects of 
The Nation's use on the interests the Court claims are encom-
passed within the right of first publication. Had the Court 
looked into actual effects, it would have discovered those 
effects to be minimal. The quotation of 300 words from the 
manuscript infringed no privacy interest of Mr. Ford. This 
author intended the words in the manuscript to be a public 
statement about his presidency. Lacking, therefore, is the 
"deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner" to keep · 
expression confidential, a consideration that the Senate Re-
port-in the passage on which the Court places great reli-
ance, see ante, at 13--recognized as the impetus behind nar-
rowing fair use for unpublished works. See S. Rep. No. 473, 
supra, at 64. See also 3 Nimmer on Copyright§ 13.05[A], at 
13-73 ("the scope of the fair use doctrine is considerably 
narrower with respect to unpublished works which 'are held 
confidential by their copyright owners") (emphasis added). 
Lacking too is any suggestion that The Nation's use inter-
fered with the copyright owner's interest in editorial control 
stroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a public fig-
ure." Ante, at 16. The impact of a prepublication use for purposes of 
news reporting will obviously vary with the circumstances. A claim of 
news reporting should not be a fig leaf for substantial plagiarism, see 
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F. 2d 91, 
but there is no warrant for concluding that prepublication quotation of a 
few sentences will usually drain all value from a copyright owner's right of 
first publication. 
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of the manuscript. The Nation made use of the Ford quotes 
on the eve of official publication. 
Thus the only interest The Nation's prepublication use 
might have infringed is the copyright owner's interest in 
capturing the full economic value of initial release. By con-
sidering this interest as a component of the "nature" of the 
copyrighted work, the Court's analysis deflates The Nation's 
claim that the informational nature of the work supports fair 
use without any inquiry into the actual or potential economic 
harm of The Nation's particular prepublication use. For this 
reason, the question of economic harm is properly considered 
under the fourth statutory factor-the effect on the value of 
or market for the copyrighted work, 17 U. S. C. § 107(4}-
and not as a presumed element of the "nature" of the 
copyright. 
The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. 
More difficult questions arise with respect to judgments 
about the importance to this case of the amount and substan-
tiality of the quotations used. The Nation quoted only ap-
proximately 300 words from a manuscript of more than 
200,000 words, and the quotes are drawn from isolated pas-
sages in disparate sections of the work. The judgment that 
this taking was quantitatively "infinitesimal," 723 F . 2d, at 
209, does not dispose of the inquiry, however. An evalua-
tion of substantiality in qualitative terms is also required. 
Much of the quoted material was Mr. Ford's matter-of-fact 
representation of the words of others in conversations with 
him; such quotations are "arguably necessary adequately to 
convey the facts," ante, at 22, and are not rich in expressive 
content. Beyond these quotations a portion of the quoted 
material was drawn from the most poignant expression in the 
Ford manuscript; in particular The Nation made use of six 
examples of Mr. Ford's expression of his reflections on 
events or perceptions about President Nixon. 22 The fair use 
22 These six quotes are: 
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inquiry turns on the propriety of the use of these quotations 
with admittedly strong expressive content. 
The Court holds that "in view of the expressive value of the 
excerpts and their key role in the infringing work," this third 
statutory factor disfavors a finding of fair use. 23 To support 
(1) "'[C]ompassion for Nixon as an individual hadn't prompted my decision 
at all.' Rather, he did it because he had 'to get the monkey off my back 
one way or the other.'" Ante, at 30-31. 
(2) "Nixon 'would not spend the time quietly in San Clemente,' and 'it 
would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on anything 
else.'" Ante, at 31. 
(3) "'I had learned that public policy often took precedence over a rule of 
law. Although I respected the tenet that no man should be above the law, 
public policy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind us as 
quickly as possible.'" Ante, at 33. 
(4) "'If I made the trip it owuld remind everybody of Watergate and the 
pardon. If I didn't people would say I lacked compassion.'" Ante, at 33. 
(5) "'He was stretched out flat on his back. There were tubes in his nose 
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with 
orange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I 
had never seen anyone closer to death.'" Ante, at 33. · 
(6) "'A terribly proud man,' writes Ford, 'he detested weakness in other 
people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to 
be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was weak. 
Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He knew they didn't like 
him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain.)'. . . . 'His pride and per-
sonal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability to tell the difference 
between right and wrong.' .... 'Nixon was out of touch with reality.'" 
Ante, at 36. 
28 The Court places some emphasis on the fact that the quotations from 
the Ford work constituted a substantial portion of The Nation's article. 
Superficially, the Court would thus appear to be evaluating The Nation's 
quotation of 300 words in relation to the amount and substantiality of ex-
pression used in relation to the second author's work as a whole. The stat-
ute directs the inquiry into "the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the capyri,ghted work as a whole,'' 17 U. S. C. § 107(3). 
As the statutory directive implies, it matters little whether the second au-
thor's use is one or 100 percent appropriated expression if the taking of 
that expression had no adverse effect on the copyrighted work. See Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra (100% of expression taken). 
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this conclusion, the Court purports to rely on on the district 
court factual findings that The Nation had taken "the heart of 
the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. This reliance is mis-
placed, and would appear to be another result of the Court's 
failure to distinguish between information and litarary form. 
When the District Court made this finding, it was evaluating 
not the quoted words at issue here but the "totality" of the 
information and reflective commentary in the Ford work. 
Ibid. The vast majority of what the District Court consid-
ered the heart of the Ford work, therefore, consisted of ideas 
and information The Nation was free to use. It may well be 
that, as a qualitative matter, most of the value of the manu-
script did lie in the information and ideas the Nation used. 
But appropriation of the "heart" of the manuscript in this 
sense is irrelevant to copyright analysis because copyright 
does not preclude a second author's use of information and 
ideas. 
Perhaps tacitly recognizing that reliance on the District 
Court finding is unjustifiable, the Court goes on to evaluate 
independently the quality of the expression appearing in The 
Nation's article. The Court states that "[t]he portions actu-
ally quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky as among the most 
powerful passages." Ante, at 23. On the basis of no more 
than this observation, and perhaps also inference from the 
fact that the quotes were important to The Nation's article, 24 
the Court adheres to its conclusion that The Nation appropri-
ated the heart of the Ford manuscript. ' 
At least with respect to the six particular quotes of Mr. 
Ford's observations and reflections about President Nixon, I 
agree with the Court's conclusion that The Nation appropri-
I presume, therefore, that the Court considered the role of the expression 
''in the infringing work" only as indirect evidence of the qualitative value of 
the expression taken in this case. If read this way, the point dovetails 
with the Court's major argument that The Nation appropriated the most 
valuable sentences of the work. 
u See note 23. 
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ated some literary form of substantial quality. I do not 
agree, however, that the substantiality of the expression 
taken was clearly excessive or inappropriate to The Nation's 
news reporting purpose. 
Had these quotations been used in the context of a critical 
book review of the Ford work, there is little question that 
such a use would be fair use within the meaning of § 107 of the 
Act. The amount and substantiality of the use-in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms-would have certainly 
been appropriate to the purpose of such a use. It is difficult 
to see how the use of these quoted words in a news report is 
less appropriate. The Court acknowledges as much: "even 
substantial quotations might qualify as a fair use in a review 
of a published work or a news account of a speech that had 
been delivered to the public." See ante, at 22. With re-
spect to the motivation for the pardon and the insights into 
the psyche of the fallen President, for example, Mr. Ford's 
reflections and perceptions are so laden with emotion and 
deeply. personal value judgments that full understanding is 
immeasurably enhanced by reproducing a limited portion of 
Mr. Ford's own words. The importance of the work, after 
all, lies not only in revelation of previously unknown fact but 
also in revelation of the thoughts, ideas, motivations, and 
fears of two presidents at a critical moment in our national 
history. Thus, while the question is not easily resolved, it is 
difficult to say that the use of the six quotations was gratu-
itous in relation to the news reporting purpose. 
Conceding that even substantial quotation is appropriate in 
a news report of a '[YUblished work, the Court would seem to 
agree that this quotation was not clearly inappropriate in 
relation to The Nation's news reporting purpose. For the 
Court, the determinative factor is again that the substan-
tiality of the use was inappropriate in relation to the pre-
publication timing of that use. That is really an objection to 
the effect of this use on the market for the copyrighted work, 
and is properly evaluated as such. 
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The Effect on the Market. The Court correctly notes that 
the effect on the market "is undoubtedly the single most im-
portant element of fair use." Ante, at 24, quoting 3 Nimmer 
on Copyright§ 13.05[A], at 13-76, and the Court properly fo-
cuses on whether The Nation's use adversely affected Harper 
& Row's serialization potential and not merely the market for 
sales of the Ford work itself. Ante, at 25. Unfortunately, 
the Court's failure to distinguish between the use of informa-
tion and the appropriation of literary form badly skews its 
analysis of this factor. 
For purposes of fair use analysis, the Court holds, it is suf-
ficient that the entire article containing the quotes eroded the 
serialization market potential of Mr. Ford's work. Ante, at 
25. On the basis of Time's cancellation of its serialization 
agreement, the Court finds that "[r ]arely will a case of copy-
right infringement present such a clear case of actual dam-
age." Ante, at 24. In essence, the Court finds that by 
using some quotes in a story about the Nixon pardon, The 
Nation "competed for a share of the market of prepublication 
excerpts" ante, at 26, because Time planned to excerpt from 
the chapters about the pardon. 
The Nation's publication indisputably precipitated Time's 
eventual cancellation. But that does not mean that The 
Nation's use of the 300 quoted words caused this injury to 
Harper & Row. Wholly apart from these quoted words, The 
Nation published significant information and ideas from the 
Ford manuscript. If it was this publication of information, 
and not the publication of the few quotations, that caused 
Time to abrogate its serialization agreement, then whatever 
the negative effect on the serialization market, that effect 
was the product of wholly legitimate activity. 
The Court of Appeals specifically held that "the evidence 
does not support a finding that it was the very limited use of 
expression per se which led to Time's decision not to print the 
excerpts." 723 F. 2d, at 208. I fully agree with this hold-
ing. If The Nation competed with Time, the competition 
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was not for a share of the market in excerpts of literary form 
but for a share of the market in the new information in the 
Ford work. That the information, and not the literary form, 
represents most of the real value of the work in this case is 
perhaps best revealed by the following provision in the con-
tract between Harper & Row and Mr. Ford: 
"Author acknowledges that the value of the rights 
granted to publisher hereunder would be substantially 
diminished by Author's public discussion of the unique 
information not previously disclosed about Author's ca-
reer and personal life which will be included in the Work, 
and Author agrees that Author will endeavor not to dis-
seminate any such information in any media, including 
television, radio and newspaper and magazine inter-
views prior to the first publication of the work here-
under." App. 484. 
The contract thus makes clear that Harper & Row sought to 
benefit substantially from monopolizing the initial revelation 
of information known only to Ford. 
Because The Nation was the first to convey the informa-
tion in this case, it did perhaps take from Harper & Row 
some of the value that publisher sought to garner for itself 
through the contractual arrangement with Ford and the li-
cense to Time. Harper & Row had every right to seek to 
monopolize revenue from that potential market through con-
tractual arrangements but it has no right to set up copyright 
a shield from competition in that market because copyright 
does not protect information. The Nation had every right to 
seek to be the first to publish that information. 
Balancing the Interests. Once the distinction between in-
formation and literary form is made clear, the statutorily pre-
scribed process of weighing the four statutory fair use factors 
discussed above leads naturally to a conclusion that The Na-
tion's limited use of literary form was not an infringement. 
Both the purpose of the use and the nature of the copyrighted 
work strongly favor the fair use defense here. The Nation 
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apppropriated Mr. Ford's expression for a purpose Congress 
expressly authorized in § 107 and borrowed from a work 
whose nature justifies some appropriation to facilitate the 
spread of information. The factor that is perhaps least fa-
vorable to the claim of fair use is the amount and substantial-
ity of the expression used. Without question, a portion of 
the expression appropriated was among the most poignant in 
the Ford manuscript. But it is difficult to conclude that this 
taking was excessive in relation to the news reporting pur-
pose. In any event, because the appropriation of literary 
form-as opposed to the use of information-was not shown 
to injure Harper & Row's economic interest, any uncertainty 
with respect to the propriety of the amount of expression 
borrowed should be resolved in favor of a finding of fair use. 25 
In light of the circumscribed scope of the quotation in The 
Nation's article and the undoubted validity of the purpose 
motivating that quotation, I must conclude that the Court 
has simply adopted an exceedingly narrrow view of fair use in 
order to impose liability for what was in essence a taking of 
unprotected information. 
III 
The Court's exceedingly narrow approach to fair use per-
mits Harper & Row to monopolize information. This holding 
"effects an important extension of property rights and a cor-
responding curtailment in the free use of knowledge and of 
ideas." International Ne:ws Service v. Associated Press, 248 
U. S., at 263 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Court· has per-
haps advanced the ability of the historian-or at least the 
211 Had The Nation sought to justify a more substantial appropriation of 
expression on a news reporting rationale, a different case might be pre-
sented. The substantiality of the taking would certainly dilute the claim of 
need to use the first author's exact words to convey a particular thought or 
sentiment. Even if the claim of need were plausible, the equities would 
have to favor the copyright owner in order to prevent erosion of virtually 
all copyright protection for works of former public officials. In this case, 
however, the need is manifest and the integrity of copyright protection for 
the works of public officials is not threatened. 
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public official who has recently left office-to capture the full 
economic value of information in his or her possession. But 
the Court does so only by risking the robust debate of public 
issues that is the "essence of self-government." Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U. S., at 74-75. The Nation was providing 
the grist for that robust debate. The Court imposes liability 
upon The Nation for no other reason than that The Nation 
succeeded in being the first to provide certain information to 
the public. I dissent. 
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